

ISSN 1059-9770

# U.S.-JAPAN WOMEN'S JOURNAL

日米女性ジャーナル

A Journal for the International  
Exchange of Gender Studies

NUMBER 41 2011



Jōsai International Center for the  
Promotion of Art and Science,  
Jōsai University  
Purdue University

『日米女性ジャーナル』は、日米間を中心に、しかし他地域も加えたグローバルな視点に立ったジェンダー研究の学術交流、情報交換を目的として、1988年の創刊以来、女性問題、男性問題、家族、労働、社会問題、文化研究等、幅広い分野をカバーし、学術論文、時事問題、インタビュー、資料等を掲載して日本語で出版してきました。1991年より、日本のジェンダー研究・情報の海外への紹介、海外での日本研究の普及、日米比較研究の奨励を目的として「英語版(English Supplement)」が出版されました。1995年10月より日米女性センター、城西大学国際学術文化振興センター(元城西大学国際文化教育センター)、パーデュー大学が共同で製作してまいりましたが、1997年8月より編集・発行所が城西大学に移りました。現在、城西大学国際学術文化振興センターとパーデュー大学史学科が共同製作しております。2000年度、「日本語版」は廃刊となりました。現在の『日米女性ジャーナル』は、English Supplement 時代から継続した号数を採用しております。

The purpose of the *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* is to exchange scholarship on women and gender between the U.S., Japan and other countries, to enlarge the base of information available in Japan on the status of American women as well as women in other countries, to disseminate information on Japanese women to the U.S. and other countries, and to stimulate the comparative study of women's issues. Until 2000, the *U.S.-Japan's Women's Journal* was published in both Japanese (*Nichibei Josei Journal*, ISSN 0898-8900) and English (*English Supplement*, ISSN 1059-9770). The current issue numbers are continuous with those for what was formerly known as the "English Supplement." From October 1995, the journal was produced jointly by the U.S.-Japan Women's Center, Jōsai International Center for the Promotion of Art and Science (formerly known as the Center for Inter-Cultural Studies and Education) and Purdue University. In August 1997, the production department moved to Jōsai University. The journal is now co-produced by the Jōsai International Center for the Promotion of Art and Science and the Purdue University Department of History.

#### 日本での購読 (Subscriptions in Japan)

購読料: 「日本語版」第20-27号 各2,500円、第16-19号 各2,300円、第1-15号 各2,000円(第2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 23号品切れ。他号も残部少) 日本語版は第27号で廃刊となります。

「英語版」 第41号2,500円、第40号2,500円、第39号2,500円、第38号2,500円、第37号2,500円、第36号2,500円、第35号2,500円、第34号2,500円、第33号2,500円、第32号2,500円、第30-31号(合併号)5,000円、第22-29号各2,500円、第20-21(合併号)5,000円、第10-19号各2,500円、第6-9号 各2,300円、第1-5号 各2,000円

購読申し込みおよび問い合わせ先: 城西大学国際学術文化振興センター

〒350-0295 埼玉県坂戸市けやき台1-1 Tel: (049) 271-7731 Fax: (049) 271-7981

購読料振り込み先: 郵便振替 00160-7-62423

または、埼玉りそな銀行、学校法人城西大学普通預金口座 56700

Subscriptions outside Japan (see the subscription information page)

Send orders to Jōsai International Center for the Promotion of Art and Science

Jōsai University

1-1 Keyakidai, Sakado-shi, Saitama-ken, Japan 350-0295.

Tel. (049) 271-7731

FAX: (049) 271-7981

E-mail: rev-jou@josai.ac.jp

**Price per issue \$17.50 (¥2,500).**

**For more information on back issues, see subscription information at back of journal.**

© All rights reserved. No part of the contents of the journal may be reproduced without the written permission of the publisher.

Printed in Tokyo, Japan.

ISSN 1059-9770

**U.S.–JAPAN WOMEN’S JOURNAL**  
**A Journal for the International Exchange of Gender Studies**

**Editors-in-Chief**

Jan Bardsley	University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Sally A. Hastings	Purdue University
Noriko Mizuta	Jōsai International Center for the Promotion of Art and Science, Jōsai University

**Managing Editor**

Miriam Murase

**Associate Editors**

Rebecca L. Copeland	Washington University
Barbara Molony	Santa Clara University
Patricia Tsurumi	University of Victoria
Chizuko Ueno	University of Tokyo
Haruko Wakita	Shiga Prefectural University
Anne Walthall	University of California at Irvine

**Copy Editor**

Victoria R. M. Scott

**Editorial and Production Staff**


Koichi Haga	Jōsai International University
Mutsumi Kadowaki	Jōsai International University
Natta Phisphumvidhi	

**Editorial Advisory Board**

Laura L. Carstensen	Stanford University
Rey Chow	University of California at Irvine
Carol Gluck	Columbia University
Hiroko Hara	Ochanomizu University
Kiyomi Kawano	Feminist Counselor
Irmela Hijjya-Kirschnereit	German Institute for Japanese Studies
Susan J. Pharr	Harvard University
Joseph H. Pleck	University of Illinois at Urbana
Gayatri C. Spivak	Columbia University
Myra H. Strober	Stanford University
Hideo Totsuka	Center for Transnational Labor Studies
Masao Yamaguchi	Sapporo University

**Founding Editor**

Yoko Kawashima	Ochanomizu University, Institute for Gender Studies (formerly)
----------------	--



# U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal

Number 41 2011

## CONTENTS

- “The Private League of Nations”:  
The Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference and  
Japanese Feminists in 1928  
— 『私設国際連盟』：—1928年汎太平洋婦人会議  
と日本人フェミニストについての考察— Taeko Shibahara 3
- Home Education in Rural Japan: Continuity and Change  
from Late Edo to the Early Postwar  
— 農村の女性の家族教育：江戸後期から  
戦後初期にわたる変化と連続性 Christina Ghanbarpour 25
- From Compensating Comfort Women to Compensated Dating  
— 従軍慰安婦の支援から援助交際へ Sharon Kinsella 52
- A Room of Their Own: Time, Space, and the Self-Perceptions  
of Married Couples in Japan  
— 日本の30代の夫婦の共有する時間、空間、  
そしてカップルとしての意識 Dalit Bloch 72
- Young Women / “Bad Girls” in Kirino Natsuo’s *Real World*  
— 桐野夏生の「リアルワールド」における  
若い女性／“不良少女” Barbara E. Thornbury 102



---

## **“The Private League of Nations”: The Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference and Japanese Feminists in 1928**

**Taeko Shibahara**

During the interwar period, from August 9 to 19, 1928, over two hundred women from Asia and the West around the Pacific Ocean convened in Honolulu, Hawai‘i. This meeting, the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference (PPWC), was the first women’s international forum held in the Pacific. Acknowledging the correlation between national and international women’s issues, Japanese delegates such as Ide Kikue were willing to collaborate with other women by asking: “How can we work and help each other internationally toward the solution of the problems so vital and so important to us all?”<sup>1</sup>

“On behalf of the members of the delegation from Japan, . . . we are very glad that we are here to discuss matters freely, so that we may be able to be a link in a chain which will connect the world in length and strength, and in light and trust.”<sup>2</sup> These were the words with which Gauntlett (née Yamada) Tsune, vice-chair of the Japanese delegation to the PPWC, greeted the audience of the PPWC. Gauntlett believed that the PPWC was a private international forum that provided a “public” space in which to address and women’s specific national issues and link them as common women’s issues; otherwise, such specific issues would continue to be dismissed within states. By identifying women’s

---

**Taeko Shibahara** received her Ph.D. in American Studies from Doshisha University in 2010. While teaching at Ryukoku University, she is revising her dissertation for publication. She is the author of “Through Americanized Japanese Woman’s Eyes,” *The Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 1, no. 2 (May 2010); “How Did Japanese Women Peace Activists Interact with European Women as They Negotiated with Nationalism and Transnational Peace Activism to Promote Peace in the Interwar Period?” *Women and Social Movements in the United States, 1600 to the Present* 16, no. 1 (March 2011); and “‘Not only for the Welfare of the Nation but for the World and Humanity’: The Interwar Suffrage Movement in Japan,” *Journal of Women’s History* 24, no. 2 (Summer 2012).

issues across national borders, women could influence the official policies concerning women within their respective nations and also, in the case of certain transnational issues such as prostitution, exert influence on an international level.

The purpose of this essay is to explore Japanese women’s activism in the PPWC. Women’s activism did not, of course begin in 1928; Japanese women had been active for decades in moral reform, anti-prostitution activities, and in efforts to secure political rights. This essay, however, is not concerned with the development of the Japanese women’s movement up to 1928. Focusing on the 1928 PPWC, it addresses four themes: (1) the background to holding the PPWC in Hawai‘i; (2) Japanese reactions; (3) general observations about the PPWC; and (4) Japanese women’s specific tactics that linked national feminists’ issues with those of international women activists.

This essay builds on the work of earlier scholars. Over the last few decades, while exploring international women’s activism and Japanese women, historians have provided various interpretations of “the interplay of empire and activism.”<sup>3</sup> For example, Ogawa Manako’s work shows how activists in the Japanese World’s Woman’s Temperance Union (WCTU) appropriated Japanese women’s agency in the “Orientalized” international women’s community in the early twentieth century. Ogawa argues that these women supported both “global sisterhood” and “male dominated nationalism,” and that in doing so, they did not challenge the broad current of white-dominated racial and cultural hierarchy.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, Elizabeth Dorn Lublin sheds light on the “political tactics”<sup>5</sup> that the Japanese WCTU women applied to achieving their reform goals, which included the abolishment of prostitution and the creation of a sober society. Lublin’s use of the phrase “political tactics” is important because it suggests that the Japanese WCTU women strategically and selectively promoted the reform movement, taking local socio-political and cultural conditions into account rather than merely re-employing activist strategies promoted by Western women. Further, examining those tactics, Lublin highlights the dynamics of power relations among individual members of the WCTU and other reform organizations. Lublin thus argues that the WCTU women embraced all three of their identities—as Christians, Japanese, and women—in pursuing their goal of promoting “the ‘betterment’ of individuals and society.”<sup>6</sup>

Yasutake Rumi’s research about Japanese women activists, the PPWCs, and the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association, a permanent organization developed from the PPWC in 1930, further advances our understanding of the interplay between Western and Christian women and Japanese women leaders in promoting activism globally.



Yasutake shows in full detail (1) how Anglo-American missionary women had paved the way for forming a transnational churchwomen's network in Japan, including the WCTU and the Young Women's Christian Association, since the late nineteenth century; (2) how Anglo-American missionary descendants in Hawai'i, who advocated Anglo-American-led Pan-Pacific internationalism during the interwar years, initiated the PPWC; (3) how activists in such Christian-originated women's networks promoted secular activism in the ways that they included their Japanese sisters; and (4) in these contexts, how those Japanese women formed the Japan Women's Committee for International Relations.<sup>7</sup> In Yasutake's interpretation, Japanese Christian and urban women activists modeled themselves on their American "teachers' cultural values and hierarchical worldview,"<sup>8</sup> and willingly collaborated with Anglo-American women at a time when the imperial ambitions of both Japan and the Anglo-American nations had intensified. In so doing, these Japanese women successfully joined "the rising tide of women's international movements centered in Europe" in the 1930s.<sup>9</sup> Thus Yasutake's research indicates that, as was true for Anglo-American women, the activism promoted by Japanese urban, middle-class women tended to sustain empire during the interwar period.

Overall, these studies sustain the position that Japanese women's activism was under the influence of transnational, Anglo-American Christian activism—or that Japanese women's activism was linked with that of Anglo-American women's transnational activism—and that Japanese women utilized American models to advance their own status in Japan. At the same time, Lublin's viewpoint offers the key to an understanding of local women's tactics to achieve their reform goals.

### **Building Bridges over the Pacific:**

#### **The Background to Holding the PPWC in Hawai'i**

Although, the 1928 PPWC was the first female international conference in the Pacific, the idea of holding such a gathering was originally proposed at a male-organized conference. In 1924, when a New Zealand legislator, Mark Cohen, attended the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference organized under the auspices of the Pan-Pacific Union (PPU), he was inspired by the welfare activities of feminists in Hawai'i, including Mrs. Francis M. Swanzy, and suggested holding "a women's and mothers' conference."<sup>10</sup> Alexander Hume Ford, the director of the PPU, immediately adopted this idea and set up the machinery for a women's "Motherhood and Child Welfare Conference" as part of a series

of other Pan-Pacific conferences organized by the PPU, including ones on Science, the Commercial, Press, Research, Conservation, Food, and Ethics.<sup>11</sup>

Both Ford and many of the descendants of U.S. Protestant missionaries—“Hawaii’s Haole (white) elite men,” to borrow Yasutake’s phrase—promoted “Pan-Pacific internationalism.”<sup>12</sup> The term can be defined as the establishment of peace and stability in the Pacific and the world under the leadership of Anglo-American social reformers. This was systematized in two male-led organizations in Hawai‘i: the PPU in 1917, and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1925.<sup>13</sup> Although women were under-represented, the fact that they participated in conferences held by these organizations in Hawai‘i eventually paved the way for holding the PPWC.<sup>14</sup>

Most importantly, those Anglo-American reformers’ ideals were supported by “other” male leaders who sought to advance their nations’ economic and diplomatic interests, and Western liberalism as well.<sup>15</sup> Some of these men had created local Pan-Pacific Clubs within their own nations, including in Tokyo and Osaka in Japan, that were affiliated with the PPU.<sup>16</sup> Others had organized National Councils for the IPR so as to research and report local problems.<sup>17</sup> While the PPU promoted “the closest peace and harmony and cooperation effort [among] all people and races of the Pacific,”<sup>18</sup> the IPR aimed to study “the conditions of the Pacific peoples with the view to improvement of the mutual relations.”<sup>19</sup> Thus it is possible to argue that Pan-Pacific internationalism, or what Ford termed “the Pan-Pacific Movement,”<sup>20</sup> created the discourse that Hawai‘i was the crossroads of the Pacific, where people of the Pacific shared mutual prosperity and peace with each other by accepting the leadership of the U.S. It was under these circumstances that the PPWC was organized.

Before entering into a detailed discussion of the PPWC, it is worth reflecting on the fundamental concerns in the Pacific during the 1920s that underlay the promotion of the Pan-Pacific movement. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), Japan had successfully joined the Great Powers and strengthened its regional power through territorial and economic expansion and treaty agreements.<sup>21</sup> Later, as other Great Powers began to seek to a balance of powers through disarmament and international cooperation after World War I, Japan gained a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations and committed itself to the promotion of international cooperation—until it withdrew from the League in 1933. In particular, in the early 1920s, Japan facilitated a friendly relationship with the U.S. under the “Washington Conference system,” or “a network of interrelated agreements [made at the Washington Conference (1921–22)],”

which formulated the Pacific policy and security during the 1920s.<sup>22</sup> Specifically, in terms of relationship with China, both the U.S. and Japan agreed, in the Nine-Power Treaty ratified in 1922, to cooperate in taking advantage of the possibilities of the Chinese market and resources.<sup>23</sup>

However, there were inevitable conflicts between the U.S. and Japan. For example, the Immigration Act of 1924, which placed a complete ban on Japanese entry into the U.S., spoiled bilateral friendly relations.<sup>24</sup> Further, Japan's military intervention against China, begun in 1927 under the rhetoric of protecting Japanese nationals and Japanese interests, signaled Japan's increasing militarization. At the same time, the U.S. began to increase its aid to the Nationalist government of China.<sup>25</sup> As Fiona Paisley writes, the PPWC was organized in the face of such changing geopolitical relations between the U.S., China, and Japan.<sup>26</sup>

Japan's overpopulation was another concern, because it was considered to affect the security of the world's food supply and future resources (Fig. 1). Despite its inclusion among the Great Powers, Japan was poor in resources and had to depend on imports, including imports of food, to support its increasing population.<sup>27</sup> The PPU had thus identified Japan's increasing population as a danger in terms of "the conservation of food and products in the Pacific."<sup>28</sup> Likewise, the IPR referred to Japan's overpopulation, and to the diplomatic issues concerning China and Manchuria, as three obstacles that prevented peace in the Pacific.<sup>29</sup> We shall later see how Japanese women responded to this issue.



Figure 1: "Japan's problem is the world's problem—the child." *The Mid-Pacific Magazine* 36, no. 2 (February 1928), back cover. Courtesy of the Library of Doshisha University.

Both American and Japanese women took advantage of these circumstances to emerge on the Pacific stage as active, transnational political players in holding the 1928 PPWC. First of all, in 1924, taking up Alexander Hume Ford's plan, Mrs. Francis M. Swanzy (who was later called "the Mother of the Conference") and other social reformers

in Hawai‘i quickly organized the Conference Committee, in preparation for holding the first international women’s conference in the Pacific.<sup>30</sup> In 1925, Catharine E. B. Cox, chairperson of the Education section of the forthcoming PPWC, sent a notice and plans for a pamphlet about the conference to Ichikawa Fusae of the Women’s Suffrage League of Japan (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei), requesting “any suggestions in regard to subjects to be handled”—thus clearly showing that, early in the planning stages, the Committee expected Japanese women’s participation in the conference.<sup>31</sup> Given that Japan’s large population was considered a threat to the world’s food supply, and that its increasing imperialistic and militaristic power threatened regional stability in the Pacific, the situation in Japan, and Asia in general, must have been one of the American feminists’ greatest concerns.<sup>32</sup>

In planning the gathering, however, these women did not literally follow Ford’s advice to have a “Motherhood and Child Welfare Conference.” In fact, they modified and expanded the original idea in such a way that the conference was to cover five themes important to the women’s rights movement in the West in the post-suffrage era: Health, Education, Women in Industry, Women in Government, and Social Service.<sup>33</sup> The conference makers therefore requested national delegates to present their papers dealing with specific national issues in these five sections. Rather than hold a general women’s conference, the planners saw the conference as part of the globalizing women’s rights movement, which increasingly addressed women’s responsibility to promote peace and social justice in the world.<sup>34</sup>

On these grounds, Mrs. Francis M. Swanzy made the conference’s ambitions clear in her speech at the PPWC. She emphasized:

In this day, when woman is taking her place in world affairs, it is both a proper and essential thing that she should have the opportunity offered by such a conference as this, to present the ‘problems of women’ and to bring to bear the results of wider varied experience in dealing with those problems.<sup>35</sup>

Swanzy encouraged participants to recognize that women’s problems were commonly experienced internationally, and that as a result women could find solutions, both in national and international political arenas, only by cooperating internationally.

In part, the importance of women themselves holding the conference reveals the lack of women’s perspectives and actual presence at other conferences sponsored by the PPU. Australian delegate Eleanor M. Hinder, who was conference program secretary to the PPWC, articulated this, noting that “though the status of women has been equal, their

numerical strength has been far below that of the men who were delegates [in other Pan-Pacific conferences].”<sup>36</sup> All the more reason that the PPWC seemed important for women.

However, we may recall that the conference contained some Eurocentric elements. For example, the official language was English throughout. This marginalized participants who could not understand English, including teachers from Japan. In addition, non-Western sisters were requested to wear their ethnic and traditional costumes at social events. Although this practice highlighted the cultural diversity among participants, it also allowed Western participants to recognize differences between their own “modern” and “advanced” cultures and other participants’ traditional ones.<sup>37</sup> As already mentioned, the conference makers did ask for suggestions from non-Western women in advance, such as Ichikawa. The themes and programs covered in the conference, however, were determined by the Conference Committee, prompting Ichikawa to later confess that the “delegates and themes of the Government section were less impressive than I had expected.”<sup>38</sup>

Under these circumstances, Western sisters’ approach to the organization of the conference does appear to have been Eurocentric. That is, Western women promoted social activism overseas based on their trust in Western political models, which overlooked non-Western or local conditions. They relied, moreover, on women using the power of the ballot, which was not universally available outside the Western countries. Such activism was also often a vehicle for exporting Western values and gender norms that emphasized women’s unique role in civilization, as agents of the “moral improvement” of “less civilized” people. More importantly, via such an international activism—a program expanded in tandem with the expansion of imperialism—Western women empowered themselves within their own imperial states.<sup>39</sup>

However, despite such elements in the Western women’s work for the PPWC, this first group encounter between Western and Asian feminists allows us to explore the complex nature of women’s transnational relationships and move beyond the concept of a simple, dichotomous power relation between the West and Asia. When confined to this simple view, Asian women’s agency has often been overlooked. In fact, as conference makers called for the meeting, women not only from the U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Hawai‘i but also from China, Fuji, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Samoa indicated their intention to participate in the PPWC in 1928. Japanese women formed one of the largest delegations, with eighteen official delegates, four associate delegates, and three observers.<sup>40</sup> As Gauntlett said, “By working hard for several months we were able to gather together many women, representative of different interests in

Japan.” Like Gauntlett herself, these women were confident in their identity, asserting that “we are not representing our government, but come representing groups of people.”<sup>41</sup>

### **Japanese Reactions: Sending Delegates to the PPWC and Public Perceptions**

Nevertheless, it was Alexander Hume Ford and the Pan-Pacific Association of Japan (Nihon Han Taiheiyō Kyōkai, the Japanese affiliate of the PPU) that took the initiative when it came to Japanese women’s participation in the PPWC. Both Ford, visiting Japan twice in 1926 and 1927, and Tokugawa Iesato, president of the Pan-Pacific Association of Japan and chair of the House of Peers (Kizoku In), encouraged a small number of women leaders to form an expediting committee to choose delegates to the conference.<sup>42</sup> In response, nine women leaders from organizations such as the Tokyo Women Federation (Tokyo Rengō Fujinkai), the Japanese WCTU, and the Women’s Peace Association in Japan (Fujin Heiwa Kyōkai, WPAJ)<sup>43</sup> started the Delegates Selection Committee (Daihyō Senkō Iinkai), a committee to choose delegates to the PPWC within the Pan-Pacific Association of Japan.<sup>44</sup> These women leaders—such as Inoue Hide and Gauntlett Tsune, who served as chair and vice-chair of the Japanese delegation to the PPWC, respectively—had attended earlier international conferences sponsored by the WCTU, the International Woman’s Suffrage Alliance, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Thus these women were not only familiar with the current of the internationalizing feminist movement, but also aware of the necessity for Japanese women’s presence at international women’s conferences as women representative of Japan.<sup>45</sup>

The Delegates Selection Committee issued invitations to Japanese women’s organizations and asked them to nominate and finance a delegate. In response, eight organizations chose a representative.<sup>46</sup> In addition to Inoue and Gauntlett, the delegates included Ichikawa Fusae, Yoshioka Yayoi of the Japan Women’s Medical Association (Nippon Joikai), Fujita Taki of the Women’s English School (Joshi Eigakujuku) and the Young Women’s Christian Association of Japan (Joshi Seinenkai), and Ide Kikue of the Pan-Pacific Association of Osaka (Osaka Han Taiheiyō Kyōkai).

In fact, participating in and choosing delegates to the PPWC attracted a lot of attention in Japan, and was described by Ichikawa as “an unprecedented sensation.”<sup>47</sup> For example, the Federation of Primary School Women’s Teachers’ Association (Zenkoku Shōgakkō Jokyōiinkai) decided to send six delegates, including Kiuchi Kyō, even though none could speak English or had been invited by the Inoue-led committee.<sup>48</sup> For these teachers, in light of contemporary social conditions and the general gist of the PPWC,

issues of working women and educating children were of vital importance. Yet almost all the delegates so far were famous educators in higher educational institutions who could never represent “general women,” including Japan’s 70,000 women teachers, these teachers insisted.<sup>49</sup> Criticizing the Inoue-led committee as a mere closed-door body based on elitism, the teachers determined to send their own delegates to the PPWC. Those chosen, including Kiuchi, held a fund-raising music concert, collected donations from fellow teachers, and gained the financial support of Shibusawa Eiichi, a leading entrepreneur, philanthropist, and an honorary vice-president of the PPU.<sup>50</sup>

In the wake of this dispute, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* newspaper called for readers’ participation in electing a delegate to the PPWC. The newspaper planned to have general readers select one delegate who would address the issues of working women and their working conditions as a representative of the newspaper company.<sup>51</sup> More importantly, the newspaper advised its readers that “to send highly authoritative women delegates to the international arena is Japanese women’s important duty.” With this statement, the newspaper assumed that Japan’s women delegates would stand as role models for other Asian women. Just as Western women were considered in their own countries to play a unique role in civilizing other women, so the *Yomiuri Shimbun* insisted on the need for Japanese women’s leadership in Asian nations, thus asserting Japan’s leading status in Asia. Of course, the newspaper acknowledged that Japanese women’s current (unequal) status in society was an “illogical anachronism” that was not appropriate to Japan’s “modernized” and “civilized” status. Nevertheless, by drawing a parallel between Japanese women’s roles and those of Western women, it argued that Japan’s internationally competitive women delegates mirrored the superiority of Japan’s status in Asia.<sup>52</sup>

The issue of who could serve as national delegates to the PPWC deserves further attention because it derived from the extension of gender roles and ideal womanhood in Japanese society. Although Japanese women were not yet able to participate directly in politics by means of the ballot, they were an integral part of national policies. Remaining in the private sphere, they were expected to support the state by means of production of industrial goods and reproduction of citizens. Moreover, a nationalized notion of womanhood—that of the “good wife and wise mother” (*ryōsai kenbo*)—fixed the ideology of such gender roles.<sup>53</sup> Thus the *Yomiuri Shimbun* described the purpose of the conference as “to bring about peace by exerting the force of women.”<sup>54</sup> That is, PPWC delegates were expected to establish friendly relations among women of the Pacific, in concert with the government’s negotiation with the international community over disarmament issues and imperial ambitions.<sup>55</sup>

Added to this—as readers’ participation in selecting a PPWC delegate demonstrated—the Japanese public expected Japanese women to make their debut on the international stage to represent women as well as the state. Accordingly, the *Yomiuri Shimbun*’s month-long public vote reached a climax and selected Shōda Yoshiko, a U.S.-educated professor at Japan Women’s University, with 110,075 out of 335,284 votes.<sup>56</sup>

Yet this flurry of activity did not mean that all Japanese women supported sending delegates to the PPWC. Even “general” teachers were not able to represent “general working women,” many of whom found it difficult to support the PPWC. It is fair to say that Japanese feminists were divided as to whether or not an international conference could usefully advance goals for Japanese women. For example, a proletarian women’s organization, the National Women’s League (*Zenkoku Fujin Dōmei*), opposed itself to the PPWC. In its view, the promoters of the Pan-Pacific movement were none other than imperialists. Such imperialists in Japan, while giving lip service to peace, accepted Japan’s military intervention in China under the rhetoric of protecting the Japanese in China. Identifying the PPWC and the Pan-Pacific movement with imperialism, those proletarian women were cautious about the cooperative interplay between the feminist movement and imperialism. Unlike bourgeois feminists, they argued, only proletarian




Figure 2: “A farewell luncheon at the Pan-Pacific Club of Tokyo to the Japanese delegates to the First Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference, President Viscount Inouye presiding.” *The Mid-Pacific Magazine* 36, no. 6 (December 1928): 465. Courtesy of the Library of Doshisha University.



women were true pacifists who opposed the China intervention, and who hoped none of their male family members fell victim to those imperialists.<sup>57</sup> In a certain sense, their criticism was appropriate, since the planning for the PPWC proceeded on the assumption that there were no animosities between races and classes in Hawai‘i.<sup>58</sup> Without doubt, the PPWC was a privileged, bourgeois-centered conference that hardly appealed to Japanese working-class women, whose working and living conditions were far from satisfactory.<sup>59</sup> As the Marxist feminist Yamakawa Kikue put it, the PPWC was “neither good nor bad” for Japanese women because it would not change Japanese women’s status in society.<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, Japanese women who did support the PPWC had various expectations about participating in it (Fig. 2). For example, Ichikawa’s reason for attending was “to take advantage of it and to advance the women’s rights movement in Japan.”<sup>61</sup> For Inoue, the PPWC was a forum for expressing how Japanese women supported both nationalism and internationalism based on women’s perspectives.<sup>62</sup> As she wrote shortly before the conference:

Given the fact that Japan is suffering from overpopulation and food shortage, no wonder the rest of the world thinks that Japan has international ambitions. In the coming conference, I am going to address how Japanese women are trying to economize in reaction to increasing shortages, and how Japanese women are struggling to maintain life.<sup>63</sup>

Inoue prepared her paper to indicate that Japanese women’s activism to alleviate the problems of food and population was connected with national as well as international problems, thus simultaneously addressing both national and feminist concerns.

Further, although she was not a delegate, Wada (Kōra) Tomi, a U.S.-educated Ph.D. and pacifist, thought that the PPWC would broaden feminist consciousness among bourgeois feminists in a way that would lead them to reconfigure their relationship with their own states. In her mind, exchange of information about women’s issues at the PPWC, including such topics as infant mortality rate and working conditions of women mill workers, would help Japanese bourgeois feminists recognize links between their lives and those of women from different classes and races. Wada thought that this would, in turn, foster a new sense of women’s roles in society, which were certainly different from those disseminated under the traditional confines of Japanese notions of womanhood.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, although the significance of the PPWC varied depending on their causes for activism, these Japanese women saw the conference as providing increasing opportunity to advance the feminist movement in Japan.

### The First Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference in Hawai‘i in 1928

In August 1928, with Honolulu resonating with the expectations of the Japanese delegates (and no doubt those of other participants as well), PPWC President Jane Addams (1860–1935)—the pioneer settlement worker and first president of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom—spoke powerfully at the opening ceremony (Fig. 3):

I am sure the interchange of achievement and honest opinion in this women’s conference of ours will give us all new courage and enthusiasm and that we shall realize as we go along that many problems cannot possibly be solved by any one country, unless their solution is undertaken by other countries as well.<sup>65</sup>




Figure 3: “Miss Jane Addams, of Hull House, international chairman of the First Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference, 1928, being greeted by the director of the Pan-Pacific Union, Alexander Hume Ford.” *The Mid-Pacific Magazine* 37, no. 4 (April–June 1928): 302. Courtesy of the Library of Doshisha University.

For Addams, who had promoted social justice and peace nationally and transnationally since the late nineteenth century, an exchange of ideas among delegates with different socio-cultural backgrounds was certainly the most important way to pursue the goals of the conference. She believed that sharing women’s different experiences and struggles was essential to solving the problems encountered internationally by women. Yet up until then, women’s participation and perspectives had been largely missing from international conferences. Therefore, to solve their problems, as Addams noted, women needed to “not only meet to talk together, but to discover topics of mutual concerns which we could discover in no other way.”<sup>66</sup>

For this purpose, the conference makers had designed the agenda to include various meetings in each of the five sections (Health, Education, Women in Industry, Women in Government, and Social Service). They also adopted a “round table” method

for the first time in women's conferences, which quickly became symbolic of the spirit of the conference, for it was used to facilitate mutual communication, nurture critical thinking, and provide particular parties with the opportunity to change their minds. Such attempts to increase intercultural communication were also strengthened through socialization programs that included luncheons, dinners, sightseeing, and entertainment.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, the conference was designed to facilitate oral communication among participants.

One of the tests of this intercultural communication came when Gauntlett requested that the planners include "the question of Traffic in Women" as a theme of discussion in the Social Service section (Fig. 4).<sup>68</sup> Being herself a member of the Japanese WCTU, committed to the movement to abolish prostitution in Japan, she insisted that prostitution issues in Japan were women's rights issues that transcended national borders. Based on this awareness, she presented her paper, titled "League of Nations Treaty on Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, and the Anti-Vice Movement in Japan," in the Social Service section. In her paper, Gauntlett explained the historical and social backgrounds of prostitution and of the anti-prostitution movement in Japan.<sup>69</sup> Then she emphasized that although "not only the traffic in women but also the traffic in all human beings is




Figure 4: "The Social Service Section was presided over by Dr. Valeria Parker; Mrs. Tsune Gauntlett of Japan and Mrs. T. E. Taylor of New Zealand were chairmen; Dr. Mildred Staley was also a member of this committee." *The Mid-Pacific Magazine* 36, no. 6 (December 1928): 438. Courtesy of the Library of Doshisha University.

strictly prohibited” by Japanese modern law, “the fact is contrary to the spirit of the law, and licensed quarters with hundreds of ‘houses of vice’ exist in nearly all the large cities.” She pointed out that this discrepancy between the spirit of the law and flourishing prostitution was in fact institutionalized by the “licensed system of prostitution” rhetoric that the government used to explain the Japanese situation vis-à-vis the League of Nations Treaty on Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children. For Gauntlett, the government justified its double standard by noting that the control of licensed houses fell partly under prefectural regulations, and that licensed quarters protected public health as a whole by segregating prostitutes from the rest of the society.<sup>70</sup>

Gauntlett raised the issue of prostitution and the struggles of anti-prostitution activists in Japan in a period when Western feminists agreed that the “question of morality” needed to be on the agenda of international women’s conferences and that women had a special responsibility to deal with a double standard of morality.<sup>71</sup> In this context, for instance, international women’s organizations such as the International Council of Women and the International Woman Suffrage Alliance lobbied the League of Nations to add the trafficking issue to its convention in 1919. As a result, the suppression of the traffic in women and children was stipulated in Article 23 (c) of the Covenant of the League of Nations.<sup>72</sup> The League also founded an Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Women and Children in 1921 that included an American social reformer, Grace Abbott. Encouraged by Abbott, the League conducted a survey on trafficking in women and published the final report in 1927.<sup>73</sup> However, given this organization’s Western focus, women in similar circumstances in Asia remained invisible.<sup>74</sup>

Thus, Gauntlett emphasized, “we believe that there should be one standard of morality for both sexes,” and insisted, “May I not dare to tell you that the existence of this legalized vice is a disgrace and menace not only to our nation, but [that] it is [a] common disgrace to womanhood of the world?”<sup>75</sup> In this way, Gauntlett showed the linkage between a specific Japanese issue and women’s broader and internationally common concerns for social justice.

The result of the presentation of her paper was the round-table discussion on the topic of “Traffic in Women and Children—An International Problem,” and two resolutions. First, delegates from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippine Islands, and the United States, as well as Japan, reported prostitution and the government policies in each local context. After round-table discussions, the PPWC unanimously passed resolutions. Those were:

to the Body of Experts on Traffic in Women and Children of the League of Nations, “to investigate thoroughly conditions in those countries within this area [the Pacific basin] which have not already been examined”; and, to the women in the Pacific area, “to do all in their power to influence their governments to carry out the recommendations of the League of Nations Report on the Traffic in Women and Children, including those urging the employment of women police and the abolitions of state regulations and of licensed houses.”<sup>76</sup> To give efficacy to these resolutions, Eleanor Hinder telegraphed Rachel E. Crowdy, Chief of the Department of Opium Traffic and Social Issues Section of the League of Nations. She encouraged Crowdy to include human trafficking issues in the Pacific area in her presentation of the report of her section to the League Assembly:

The Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference is of the opinion that it would be of great value to the countries of the Pacific Basin if the Body of Reports on the Traffic in Women and Children of the League of Nations, would continue to investigate, thoroughly, conditions of those countries within this area which have not already been examined. It is the opinion of more than one person that by this action, the very great work of this section for the women of the world has become nearer to women of the Pacific in a way that it has never been possible for it to do before.<sup>77</sup>

Thus the PPWC and its national delegates, including Japanese women, politicized national women’s issues as being inclusive both of other Pacific women and of women all over the world. By doing so, these women were able to address together problems of women nationally and internationally. Because of the “internationalization of women’s problems,” the participants came to the conclusion that they could utilize the League of Nations as a forum to solve international women’s problems, including in the Pacific.

It is clear that the participants in the 1928 PPWC shared this recognition of the “internationalization of women’s problems.” For example, Elizabeth Green of the IPR articulated that “almost every item brought forward for consideration was discussed eventually in its international aspects,” and therefore participants discovered “wherein solutions were themselves inextricably international in character.”<sup>78</sup> More importantly, the consequence of this discovery was “the recognition of the fact that women must find places in international parliaments if they are to affect foreign policies and the carrying out of international covenants.” Green’s analyses show that the participants of the PPWC developed a different perspective from that of the PPU, which advocated the Pan-Pacific movement. Unlike the PPU, participants of the PPWC were not satisfied simply with the

formation of a peace network in the Pacific based on female solidarity. Rather, as they located the root of the women’s problems in international injustice, they determined to take responsible positions in both national and international political arenas. In fact, this determination marked the emergence of a new form of feminist consciousness developed via interactive communication during the PPWC.

### **Conclusion**

Although Alexander Hume Ford financially supported women in holding the PPWC, based on his ideal to “create a patriotism of the Pacific,” both American and Japanese feminists interpreted Ford’s idea for a conference as an opportunity to empower women. Male and female social activists alike were committed to promoting peace in the Pacific, but they approached doing so via gender-specific strategies: whereas men wanted to move toward this common goal by balancing military and economic powers among nations, women wanted to promote peace by promoting human welfare.

The PPWC was the first transnational public forum in which Western and Japanese women supportively exchanged views and ideas to promote feminist causes—a fact that challenges the simple analysis of the conference as “Eurocentric.” For Western feminists, the PPWC was significant in that it broadened the scope of their movement so that it became more all-inclusive. Similarly, for Japanese feminists, the PPWC was an opportunity to address national women’s issues as transnational ones, and to justify their belief in women’s activism. Even though Japanese women could not be elected to government posts because they were still unenfranchised, at the PPWC they could explain Japan’s conditions to Western women based on the commonality of women worldwide. By thus assuming a public, “political” role, Japanese women did not confine themselves to roles prescribed by notions of traditional Japanese womanhood.

Also, via the conference Japanese women could expect to influence their government’s policies through international pressures to reform society. In Ichikawa’s view, although discussions in the Government section of the PPWC were less stimulating than she had expected, the Japanese delegates’ presentations on Japanese social issues, including women’s political status and the licensed prostitution system, were nevertheless effective enough to have apparently embarrassed the government.<sup>79</sup> Accordingly, concerning the issue of the Traffic in Women and Children, the Japanese government accepted the League of Nations’ investigation in 1931.<sup>80</sup> Thus, as Gauntlett criticized the government’s

double standard regarding the licensed prostitution system and extended this criticism internationally, Japanese women were able to seek a solution for national problems through transnational cooperation.

The idea of creating a transnational women's space linked women in the West and women in Asia. Since women's issues such as prostitution, women's and children's labor, health, empowerment in politics, and education were not fully addressed in national politics, women found an opportunity to discuss these problems at an international forum—in this case, the PPWC. The conference was thus similar to “the League of Nations”—or, as Gauntlett referred to it, “the Private League of Nations.”<sup>81</sup> Of course, the League of Nations had no real power to compel participant nations to end or restrict inhuman activities, including military aggression and the neglect or exploitation of women and children. However, such international forums did provide a nursery space for various causes, where fledgling power groups were able to consolidate identities and explore strategies to empower themselves. In this sense, “transnational” was an essential component in the formation of Japanese feminism.

### Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Sally A. Hastings and the other editors of *USJWJ*, as well as the anonymous reviewers for *USJWJ*, for valuable and critical comments. I am grateful to Professor Gavin J. Campbell and to seminar classmates at the Graduate School of Global Studies at Doshisha University for their close readings and discussions of my first manuscript. I also acknowledge Diane Haring for her valuable advice.

### Notes

1. Kikue Ide, “Legal and Political Relations of Women of Japan Today—An Interpretation,” in *Women of the Pacific: Being a Record of the Proceedings of the First Pan-Pacific Women's Conference which was held in Honolulu from the 9<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> of August 1928, under the auspices of the Pan-Pacific Union* (Honolulu: The Pan-Pacific Union, 1928), 200 (hereafter *Women of the Pacific*).

2. Tsune Gauntlett, “Greeting from National Delegations,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 15.

3. Kathryn Kish Sklar, “Preface,” in Kimberly Jensen and Erika Kuhlman, eds., *Women and Transnational Activism in Historical Perspective* (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2010), x.

4. Manako Ogawa, “The ‘White Ribbon League of Nations’ Meets Japan: The Trans-Pacific Activism of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 1906–1930,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 21–50.

5. Elizabeth Dorn Lublin, *Reforming Japan: The Women's Christian Temperance Union in the Meiji Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), 8.

6. Ibid., 4.
7. Rumi Yasutake, “The First Wave of International Women’s Movements from a Japanese Perspective: Western Outreach and Japanese Women Activists during the Interwar Years,” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 32 (2009): 13–20. Also see idem, “Han Taiheiyō Fujin Kyōkai no setsuritsu to senkan-ki no katsudō: josei-tachi no Kirisutokyō ekkyō nettowāku” (Pan-Pacific Women’s Association during the interwar years: An examination of transnational Churchwomen’s network), *Doshisha Daigaku Amerika kenkyu* (March 2009): 67–82.
8. Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 19.
9. Ibid., 13.
10. Ann Y. Satterthwaite, “The Third Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference,” *Mid-Pacific Magazine* 47, no. 4 (April–June 1934): 303–4.
11. “Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference,” *Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union*, New Series, no. 102 (July 1928): 5.
12. Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 16; idem, “Han Taiheiyō Fujin Kyōkai,” 70.
13. On this subject, see Jon Thares Davidann, *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.–Japanese Relations 1919–1941* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
14. Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 16.
15. Tomoko Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 36.
16. Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 16.
17. Hoshino Aiko, “Taiheiyō Kaigi ichimon ittō” (Q&A about the IPR), *Fusen* 3, no. 12 (Dec. 1929): 17–20.
18. “Pacific Peace, Dr. Ford’s Theme: Director of Union in Honolulu Talks in Tokio of Wide Longing for It,” *New York Times*, June 19, 1927.
19. “See Steps to Peace in Pacific Session,” *New York Times*, July 30, 1927.
20. “Pacific Peace, Dr. Ford’s Theme,” *New York Times*, June 19, 1927.
21. Fiona Paisley, “Culture and Internationalism in Australian Feminism’s Pacific Age,” *Journal of Women’s History* 14 (Autumn 2002): 107. Japan had colonized Taiwan, Korea, and South Manchuria by the 1920s, renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905 and 1907, and signed agreements with Russia in 1907 and with the U.S. in 1908. For further information, see Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 514.
22. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 520–21. These agreements included the Washington Naval Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty. The Nine-Power Treaty was signed during the Washington Naval Congress in 1922, to protect China’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and to affirm that all nations would do business with China on equal terms. See “Nine-Power Treaty,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011. Web. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/415545/Nine-Power-Treaty> (accessed on Sept. 14, 2011).
23. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 520–21.
24. Davidann, *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.–Japanese Relations*, 81–102.
25. Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American–East Asian Relations*,



revised ed. (Chicago: Imprint Publications, Inc., 1967), 157. See also Davidann, *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.–Japanese Relations*.

26. Paisley, “Culture and Internationalism,” 107.

27. Tano Jodai, “Japan of Yesterday and Today,” *PAX International* 1, no. 11 (Oct. 1926): 4, (microfilmed) Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Collection.

28. “Aims of the Pan-Pacific Union,” *Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union*, New Series, no. 168 (Feb. 1934): 2.

29. *New York Times*, July 30, 1927.

30. Ann Y. Satterthwaite, “The Third Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference,” *The Mid-Pacific Magazine* 47, no. 4 (April–June 1934): 303–4.

31. Catharine E. B. Cox, Chairman, Educational Section, Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference, to Ichikawa Fusae, Sept. 21, 1925, in the Fusae Ichikawa Memorial Association, ed., *Fujin sansei kankei shishiryō* (Collection on the Japanese women’s suffrage movement), (microfilmed), (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentā, 2005), 2 (hereafter *FSKS*).

32. Paisley points out the twofold purpose of the PPWC: (1) to attempt to contain Japan’s military aggression; and (2) to promote the international feminist movement. See Paisley, “Culture and Internationalism,” 107.

33. “Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference 1928,” *Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union*, no. 102 (July 1928): 5–6.

34. Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 13–14; Sugimori Nagako, *Amerika no josei heiwa undō shi: 1898–1931* (A history of the American women’s peace movement: 1898–1931), (Tokyo: Domesu shuppan, 1996), 165–30. Sugimori characterizes the PPWC as an example of “pashifizumu to feminizumu no yūgō” (merging pacifism and feminism).

35. Mrs. Francis M. Swanzy, “Greetings,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 8.

36. Eleanor M. Hinder, “Pacific Women: Personnel of the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference Honolulu, August 9–19, 1928,” *Pacific Affairs* 1, no. 3 (July 1928): 9.

37. Paisley “Culture and Internationalism in Australian Feminism’s Pacific Age,” 115–7; Ogawa, “The ‘White Ribbon League of Nations’ Meets Japan,” 44–45; Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 17.

38. Ichikawa Fusae, “Kaigi no shōrai narabi ni kansō” (Prospects of the conference and its future), *Fusen* 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1929): 5 (my translation).

39. On this subject see, for example, Allison L. Sneider, *Suffragists in an Imperial Age: U.S. Expansion and the Woman Question, 1870–1929* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

40. Kiuchi Kyō, *Kyōiku ichiro: Han Taiheiyō Fujin Kaigi ni resshite* (Education is the cause: Participating in the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference), (Tokyo: ōzorasha, 1989), 56.

41. Tsune Gauntlett, “Greetings from National Delegations,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 15.

42. Ichikawa Fusae, “Han Taiheiyō Fujinkaigi ni tsuite” (Re the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference), *Fujin koron* (Women’s review), no. 155 (July 1928): 34.

43. The WPAJ was organized in 1921 and affiliated to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 1924. On this subject, see Nakajima Kuni and Sugimori Nagako,

eds., *Nijū seiki ni okeru josei no heiwa undō: Fujin Kokusai Heiwa Jiyū Renmei to Nihon no josei* (The women’s peace movement in the twentieth century: WILPF and Japanese women), (Tokyo: Domesu shuppan, 2006).

44. Ichikawa, “Han Taiheiyō Fujinkaigi ni tsuite,” 38.

45. For example, Inoue, who was a professor of Japan Women’s University and chairperson of the WPAJ, had attended a peace conference in Washington in 1921. Gauntlett, leader of the JWCTU and the WPAJ, had attended congresses of the WCTU and the International Woman’s Suffrage Alliance as early as 1920.

46. *Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union*, no. 102 (July 1928): 8.

47. Ichikawa, “Han Taiheiyō Fujinkaigi ni tsuite,” 33 (my translation).

48. Kiuchi, *Kyōiku ichiro*, 133 ff.

49. Okada Toshiko, “Han Taiheiyō kaigi fujin ni shōjōkyōinkai funkisu” (Primary School Women’s Teachers’ Association challenges women of the Pan-Pacific Conference), *Fujin undō* 6, no. 4 (May 1928): 13–14.

50. *Ibid.*; on this subject, see Yasutake, “The First Wave,” 16.

51. “Honsha yori hakensuru fujin daihyō no jinsen” (The selection of our company’s delegate), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 7, 1928 (my translation).

52. “Shōrai no fujin bunka to wagasha no hōfu” (Women’s culture in the future and our company’s aspirations), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 16, 1928.

53. On this subject, see Sharon L. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983); Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings, “The Meiji State’s Policy towards Women, 1890–1910,” in Gail Lee Bernstein, ed., *Recreating Japanese Women: 1600–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 151–74.

54. “Fujin no chikara de heiwa no shōrai ni tsukusu” (Use the force of women to bring about peace), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 13, 1928 (my translation).

55. In addition to the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, Japan signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, which stipulated “the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.”

56. “Han Taiheiyō Fujinkaigi haken daihyō ni Shōda Yoshiko-shi tōsen-su” (Ms. Yoshiko Shōda was selected as a PPWC delegate), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 24, 1928.

57. “Zenkoku Fujin Dōmei no Han Taiheiyō Fujinkaigi hantai seimeisho” (Opposition to the PPWC by National Women’s League), July 18, 1928, *FSKS* (unfilmed), 2315 (my translation).

58. Akami points out race relations in Hawai‘i were never “as rosy as presented,” and that the commercial and economic prosperity in Hawai‘i was supported by “cheap ‘colored’ labour.” See Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, 36.

59. For relevant research, see Barbara Molony, “Activism among Women in the Taisho Cotton Textile Industry,” in Gail Lee Bernstein, ed., *Recreating Japanese Women*, 217–38.

60. Yamakawa Kikue, “Shodaihyō eno kibō” (Requests to the delegates), *Fusen* 2, no. 5 (July 1928): 9 (my translation). For relevant historiography, see Vera Mackie, *Creating Socialist Women in Japan: Gender, Labour and Activism, 1900–1937* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

61. Ichikawa, “Han Taiheiyō Fujinkaigi ni tsuite,” 33 (my translation).
62. “Daihyō to shite jūyō na shikaku to san jōken” (Three important qualifications as the delegates), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 20, 1928, 3.
63. Inoue Hide, “Hyōjun seikatsu” (Standard of living), *Rengo fujin* (Women’s federation), no. 2 (Aug. 1928): 10, in *FSKS* (microfilmed), 42 (my translation).
64. Wada Tomi, “Han Taiheiyō Sekai Fujintaikai no shōshū” (Call of the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference), *Fujin koron* (Women’s review) 137 (Jan. 1927): 25–29 (my translation). Wada had served as an interpreter for Jane Addams in 1923, when Addams gave speeches to Japanese audiences in Japan.
65. Jane Addams, “Presidential Address,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 12.
66. Ibid.
67. Eleanor M. Hinder, “An Evolving Conference Machinery,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 20.
68. “Traffic in Women and Children—An International Problem: Round Table Discussion, Leader: Mrs. T. E. Taylor, New Zealand,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 265–67.
69. On this subject, see Lublin, *Reforming Japan*, 101–25; Ogawa, “The ‘White Ribbon League of Nations’ Meets Japan,” 36–38.
70. Tsune Gauntlett, “Anti-Vice Movement in Japan (An Examination of the Position of Japan in Relation to the League of Nations Treaty),” in *Women of the Pacific*, 241–44.
71. Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 150.
72. Katrina Leppänen, “International Reorganization and Traffic in Women: Venues of Vulnerability and Resistance,” <http://www.idehist.uu.se/vethist/lychnos/articles/2006-58.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2011): 116.
73. Helen J. Self, “League of Nations,” in Melissa Hope Ditmore, ed., *Encyclopedia of Prostitution and Sex Work* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006) 1: 248–49.
74. To refer to “the Traffic in Women and Children,” the League initially used the term “White Slave Traffic,” but dropped it for “the Traffic in Women and Children” at the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children in 1921. The League also raised the age of legal protection from 18 to 21. To regulate “White Slave Traffic,” two international agreements were signed in 1904 and 1910. For relevant historiography, see Leppänen, “International Reorganization and Traffic in Women.” Leppänen notes that the League published *Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East* in 1932, and that, along with the 1927 report, these two documents were “ambitious enquiries to gather information from all parts of the world, the first mainly dealing with the ‘west’ and the second with the ‘east.’” See Leppänen, “International Reorganization and Traffic in Women,” 117. Regarding Grace Abbott, see Self, “League of Nations,” 248. The Japanese government confirmed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children in 1925, while reserving its right to maintain the age limit in 18. The government raised the age limit to 21 in 1927. For further information, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children,” <http://www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/search2.php?PID=336> (accessed October 30, 2011).

75. Gauntlett, “Anti-Vice Movement in Japan,” 244.

76. “Traffic in Women and Children,” in *Women of the Pacific*, 265–67.

77. Eleanor M. Hinder to Rachel E. Crowdy, Aug. 21, 1928, *Jane Addams Papers*, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1984), 20: 198.

78. Elizabeth Green, “The Pacific Technique New Clinical Notes on Its Evolution: Some Aspects of the Pan-Pacific Woman’s Conference (Honolulu, August 9–19) of Interest to the Institute of Pacific Relations Authors(s),” *Pacific Affairs* 1, no. 4 (Aug.–Sept. 1928): 15.

79. Ichikawa, “Kaigi no shōrai narabi ni kansō,” 5.

80. “Haishō mondai zadankai” (Discussion meeting on the movement to abolish prostitution), *Fusen* 5, no. 6 (June 1931): 10–11. The Prostitution Prevention Law was enacted in 1956. On this subject, see Vera Mackie, *Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Empowerment and Sexuality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 137; Fujime Yuki, *Sei no rekishigaku: Kōshōseido • Dataizai taisei kara Baishunbōshihō • Yūseihogohō taisei e* (A historiography of sexuality: From licensed prostitution system and criminalization of abortion to the Prostitute Prevention Law and the Eugenics Protection Law), (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1999).

81. Gauntlett Tsune, “Fujin to heiwa” (Women and peace), in *Rengo fujin* (Women’s federation), no. 2 (Aug. 1928): 8, in *FSKS* (microfilmed), 42: 1362.

---

# Home Education in Rural Japan: Continuity and Change from Late Edo to the Early Postwar

Christina Ghanbarpour

As recent studies have begun to reexamine the nature and extent of education in Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,<sup>1</sup> one of the questions that remains open to debate is the level of education that rural women were able to attain, as well as what barriers rural women faced and how, or whether, they were able to overcome them. The Meiji government's commitment to expanding education, which included legislation that required girls to attend school and obliged local governments to build girls' schools, certainly increased their educational options. Moreover, the fact that literacy rates appear to have increased over time suggests that efforts to improve women's education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were successful. As one 1948 survey showed, over 73 percent of the 756 adults who participated in the survey had received an education beyond elementary school, over 98 percent were at least partially literate, and 96 percent could write at least some Chinese characters.<sup>2</sup>

Yet the picture of educational achievement that emerges from these types of legal statutes and statistical data belies the persistent inequities that plagued rural education from 1868 to 1945. Despite legal changes that spread education, especially to girls, in the Meiji period (1868–1912), girls and boys in the poorest areas sometimes lacked even a place to study. Girls also appear to have been pulled out of school more often than their brothers, and tended to end their education earlier, usually to perform tasks

---

**Christina Ghanbarpour** recently completed her dissertation on rural Japanese women's roles in spreading modernity in the History Department of the University of California, Irvine. She is working on a chapter on modern Christian identity in Japan and teaches world history at Santa Monica College in Santa Monica, California.

such as raising younger siblings. In response to the paucity of educational resources in rural areas, well-off rural families often sent their children to schools in urban areas; but packing children off to urban centers to study presented its own risks, such as requiring a significant investment of the family’s resources and putting a child’s health and safety in jeopardy. These challenges draw attention to the fact that the education of rural women and girls was neither inevitable nor achieved solely through legislative guidance, but was a constantly negotiated process marked by the efforts that rural girls and women, as well as their families, made to promote their educational welfare.

What, then, were the primary barriers that rural women and girls faced in gaining an education, what circumstances helped them overcome them, and what, ultimately, were they able to achieve? Resolving these questions offers a way to address broader problems in the history of women’s education, such as what the majority of Japanese women, who lived in rural areas, had been able to achieve before 1868, how rural men’s and women’s educations were constructed, and how rural women and girls reconciled the disjunction between their lack of opportunities and the acquisition of literacy and other skills. By showing that rural women sought out opportunities to educate themselves, my work responds to Mayuzumi Kimine’s and others’ call for scholars to represent rural women in ways that counter stereotypes of passivity and lack of agency.<sup>3</sup> This study also shows that long-standing methods of teaching and learning continued to shape women’s education in the modern period, helped compensate for some of the deficiencies in the national educational system, and laid the groundwork for trends in education still evident today.

That the farmers who constituted the majority of Japan’s population before 1945 differed from educators in their ideas of what and how to teach their children helps explain how rural women’s education took shape, while challenging us to revise contemporary notions of what constitutes an education. As one early twentieth-century American study of Japanese women’s education explained:

The little girls in the cities often learned the elements of reading and writing, and sometimes spent much time on music and dancing. . . . In the country, however, life left little time for study of any kind, and even the most elementary education was unusual.<sup>4</sup>

What the writer calls “life” was not considered to be an education for rural girls in and of itself; rather, the acquisition of skills in an informal setting—whether literacy or

technical skills, such as learning how to tend crops, sew clothes, or manage silkworms—is described as an impediment to formal education in reading, writing, and the arts. Yet, if we are to define education to include the transmission of knowledge that was important to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century farmer—such as the skills needed to run a farm household, earn an income, and maintain the family’s sense of identity and continuity over time—then the term “education” must reflect the fact that the type of learning that farmers needed did not always occur in an institutional setting, such as a school, nor was it contained within a single category of knowledge, such as academic or technical knowledge. The Japanese language acknowledges multiple forms of education through terms such as *gakumon*, which connotes a formal education in academic skills, and *kunren*, a training or drill that, along with the general term for education, *kyōiku*, is sometimes used to describe how a mother-in-law teaches her daughter-in-law; but these terms do not necessarily tell us where or how the education occurred. I therefore use the term *formal education* to describe the acquisition of abstract skills, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, in an institutional environment, and *informal education* to describe the acquisition of a wide range of skills in a casual or naturalized manner and in an informal setting, such as learning how to read or sew at home.

A final problem in defining rural women’s and girls’ education concerns the difference between “work,” which often was little more than the exploitation of children’s labor, and “education,” which was meant to impart a skill. The line between these two categories was frequently blurred and determined by factors such as the status, wealth, and ambitions of the farm family in question. In the Meiji as in the Edo period (1603–1868), a farm woman’s family background (e.g., past wealth or status, or an educated father, mother, or grandmother) appears to have helped rural girls advance beyond the educational limits of their peers—much as has been found true for women’s education today.<sup>5</sup> However, as national reformulations of women’s and men’s roles in the household began to spread into rural areas, rural women were increasingly called upon to teach abstract skills to their children in addition to technical skills, replacing fathers to some extent in terms of being responsible for their children’s education in reading, writing, and arithmetic. An analysis of how rural women’s education developed in the modern period thus helps elucidate what factors have long contributed to Japanese women’s educational achievement, as well as how women’s roles in teaching and learning skills changed over time.

### Women’s and Girls’ Education in the Edo and Early Meiji Periods

Earlier studies of education in the Edo period have suggested that, compared to men, women and girls enjoyed relatively fewer opportunities to gain a formal education. For example, schools, such as domain schools (*hankō* or *hangaku*) and private academies (*shijuku*), often only accepted boys, thus limiting the number of places where girls and women could learn. When girls were allowed to enter a school—usually a home school or a temple school (*terakoya*)—their families were often loath to allow them to do so because they would lose their labor and/or have to risk sending them far from home. As far as educational content was concerned, girls’ education might consist of little more than sewing and copying out conservative tracts emphasizing ideal female comportment, such as the *Onna daigaku* (Greater learning for women); more complicated subjects, such as learning Chinese and studying the Confucian classics, were considered masculine spheres of knowledge inappropriate for women. As a result, estimates of literacy in this period were about 40 percent for men, as compared to only 10 to 15 percent for women.<sup>6</sup>

More recent studies have shown that a few women were able to gain a more rigorous education, and that both men’s and women’s literacy rates were likely to have been higher. For example, Martha Tocco highlights the nearly universal literacy rates of urban-dwelling samurai women, and notes the proliferation not only of women’s moral texts but of textbooks that covered subjects such as geography, geometry, and arithmetic, and that in some cases exceeded the number of moral texts being produced.<sup>7</sup> Though some schools did not accept women, she notes that the number of settings where women and girls could obtain an education and sometimes teach had grown enormously by the end of the Edo period, and had begun to include educational institutions that had formerly only been open to men. Tocco argues that, though factors such as affluence, region, and class usually played a defining role in the level of education a woman could achieve, a few women of the commoner classes were able to receive an education of sufficient quality that they were able to open their own schools in castle towns and large cities in the early nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup>

Though many of these trends largely or only affected urban women, they reflect a more limited growth in opportunities for rural women to gain literacy and other abstract skills. P. F. Kornicki has shown that the number of girls’ schools is likely to have been higher than has been recorded in official records, since recent research has uncovered many more schools than were previously thought to have existed. He also notes that a few farm women, such as the daughters of village headmen and wealthy peasants in Tosa, had



been learning writing and arithmetic as early as the mid-seventeenth century.<sup>9</sup> Richard Rubinger has shown the positive effect that commercialization appears to have had on rural women's education. In one case, a poor farmer's daughter sent to work in an inn in 1840 sent a letter petitioning for the cancelation of her contract to the local daimyo. The letter was three pages long, written in a mix of formal and informal language, and included some simple Chinese characters.<sup>10</sup> While such women were exceptional, they show that literacy was not limited to upper-class urban women but had become possible even for rural women of limited wealth and status.

Like urban women, farm women faced numerous barriers to gaining an education. These included not only the basic limitations of sex, class, and wealth that Tocco noted, but the fact that both male and female farmers' attempts to gain a formal education were restricted by their lack of access to schools, which were clustered in or near castle towns and in Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka. Their attempts to become literate were also often viewed by the samurai elite as both pretension and as dereliction of their true duties in the fields and at the loom. A typical encapsulation of the ideal farmers' life, as viewed from the perspective of the samurai elite, is as follows:

[When farmers] wake in the morning, they should harvest the long grasses in the morning, cultivate the fields and paddies in the afternoon, weave rope and knit sacks at night, and in all things perform their work without negligence. . . . A man must earn his living by harvesting (*saku*), his wife by weaving hemp [cloth] and night work.<sup>11</sup>

Here, farmers' lives are entirely defined by their work, which is to occupy them day and night. As for education, not only is it not mentioned, but it is difficult to imagine where it would fit into a routine of unremitting work. In this sense, both ideological and practical barriers limited the amount of formal education that farmers could hope to gain.

Yet in spite of these barriers, scholars such as Takahashi Satoshi have argued that reading and writing had become an essential part of the rural landscape as early as the mid-eighteenth century. This was partly due to circumstances that encouraged the samurai to educate farmers despite their concerns that such an education was neither necessary nor desirable. For one, in order to spread the Confucian ideology that underpinned samurai rule, samurai encouraged the publication of Confucian moral texts, such as the *Rikuyu engi* (Amplification of the six maxims), for use as readers in local *terakoya*.<sup>12</sup> In addition, as the daimyo increasingly relied on the local landlord class to carry out the daimyos' responsibilities for managing land and tax payments, reading, writing, and math skills

became the bare necessities that wealthy farmers needed to carry out their administrative duties. For example, in 1713, the *bakufu* government ordered village headmen to affix their seals to and display ledgers recording yields during the collection of yearly and other taxes. In 1751, the government began requiring the public display of ledgers as needed, and had all farmers, rather than solely the village head, affix their seals to them as a way of preventing lawsuits.<sup>13</sup> Such laws would have forced village heads to keep better records, and may have encouraged small landowning farmers to acquire such skills themselves.<sup>14</sup>

The fact that such trends made learning more widely available in rural areas, as well as village elites’ desire to establish an illustrious identity for themselves, helps explain why a small number of farm women were also able to gain literacy and other abstract skills. Anne Walthall has found that wives in two well-to-do farm families made entries in their husbands’ diaries in their husbands’ absence; another two farm women in what is now Fujisawa in Kanagawa Prefecture kept diaries; and the sister of Suzuki Bokushi (1770–1842), the famous writer of *Hokuetsu seppu* (Snow country tales), left over a thousand poems when she died.<sup>15</sup> Both the feminist politician Ichikawa Fusae and the celebrated novelist Hirabayashi Eiko’s grandmothers were literate, and the well-to-do farm woman Matsuo Tase (1811–94) was an accomplished poet as well as a revolutionary from a family with a long line of educated women.<sup>16</sup> Other studies have found letters and official documents that appear to have been written and signed by farm women.<sup>17</sup> Thus, farm women in the upper echelons of village society appear not only to have been able to access educational opportunities, but in extraordinary cases to have become skilled writers and poets.

The decline of the Ichikawa family’s fortunes exemplifies how close the association between status and female literacy had grown by the end of Edo period, and illustrates how female literacy remained relevant as a marker of status into the Meiji period. Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981), writing of her early life growing up on a farmstead in Aichi Prefecture, wrote of her mother and grandmother:

My grandmother had worked in a great house (*yashiki*) somewhere, and although she had learned to read and write a little, my mother was completely illiterate. As a result, she was bullied. When she [first] came as a bride, . . . it was an extremely painful experience [for her].<sup>18</sup>

Ichikawa’s comments show that her family valued women’s education, which in her grandmother’s time consisted of basic literacy and the skills of etiquette and proper

comportment that the Ichikawas' social superiors would have taught her grandmother while she was working for them. However, bad investments wasted the family's fortunes, and though still landowners, they came to possess only a fraction of the land that they had once owned.<sup>19</sup> By the time Ichikawa's father, the family heir, had reached marriageable age, the family's fortunes had sunk to the point that the Ichikawas were forced to settle for an illiterate bride, whom they appear to have bullied for her lack of refinement.

With respect to how rural women gained the skills that often made up a formal education, such as literacy and moral instruction, Ronald Dore has shown that some domain officials encouraged itinerant lecturers to visit local villages, and these sometimes gave sermons specifically to farm women. Records of these events suggest that large numbers of women attended.<sup>20</sup> Bokushi personally taught his granddaughter how to read and write, and Matsuo Tase and Ichikawa Fusae's grandmother appear to have learned to read and write either as young children at home or while in service in other families' homes.<sup>21</sup> In the case both of Bokushi's grandchildren and of Matsuo Tase, male relatives assumed the responsibility of educating female children in reading, writing, and arithmetic.<sup>22</sup> The fact that rural girls and women learned reading and other abstract skills in their or in others' homes suggests that women's and girls' acquisition of these skills often took place outside of schools, which may account for the lower school attendance rate of girls compared to boys.

Literacy, of course, was not the only skill that rural boys and girls learned, but was one of the many types of knowledge that farmers thought appropriate to pass on to their children. Ichikawa Kiyoshi has argued that children learned a wide array of subjects, including basic medicine, herbal remedies, the customs of their households and villages, and farming techniques, through daily observation and lived experience (*taiken*). Women and girls also learned cooking, sewing, and etiquette—skills essential to the smooth running of a household—from their mothers and mothers-in-law, and parents sometimes sent their daughters off to their marriage beds with erotic guides that explained what they could expect to occur on their first night of marriage.<sup>23</sup> These forms of transmission were not necessarily limited to upper-class farmers, as even poor and middling farmers would have had access to village customs, herbal remedies, and at least basic farming techniques. They thus illustrate the types of knowledge that farmers as a whole likely sought to pass on to their children, and indicate the methods that they employed to impart them.

While these instances highlight the roles that occupation, status, and wealth played in shaping girls' education, regional differences and proximity to urban areas also affected

rural women’s education in the Edo period. For example, Yakuwa Tomohiro has shown, through early Meiji-era surveys of signature rates (*jishōritsu chōsa*), that the degree of literacy that rural women in the late Edo period were able to attain most likely differed considerably depending on where they lived.<sup>24</sup> The surveys, which were carried out in Shiga, Gunma, Aomori, Kagoshima, and Okayama prefectures between 1877 and 1887, recorded how many people over the age of six years old could sign their own names (Table). An 1879 group of surveys also recorded signature rates in Kuga County, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The surveys show that the number of people who could sign their names ranged from an overall high of approximately 64 percent to a low of less than 20 percent, within which female literacy rates ranged from 42 to slightly less than 3 percent (see Table).

**Table. Signature Rates as a Measure of Literacy in Japanese Prefectures**

Year	Prefecture	Men	Women	Total	Female Literacy as a Percentage of Men’s
1877	Shiga	89.23	39.31	64.13	44.1
1879	Kuga County, Yamaguchi*	54.96	16.48	36.31	30.0
1880	Gunma	79.13	23.41	52.00	29.6
1881	Aomori	37.39	2.71	19.94	7.2
1884	Kagoshima	33.43	4.00	18.33	12.0
1887	Okayama	65.64	42.05	54.38	64.1

\* Partial survey.

Source: Adapted and translated from Yakuwa Tomohiro, “Kinsei shakai to shikiji” (Early modern society and literacy), *Kyōikugaku kenkyū*, 70, no. 4 (December 2003): 56–57.

Though the surveys do not distinguish between castle towns, small towns, and rural areas within the prefectures, the overall picture of literacy that they portray shows an often marked difference in partial literacy rates from prefecture to prefecture. This is particularly true with respect to gender differences in literacy rates. Though the recorded rates may have been affected by factors such as surveyors altering the test environment or women being reluctant to reveal extensive learning, they all show that women’s literacy rates never reached more than a fraction of those achieved by men.<sup>25</sup> However, where men’s literacy was high, women’s literacy tended to be high as well; conversely, the two

overall lowest-scoring prefectures, Aomori and Kagoshima, not only have the lowest scores for women but also the widest gap between men's and women's basic literacy rates. The gender gap between literacy rates in the highest- and lowest-scoring prefectures is also notable. Though the male signature rate recorded in Shiga, the highest-scoring prefecture for men, is almost three times higher than the signature rate for men in Kagoshima, the lowest-scoring prefecture for men, the female signature rate in women's highest-scoring prefecture, Okayama, is about fourteen times the rate recorded in their lowest-scoring prefecture, Aomori.

Thus, whereas basic literacy would seem to have become fairly important for men, with no less than one third being able at least to sign their own names even in areas where literacy was generally low, there was no such consensus on female literacy, as signature rates could range from slightly over 40 percent to almost nothing. In regions where a degree of literacy was found to be particularly valuable, it appears to have been considered so for both sexes, while in prefectures with a low evaluation of literacy, men significantly outperformed women. A high regional literacy rate, which would reflect a local emphasis on and/or necessity for reading and writing skills, therefore appears to have had a positive effect on women's literacy, whereas a low prefectural literacy rate is correlated with a profoundly low literacy rate for women.<sup>26</sup> The data thus demonstrate an enormous range in women's educational achievement and suggest that this was closely linked to men's educational achievement.

If we examine the data in the context of broader regional differences, the figures suggest that women's literacy was probably highest relative to men's in western Honshū and lowest in northeastern Honshū. For example, female literacy relative to men's literacy in Gunma is significantly lower than in the two western prefectures, namely, Shiga and Okayama (see Table). In addition, the survey of Kuga County in Yamaguchi Prefecture, which is in western Honshū, places overall literacy there lower than in Shiga and Okayama but higher than in Kagoshima and Aomori (see Table), which are located in Kyushu and in the Tohoku (northeastern) area of Honshū, respectively. We would expect the Kuga County results to skew high in comparison to the prefectural surveys because there would have been relatively fewer agricultural areas included in this small-scale study compared to the large-scale prefectural surveys. However, if we examine only the farming population in Kuga County, the breakdown of literacy rates still shows a range of between 12 and 51 percent literacy among farmers, as compared to only 20 and 18 percent overall literacy, respectively, for Aomori and Kagoshima.<sup>27</sup>

The Kuga County study also provides data on basic literacy rates relative to proximity to urban areas and in relation to farm work. In terms of overall literacy, the most notable villages in Kuga County were Nishimi Village, which had a literacy rate of 66.9 percent for a population of which 73 percent was involved in agriculture, and Yokoyama Village, which had a literacy rate of 64.5 percent for a population of which 68 percent was involved in agriculture. Both are located close to the city of Iwakuni, then the regional capital and castle town of Iwakuni domain, which topped the list with an overall literacy rate of almost 68 percent.<sup>28</sup> With respect to gendered differences in literacy rates, men’s signature rates ranged from a low of 19.3 percent in the school district that served the villages of Kamidatoko, Shimodatoko, Shibukuma, and Nishibata to a high of 98.3 percent in the area under the jurisdiction of the Kōjiro Village elementary school. Women’s signature rates ranged from 0 percent in Hataki Village to 68.5 percent in Iwakuni.<sup>29</sup> Though Yakuwa does not provide a breakdown of men’s and women’s signature rates for each village, nor does he show what women’s and men’s signature rates in each town and village were relative to their proximity to urban areas, he does note that the data on Kuga County show a more pronounced correlation between illiteracy and farm work for women than for men, such that women who engaged in farm work were more likely to be illiterate than men engaged in farm work.<sup>30</sup>

Other studies of Edo- and Meiji-period literacy rates for western and eastern Honshū have identified a similar discrepancy. For example, Herbert Passin’s study of education in the Edo period found a school attendance rate of only 5 percent for girls in the Tohoku area—a large area that would have included several cities and towns—while an isolated mountain village near Kyoto had a literacy rate of 56 percent for boys and 15 percent for girls.<sup>31</sup> Another study, which focused on surveys given to military recruits along with other information collected by the Ministry of War (Rikugunshō) in the late nineteenth century, found equally wide disparities that ranged from a low of 20 percent male literacy to a high of 80 percent, with the lowest literacy rates concentrated in Kyushu, Shikoku, Tohoku, and northern Hokkaido.<sup>32</sup> Given these data, Passin’s assertion that literacy in the Edo period ranged from “almost 100%” among “village notables” to 20 percent among “peasants in the more isolated areas” seems rather high, unless we only take male literacy rates into account.<sup>33</sup> These studies therefore suggest that several factors, including status, region, wealth, and occupation, affected rural women’s ability to acquire abstract skills such as reading and writing, and the degree to which they were able to master them.

### Formal Education in the Meiji-Taishō Period

Though the ways that rural men and women taught girls in the Meiji period continued to reflect long-standing patterns, the transition to a modern, national school system affected rural women's education in numerous ways. New opportunities, fostered by the expansion of the school system and the growth of educational resources in urban areas, offered new life courses for ambitious farm girls, and some poor rural women were able to gain a basic education in skills such as reading and writing. However, it remained difficult for most farm women to continue their formal education beyond a year or two of elementary school, revealing how the uneven spread of educational opportunity in rural areas in the Meiji and Taishō (1912–26) periods affected the overall development of women's education.

The rise in attendance rates from approximately 45 percent (60.3 percent for boys, 28.3 for girls) in 1887 to over 98 percent (98.9 for boys, 97.3 for girls) by 1909 suggests that Meiji efforts to ensure that all children would gain at least a minimal education had largely succeeded.<sup>34</sup> However, anecdotal evidence suggests that efforts to improve education were not as successful as the attendance rates indicate. Several factors, such as a lack of appropriate facilities, the reluctance of parents to send their children to school, distance to educational facilities, and, in some cases, concerns for girls' safety, made it particularly difficult for rural girls to receive an education.

After 1868, formal education in rural areas was shaped by a series of laws that established the Meiji state's evolving approach to education, as well as its attempts to manage the financial burden that such an expansion imposed. The 1872 Gakusei (Education Law) was the first of these. In contrast to earlier practice, the Gakusei established a universal educational system in which, in theory, all Japanese subjects would have at least a minimal education. Over the next twenty years, compulsory education was increased from four to six years, tuition was abandoned, and various types of schools, such as *komori* (babysitter) and night schools, were established in order to expand educational opportunities. In 1899, each prefecture was required to build at least one girls' higher school.

Despite these efforts, anecdotal accounts suggest that it continued to be difficult for rural girls to gain an education, even in the early twentieth century. One problem was a lack of facilities, as well as the fact that girls appear to have been frequently pulled out of school to support their families. Kawamata Haya, a farm woman born in Ibaraki Prefecture in 1901 who failed to complete more than a year of schooling, stated:

The branch school in Oshinobe [Village, in Ibaraki Prefecture] only went up to fourth grade, so you had to go to Masaki. But you had to cross fields, paddies, and mountains to get there. Robbers might jump out at you.<sup>35</sup>

Her story reflects the distance children traveled to reach school, as well as parents’ concerns for their daughters’ safety. Kawamata estimated that, out of ten female peers, the majority of whom were female, four quit after only one year, while another two quit somewhat later for various reasons, such as being the youngest child or being the daughter of a family in retirement (*inkyō musume*). She herself quit after only a year of school to help with the housework.<sup>36</sup>

Another woman, Kawamata Masa (no relation), who was born in 1907 in the nearby village of Nakano, started working as a *komori* (babysitter) at the age of eight, after the death of her mother. Though her younger sister, Mitsu, was able to go to school for two years, Masa was not able to go to school at all, nor was she educated by the family who hired her (though one of their daughters, who was the same age as Masa, was sent to school). Masa described a childhood of nearly constant toil, working at first only as a *komori* but later as a field hand whose labor included digging fields at night by moonlight (*yobatakehor*). When she was twelve, she returned to her family’s home, and started working half for her family and half as a hired laborer for other families.<sup>37</sup> In these ways, girls’ formal education appears to have continued to be hampered by a lack of facilities, limited safety, and families’ reliance on girls’ labor to run the household and earn an income.

As indicated by the difference between Masa’s education and that of the daughter of the family she worked for, affluence continued to be a determining factor in farm girls’ education. Even former wealth, which often coincided with a high social status, appears to have helped rural girls gain an education in the early twentieth century. Hirabayashi Eiko (1902–2001), for example, was born into a farming family that had once been well-to-do, with five houses bearing the Hirabayashi name in the small farming village in Nagano Prefecture where she was born, and the family itself having once owned a considerable amount of land. Eiko’s mother, an only child, inherited the house in which she had been raised; her father, the son of a former samurai family (*shizoku*) of limited resources, had married into the Hirabayashi family as a *mukoyōshi* (adopted bridegroom). Eiko described her educational experience as follows:

I didn’t have what you would call a “real” education (*kyōiku rashii kyōiku ukete nai*). I had only gone to a higher elementary school. Then when I was sixteen, I wanted to study so much that I left the house. I boarded at a small private school (*juku*) in



Osaka and helped out with the housework for the family who ran it. . . . The school's students were all sons of shop assistants in merchant households, so the textbooks were middle-school ones. They were so difficult that it was really hard for me.<sup>38</sup>

Hirabayashi's account is revealing in several respects. For one, it shows that both her family's background, which helped her go on to a higher elementary school, and her dogged personal commitment, which propelled her to complete her education despite numerous obstacles, were essential to achieving her educational goals. Her account also reveals that even farm girls who had attended higher elementary school did not have an education equal to that of boys in urban areas. Her integration into an urban private school thus put her at a disadvantage, as did having to work and living far from home in a distant city. Lastly, her sense that her education was not a "real" or "proper" education is striking in comparison to the inability of Kawamata Haya, Kawamata Masa, and their peers even to struggle through a year or two of elementary school. This suggests a large range in the opportunities open to rural women, as well as the significant difference in the paths their lives could ultimately take. Family background, combined with a strong personal commitment, were thus significant factors in helping rural girls and women attain a higher level of education.

Family support, such as an educated grandparent or dedicated parent, also appears to have helped rural girls gain an education. Hirabayashi Eiko has written about her parents' desire that she continue her education at a time when only one or two girls from her village would do so, while Ichikawa Fusae wrote that it was her father who urged all his children to gain an education.<sup>39</sup> Matsuura Isami of Yamashiraishi Village in Fukushima Prefecture arranged for all his sons and daughters to gain an education, personally traveling to Tokyo to examine schools and arrange for housing and care for his children there, while his wife, Kō, saved up the money her father-in-law gave her as birth money to help fund their children's education.<sup>40</sup>

In these instances, a combination of circumstances, such as a family member supportive of his or her daughter's education, sufficient wealth and status to aid in the achievement of such goals, and a strong personal commitment helped rural girls and women overcome barriers to gaining an education. Yet women educated under these circumstances were probably the exceptions. In many cases, families' continued reliance on their daughters' labor for support and income, the distance girls and women had to travel to gain an education, and the danger of traveling long distances to school appear to have prevented rural girls and women from continuing their education.

Nevertheless, some farm girls and women were able to gain an education outside of the national school system through long-standing methods of teaching and learning that were lifelong, that occurred in informal settings, and that were often learned from a variety of mentors, including parents, in-laws, and local notables. This means of gaining an education helped compensate for some of the deficiencies of the national school system, while imparting practical skills and enriching rural women’s personal lives.

### **Informal Education in the Meiji-Taishō Periods**

Two case studies of farm women’s educational experiences, drawn from the small landowning classes in northeastern and central Japan, respectively, show the interplay of long-standing educational methods and the modern school system during this time. The first is the case of Inamura Hanshirō’s mother (1880–1932).<sup>41</sup> Inamura’s mother was born the eldest daughter of a small landowning family in Fujimi Village in Yamanashi Prefecture, and graduated from elementary school at a time when only a very small number of girls or boys attended school. According to the local school’s records, 10 boys and no girls attended school in 1888; 25 boys and 4 girls attended in 1890; and 25 boys and 8 girls attended in 1892. Though the figures show a gradual increase in attendance, it remained remarkably low compared to the actual number of school-aged children living in the village, which in 1890 was 77 boys and 236 girls.<sup>42</sup> The fact that the Inamura family thought it prudent to educate Inamura’s mother was likely due to the fact that, as the family’s sole heir, the family depended on her to continue the household if they failed to find her a competent husband or could no longer manage the household themselves. To further ensure the family’s survival, she was married at age twelve to Inamura’s father, who had to prove his competence and dedication to the family by working for them for a few years, according to the local custom.<sup>43</sup>

Inamura’s mother’s education, however, did not end with elementary school, but included learning how to accomplish various tasks and then teaching these skills to other family members. For example, Inamura writes that his mother taught his younger sister how to cook certain types of local seasonal foods, and that this sister later taught these to his own wife. Inamura’s mother also taught him how to farm, as well as the names of various weeds, how to dig them up, and how to prevent their spread—all of which she had somehow memorized.<sup>44</sup> In addition, she most likely learned skills such as managing the household and how to care for silkworms from her own mother, with whom she often worked. After Inamura’s graduation from an agricultural school, however, she allowed

him to take over the silkworm breeding.<sup>45</sup> This illustrates both the various skills Inamura's mother had learned throughout her life and how one of these skill sets stopped being transmitted after her children had gained a formal education, which presumably trumped her own knowledge gained through experience.<sup>46</sup>

The second case is that of the Nakamura family. Nakamura Michi was born into a farming household in Saitama Prefecture in 1911. Like Inamura's mother, the variety of technical skills that she learned at home was clearly an important part of her lifelong education, yet she learned them in an informal way that meant her skills were unlikely to have been acknowledged as the result of any particular kind of learning:

The *tedama* (juggling balls) we used to play with were of course homemade. . . . I believe my mother or older sisters taught me how to make them, but I don't really remember. In those days, it was common to make everything yourself, from toys to clothing, so without any memory of having been taught I became able naturally to do various things.<sup>47</sup>

Though Nakamura's mother and sisters acted as role models, modeling the skills Nakamura was to learn, the process of learning was so much a part of the fabric of life that she appears to have learned them without explicit instruction. This method of learning was a lifelong process; as technology and circumstances changed, Nakamura states that she and her peers learned to use a loom to make clothing. She became so skilled that she sometimes worked day and night on it to make the family's clothes.<sup>48</sup> When her in-laws decided to take up sericulture sometime after her marriage at age eighteen, she learned how to make thread and cloth out of the imperfect silk cocoons that could not be sold.<sup>49</sup> In these ways, she built upon the skills she had acquired in her youth and continued to learn new ones throughout her life.

Nor were such skills limited to domestic use. Though Nakamura herself sewed only the family's work clothes, her sister sewed for pay:

My oldest sister was physically weak, so instead of going out to the fields she just sewed all day long (*saihō bakari*). She had a contract with a dry goods store to sew *hōmongi* (women's formal kimono) and *hakama* (men's formal divided skirt). I wanted to do that too, but there was always just [a lot of] field work, so I was never given more than the everyday clothes to sew.<sup>50</sup>

Though Nakamura Michi does not explain how her sister learned to sew the complicated patterns, it seems likely that she either learned them from her mother or from instructions

sent from the store. In either case, long years of sewing at home had helped her gain the fundamental skills needed to produce formal clothes for sale. In these ways, Nakamura’s sister appears to have learned the technical skills she used to augment the family income informally, at home, and over a long period of time.

Other resources, such as agricultural associations (*nōkai*), women’s associations, and locally organized culture societies, provided additional means through which rural women could gain an education. These were usually ad hoc and informal, and were often designed such that educated and older women taught younger and less educated (or uneducated) women various skills. In this sense, they mimicked the structure of learning established in the home, and indeed sometimes took place at someone’s home. For example, Inada Kōichi writes that his father established a teacher’s house in the 1920s where the teacher’s wife taught young women *ikebana* (flower arrangement) and basic tailoring.<sup>51</sup> Larger organizations, a few of which had been active from as early as the 1880s, sponsored educational activities, such as lectures and workshops.<sup>52</sup> Thus, as in the Edo period, women continued to gain a number of the practical skills needed to run a household and earn an income in informal settings, and these tended to supplement their lack of formal education.

### **Magazines and Rural Women’s Education in the Early Shōwa Period**

By the 1920s, girls’ elementary school attendance had reached a level virtually equivalent to that of boys. However, it was not until the 1930s and 1940s that a reading public of rural women had developed enough that we begin to see a range of periodicals being published that specifically targeted them. These magazines offered both entertainment and educational content, providing informative articles on topics such as health, hygiene, and nutrition, games and stories for children, and support for women’s reading skills. In this way, women’s magazines may be said to have become an additional source of informal education for rural women, both in developing their reading skills and in providing practical information.

One of the most popular rural magazines was *Ie no hikari* (Light of the home). Founded in 1925, the language and content of the magazine appear to have initially been aimed largely at educated men interested in women’s issues, much like early editions of the first women’s magazines published in the late nineteenth century.<sup>53</sup> Early copies of *Ie no hikari* featured articles by well-known educators such as Yokoi Tokio, and addressed questions such as how to improve rural women’s access to education, raise rural women’s

low status, and reform the family. As was common in mass-circulation magazines, *Ie no hikari* provided the Japanese readings of Chinese characters (*rubi*) alongside them in the text, which would have made the content more accessible to rural residents.

By the 1930s, however, the content of the magazine had shifted to a more popular format that included simpler, eye-catching articles on a range of female-friendly subjects, such as recipes, dress patterns, and entertainment, alongside discussions of ongoing rural concerns. Though the magazine tended to focus on local events, it also occasionally brought rural women news of the wider world, such as the fashions of Western movie stars and news about rural women in other countries. Subscriptions grew substantially from 1925 to 1946, suggesting that, in addition to the rural women whose families purchased subscriptions, rural women unable to purchase subscriptions became familiar with *Ie no hikari* through the sheer number of copies that circulated in rural areas.<sup>54</sup> The magazine reached 1.4 million subscriptions in 1937, maintaining a subscription volume of over 1.2 million from that point on until it dropped to under 400,000 in the last year of the war. The highest subscription volume achieved during this period was 1.5 million in 1944.<sup>55</sup>

*Ie no hikari*'s educational content also changed. Rather than focusing on discussions of how best to improve women's education, the magazine created a children's section that did so directly. "Kodomo no *Ie no hikari*" (*Ie no hikari* for children) introduced stories that combined reading skill development and moral character-building, and offered games, puzzles, and cartoons. These included articles designed to cultivate good habits, such as keeping a journal, which depicted both sexes engaged in educational tasks.<sup>56</sup> Women would also have found educational content on topics such as child care in the pages that directly preceded the children's section, which shows how the magazine combined mothers' and children's education.<sup>57</sup> In this way, *Ie no hikari* provided informative content for rural women and girls, and created a means by which rural women could educate themselves and their children.

Mainstream women's magazines also began to include articles on rural women. *Fujin kōron* (Ladies' review), *Fujin no tomo* (Ladies' companion), and *Shūfu no tomo* (Housewife's companion) all ran articles on rural women in the 1930s, which sources, such as reader comments published in the magazines, show were read by some rural women.<sup>58</sup> *Hataraku fujin* (Working women), which was founded as a resource for both urban and rural working women in the 1930s, featured advice columns on topics ranging from health and hygiene to legal counsel, and reported extensively on village conditions. Though it is likely that periodicals such as these were beyond the reach of the majority of

rural women, particularly those who had grown up with little or no formal education in the Meiji and early Taishō periods, the increase in publications addressing them indicates that readership among farm women had increased substantially.

### **Informal Education in the Wartime and Early Postwar Periods**

Because the family structure remained largely the same during and after the war, home education may be expected to have remained the same as well. This is true with respect to the role of mothers-in-law in training their daughters-in-law, the types of skills women were expected to master, and the continued importance of magazines as sources of information. However, a few key differences point to ongoing changes in the nature and structure of informal education. The first is the general breakdown of formal education during the war years and the decline in opportunities to gain an education, either formal or informal, during this time. The second is the significant change in the content of mass magazines during and after the war, which reflected both the reality of rural women’s lives and their engagement with the shift in *zeitgeist*. A third difference is that rural women in the early postwar period appear to have adopted a more vocal and critical stance toward the older women who were expected to train them, in contrast to the virtual silence on such conflicts during the war.

Rural magazines continued to be a source of informal education for women during the war. Rural families purchased *Ie no hikari* throughout the war years, in spite of increased rationing and shortages and despite the fact that the magazine itself, which had grown in length to more than two hundred pages by the 1930s, significantly reduced its page length in the last years of the war. The content of the magazine also changed, both to reflect the needs of women on the home front and to promote government propaganda. For example, the March 1943 issue ran articles on topics such as how to make bandages, grow food crops quickly, and avoid malnutrition, in between militaristic articles on American aggression, Manchurian war brides, and soldiers’ sacrifices in the field.<sup>59</sup> The July 1944 edition devoted about half of its forty-two pages to war stories, while the other half featured articles on how to make everything from compost to canvas shoes.<sup>60</sup> Here we might wonder what messages rural women would have read into the disjunction between the sections devoted to teaching them the skills they needed simply to survive and those that portrayed a highly idealized version of the war. Similarly, because all Japanese were expected to show exceptional unity and harmony during the war years, articles that explored topics such as the frictions between younger and older

women largely disappeared, though women undoubtedly still experienced such tensions. In this way, though magazines continued to act as a source of informal education, not all the lessons that they attempted to teach women appear to have been explicitly stated.

It was in part due to the responsibilities that women were forced to assume that women's and girls' education in other areas, such as reading and writing, appears to have declined. During the war years, rural women were called upon to fill a variety of positions left open by the shortage of men, such as repairing roads, delivering mail, and hauling charcoal.<sup>61</sup> While these occupations sometimes offered women the opportunity to learn new skills, as a whole they appear to have merely increased the time rural women spent on manual labor. Combined with disruptions in formal education in the last years of the war,<sup>62</sup> this suggests that women's opportunities to gain an education declined during these years.

After the war, *le no hikari* and other women's magazines changed their content again, printing dates and numerals in English and including articles and advertisements on topics such as patterns for Western-style dresses and English-language education.<sup>63</sup> In most of these cases, the English-language content was very limited, consisting almost entirely of *katakana* translations of English words paired with an explanatory illustration. When English words and letters were used, they most often appeared in abbreviations and in advertisements, suggesting that early English-language usage was largely decorative in the mass magazines that many rural women would have read. Yet their presence also illustrates how magazines continued to educate rural women by making foreign words and ideas familiar to readers who would otherwise have had few ways of gaining such knowledge.

With respect to learning from older women, however, rural women in the early postwar period appear to have become less willing to accept older women as mentors, and voiced their discontent with them increasingly through public forums. For example, Ōno Fumiko, a 45-year-old housewife in Akita Prefecture, wrote the following to the women's magazine *Fujin asahi* (Asahi magazine for women) in July 1950:

My role [in the household] is teaching and raising the children and backup house-keeping, but having above all to ask grandmother's [her mother-in-law's] opinion on everything gives me a lot of grief. . . . Even with the scrubbing work, where I'd like to use several cloths at once to save time, Grandma won't allow me to use more than one cloth at a time.<sup>64</sup>

Here, Ōno describes how little she values the opinion of her mother-in-law, whom she elsewhere describes as “stubborn” and “superstitious.”<sup>65</sup> Although the structure of the family requires that younger women learn from older women, and although Ōno herself teaches various skills to the younger women and children in the household, she feels considerable scorn for her own mentor. She describes her efforts to combat her mother-in-law’s dictates as follows:

At the last meeting of the weekly Village Housewives’ Association, we were told that . . . we have to confront our grandmas, and there were even some people who said that getting into fights with them was inevitable. But for me such things are just impossible. I tried calmly reasoning with her, but Grandma is stubborn. Well, I think the only way to do it is to talk about my feelings with others and try to gain supporters—then as a group we can try to move her.<sup>66</sup>

Ōno explains how, though she finds that she is unable to follow all of the association’s advice, she relies on it as a place to vent her frustrations and gather the supporters she feels could help her eventually change her mother-in-law’s mind. Her story illustrates both the friction between older and younger generations and how women turned to public forums to rail against their home teachers and attempt to undermine them.

Similarly, Mizoue Yasuko, an ethnographer who focused on rural women and who was herself born in a farming village in Hiroshima, noted that mother-in-law/daughter-in-law conflicts topped the list of the complaints that young farm women from the Shimane prefectural women’s association had submitted to the Third Annual Conference on Women in 1956. The women imagined how much better their lives would be if it were not for the older generation, and expressed the desire to live under their own roofs rather than continuing to live with their parents-in-law.<sup>67</sup> The fact that their average age was twenty-three—almost half Ōno’s age—indicates that generational conflicts were not limited to farm women in any one age group. Rather, women in different age groups appear to have heeded the postwar era’s call to embrace change by turning increasingly to their peer groups for support and guidance in public forums instead of to older women at home.

### **Conclusion**

To return to the question of the primary barriers that prevented rural women and girls from gaining a formal education, Benjamin C. Duke has argued in his recent book on modern Japanese education that rural resistance to education in the Meiji period was based on several factors, such as high taxes, the lack of moral content in education, and



girls' inclusion in the same classrooms as boys. Whereas the temple schools (*terakoya*) that spread widely in the Edo period had reflected local values by largely excluding girls, who were thought to learn best by receiving training in housework and child care at home, the modern, national school system forced both sexes to attend and was focused on academic subjects such as science and math.<sup>68</sup> Duke argues that such changes were met with resistance not merely because of the educational content—which differed from what and how children learned at home and in temple schools, and may not have been seen as particularly useful to farm families—but simply by virtue of changing long-standing rural customs. Duke believes that farmers' resistance to changes in custom was the main reason parents stopped sending their children to school, thus actually increasing the gap between male and female education in the early years of the Meiji period.<sup>69</sup>

In contrast, Maeda Takashi has argued that resistance to education, and particularly to girls' education, was not directed at education per se but at the imposition of Confucian-based samurai values and a lack of practicality in the modern educational system. Maeda states that the older generation's negative attitude toward education in the early Meiji period extended to both sexes, and revolved around the fear that children would not learn the skills needed to continue the household.<sup>70</sup> Though women and girls traditionally learned the skills that they needed by memorizing and repeating what they saw and heard at home, such skills were not limited to raising children and doing housework, as Duke suggests, but included skills that touched upon everything from farming to cocoon production. Maeda notes that his own grandmother mentally kept track of the sums that more than a hundred clients owed the family, and could recall events that had occurred many years ago even when she was at an advanced age.<sup>71</sup>

My research suggests that rural girls' and women's difficulties in accessing a formal education were likely more along the lines of what Maeda has proposed than Duke. As the case of Inamura Hanshirō's mother shows, families adjusted their expectations of how much formal education to give their daughters depending on what would help the family survive, which for the Inamuras meant preparing Hanshirō's mother to take over the family headship in case it became necessary for her to do so. For other families, such as the Ichikawas, basic literacy, along with etiquette and other skills, were coveted markers of status. Later accounts, such as those of Kawamata Haya and Kawamata Masa, suggest that although farm girls were pulled out of school more often than boys were, one of the most compelling reasons for doing so was their families' reliance on their labor, which was needed both to keep a household running and to generate income. In these instances,

family survival, prestige, and income clearly carried more weight than did some of the factors that Duke proposes, such as schools’ lack of moral education and mixed-sex classrooms. Other factors that influenced whether a girl could gain such an education include a lack of educational facilities, concerns over daughters’ welfare, and the woman or girl’s personal commitment to education—all of which could play significant roles in limiting or enhancing farm girls’ opportunities to gain a formal education.

As for what helped them overcome these barriers, Duke’s data on school attendance, which he draws on to conclude that the educational gap between the sexes may have widened, only shows that the number of girls who were attending either the new schools or the *terakoya* (which had been closed) was very low; they do not show how many girls continued to be educated either in their own homes or in someone else’s. As I have shown here, informal education constituted an important part of rural girls’ and women’s education in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and included a range of practical skills that taught them how to run a household, maintain local traditions, and in some cases produce goods for sale. Rather than resisting change, some rural women learned new skills and embraced new technology over the course of their lives. By the 1930s, mass-circulation magazines had begun contributing to this process, bringing women a wide range of information, helping them sharpen their reading skills, and inculcating the idea that women could not only learn from others but also teach themselves.

The benefits that rural women gained from informal education may be one reason that it persists as a contemporary method of teaching and learning. Kubota Ken’ichi has argued that some of the educational techniques whereby rural women learned skills at home, such as learning by observing behavior, which he believes dates to the Edo period, continue to influence educational practices.<sup>72</sup> James McLendon has found that lifelong learning—what he defines as self-cultivation—was a way for older women to find meaning in their lives and even, in one case, to improve a woman’s performance at work.<sup>73</sup> The concept of lifelong learning also helped define Japanese educational reform in the late 1980s and has shaped some of the scholarship on rural men’s and women’s education.<sup>74</sup> Thus, the long-standing methods of teaching and learning that shaped rural women’s informal education remain relevant in both men’s and women’s education, even as formal education has become universal.

What rural women were ultimately able to achieve thus ranged widely. Whereas poorer women spent most of their time working, and thus seem to have been unable to take advantage of either formal or informal educational opportunities, women such as

Nakamura Michi achieved a high level of skill at sewing and making clothes, and seem to have enjoyed the personal satisfaction of contributing to their family's welfare. Both Ichikawa Fusae and Hirabayashi Eiko's stories reflect experiences that are more typical of what contemporary readers might imagine when discussing women's educational achievement, but their educations were extraordinary in comparison to what other rural women were able to accomplish. In these ways, the education that rural women gained was remarkably diverse, and came from both formal and informal sources.

### Notes

1. See, for example, P. F. Kornicki, Mara Patessio, and G. G. Rowley, eds., *The Female as Subject: Reading and Writing in Early Modern Japan* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies, 2010); Richard Rubinger, *Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007); Martha Tocco, "Made in Japan: Meiji Women's Education," in Kathleen Uno and Barbara Molony, eds., *Gendering Modern Japanese History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 39–60.

2. The survey participants consisted of 352 women and 404 men aged 15 to 64. Those labeled "partially literate" could read and write numbers, *katakana*, and *hiragana*, but not Chinese characters (*kanji*). See Shibuta Takashi, "Yomikaki nōryoku chōsa nitsuite," (Regarding the survey on reading and writing ability) *Kyōiku* (Education), (April 1948): 62–75.

3. Mayuzumi Kimine, "Unfolding Possibilities through a Decolonizing Project: Indigenous Knowledges and Rural Japanese Women," *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 22, no. 5 (2009): 507–26; Akitsu Motoki et al., eds., *Nōson gender: josei to chiiki he no atarashii manazashi* (Gender in farming villages: A new look at women and region), (Tokyo: Shōwadō, 2007).

4. Margaret E. Burton, *The Education of Women in Japan* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1914), 27.

5. Takie Sugiyama Lebra, "Japanese Women in Male Dominant Careers: Cultural Barriers and Accommodations for Role Transcendence," *Ethnology* 20, no. 4 (October 2006): 291–306.

6. Herbert Passin, *Society and Education in Japan* (New York: Kondansha International, 1983); Robert P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

7. Tocco, "Made in Japan," 39–60.

8. Tocco, "Made in Japan," 43.

9. P. F. Kornicki, "Women, Education, and Literacy," in Kornicki, Patessio, and Rowley, eds., *The Female as Subject*, 7–37.

10. Rubinger, *Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan*. The case of the farmer's daughter is drawn from Yakuwa Tomohiro, "Kinsei Echigo no minshū to manabi," in Aoki Michi and Abe Tsunehisa, eds., *Bakumatsu ishin to minshū shakai* (The Meiji revolution and commoner society), (Tokyo: Kōshi shoin, 1998), 125–29.

11. *Tokugawa bakuhan ofuregaki* (Tokugawa edict, 1649), cited in Maruoka Hideko, *Nihon*

*nōson fujin mondai* (The woman problem in Japan’s farming villages), (New York: Kōyō shoin, 1937), 79 (my translation). Night work (*yonabe*) usually consisted of needlework and other small tasks.

12. Takahashi Satoshi, *Minshū to gōnō* (The common people and wealthy farmers), (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985), 14–15.

13. Takahashi, *Minshū to gōnō*, 15.

14. Rubinger points to a few examples where this may indeed have been the case. See Rubinger, *Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan*, 33.

15. Anne Walthall, “The Family Ideology of the Rural Entrepreneurs in Nineteenth-century Japan,” *Journal of Social History* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 463–83.

16. Ichikawa Fusae, *Ichikawa Fusae jiden* (Collected works of Ichikawa Fusae), (Tokyo: Shinjuku shobō, 1974), vol. 1 (Senzen hen): 4–5; Hirabayashi Eiko, interviewed and edited by Okada Takako in Okada, ed., *Kaze ni mukatta onnatachi* (Women against the wind), (Tokyo: Chūsekisha, 2001), 99.

17. Ogawa Sachiyo, “Asadake no joseitachi” (The Asada family women), in Kinsei Joseishi Kenkyūkai, ed., *Edojidai no onnatachi* (Women of the Edo period), (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1990), 79–117; Yabuta Yutaka, “Nishitani Saku and Her Mother: ‘Writing’ in the Lives of Edo Period Women,” in Kornicki, Patessio, and Rowley, eds., *The Female as Subject*, 141–50.

18. Ichikawa, *Ichikawa Fusae jiden*, 4–5 (my translation).

19. According to Ichikawa, the family had become impoverished as a result of various undertakings and so, though still landowners, only farmed about 7 or 8 *tan* (1.72 to 1.96 acres) of land by the time she was growing up. According to the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, families with 5 *tan* to 1 *chō* of land made up 32.5 percent of the farming population in 1910, with approximately one-third of the population owning less than that and one-third owning more. The wealthiest landowners, who owned 2 *chō* or more, composed the top one-tenth. See Nōrinshō Nōrin Keizaikyoku Tōkei Chōsabu, *Nōrinshō ruinen tōkeihyō* (Annual statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), (Tokyo: Nōrin tōkei kyōkai, 1955), 4.

20. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*, 240–41.

21. In the case of Matsuo Tase, different accounts suggest different sources for her writing skills. For a discussion of these, see Anne Walthall, *The Weak Body of a Useless Woman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 21–23.

22. Walthall, “The Family Ideology of the Rural Entrepreneurs,” 471; Walthall, *The Weak Body*, 21–23.

23. Ichikawa Kiyoshi, “Kinsei minshū no kazoku kyōiku” (The home education of commoners in the early modern period), in Igeta Ryōji et al., eds., *Ie to kyōiku* (Home and education), (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1996), 52–81.

24. Yakuwa Tomohiro, “Kinsei shakai to shikiji” (Early modern society and literacy), *Kyōikugaku kenkyū* 70, no. 4 (December 2003): 54–65.

25. Such factors would have tended to inflate the literacy rates of men to correspond to normative expectations of men’s superiority in reading and writing. For this reason, we cannot know precisely how women’s literacy compared to men’s. Yakuwa discusses further issues regarding the survey material in “Kinsei shakai to shikiji,” 55–57.

26. In the case of Okayama, the high literacy rates for both sexes may be a legacy of the policies of the local daimyo, who had placed a particular emphasis on education. See John W. Hall, *Government and Local Power in Japan, 500 to 1700* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

27. Yakuwa, “Kinsei shakai to shikiji,” 58–59.

28. Yakuwa, “Kinsei shakai to shikiji,” 58.

29. Yakuwa, “Kinsei shakai to shikiji,” 58.

30. The rates are  $r = -0.47$  for men and  $r = -0.68$  for women, where  $r$  is the coefficient for the correlation between the ability to sign one’s own name and the amount of farm work one did (the negative indicates that it is an inverse relationship). Yakuwa, “Kinsei shakai to shikiji,” 58.

31. The low school attendance rate does not indicate whether, or how many, girls were home schooled. However, given that the figure is very low, it suggests that women’s education was not highly valued, and thus literacy is unlikely to have been very high. Passin, *Society and Education in Japan*, 46, 47.

32. Kiyokawa Ikuko, “‘Sōtei kyōiku chōsa’ ni miru gimusei shūgaku no fukyū” (The spread of compulsory education as observed in the “Survey on Planned Education”), *Kyōiku shakaigaku kenkyū* 51 (October 1992): 111–35.

33. Passin, *Society and Education in Japan*, 56–57.

34. Monbushō, ed., “Gimu kyōiku nengen no enchō” (The lengthening of the number of years of compulsory education), in *Gakusei hyakunen shi* (One hundred years of the educational system), at [http://www.mext.go.jp/b\\_menu/hakusho/html/hpbz198101/hpbz198101\\_2\\_053.html](http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpbz198101/hpbz198101_2_053.html), accessed 12/10/2010.

35. Kawamata Haya, interviewed and edited by Higashi Toshio in Higashi, ed., *Josei no shigoto to seikatsu no nōsonshi* (A history of farming villages through the work and daily lives of women), (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shōbō, 1989), 61 (my translation).

36. Kawamata Haya, in Higashi, ed., *Josei no shigoto to seikatsu no nōsonshi*, 61.

37. Kawamata Masa, in Higashi, ed., *Josei no shigoto to seikatsu no nōsonshi*, 78–79, 84–85.

38. Hirabayashi, in Okada, ed., *Kaze ni mukatta onnatachi*, 97 (my translation).

39. Ichikawa, *Ichikawa Fusae jiden*, 5; Hirabayashi, in Okada, ed., *Kaze ni mukatta onnatachi*, 98.

40. Gail Lee Bernstein, *Isami’s House* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 83–96.

41. Interestingly, Inamura does not give his mother’s name, but refers to her as “Mother” throughout the text. This reflects both the memoir style of the text, which was written in memoriam, and the somewhat old-fashioned custom of not referring to women by name (perhaps his mother would not have liked having her name publicized). Inamura Hanshirō, *Aru nōfu no isshō* (The life of a farm woman), (Tokyo: Nōsangyoson bunka kyōkai, 1980).

42. Inamura, *Aru nōfu no isshō*, 14–15.

43. Inamura’s father was not allowed to stay at the house until he had performed about four years of labor for his mother’s family. The marriage appears to have been consummated when his mother turned sixteen. Inamura, *Aru nōfu no isshō*, 22–23.

44. Inamura, *Aru nōfu no isshō*, 34–35, 83.

45. Inamura, *Aru nōfu no issshō*, 60–63.

46. Inamura himself had much less confidence in his skills, and describes his feelings of extreme anxiety when, as a recent graduate who had only done a few hands-on experiments under the close supervision of an expert at the agricultural school, he first experienced having the family’s livelihood literally in his own hands. He credits his mother’s assistance and confidence in him as the main reasons he was eventually able to come to manage the family’s sericulture. Inamura, *Aru nōfu no issshō*, 60–63.

47. Nakamura Michi, “Nōson no daiku no musume toshite sodatsu” (Growing up the daughter of a rural carpenter), in Yuzawa Yasuhiko ed., *Sobo, Hahatachi no musume jidai* (When our grandmothers and mothers were young), recorded by Nagafuji Kiyoko (Tokyo: Cress shuppan, 1999), 32–33 (my translation).

48. Nakamura, “Nōson no daiku no musume toshite sodatsu,” 34–35.

49. Nakamura, “Nōson no daiku no musume toshite sodatsu,” 35.

50. Nakamura, “Nōson no daiku no musume toshite sodatsu,” 34 (my translation).

51. Inaba Kōichi, *Gokuhin no mura no kurashi* (Life in a destitute village), (Kyoto: burakumondai kenkyūjo, 1995), 110–11.

52. Senichi Kōtarō, ed., *Nōson fujin no seikatsu wo miru* (A look at the daily lives of farm women), (Tokyo: sangyō kumiai chūokai, 1936).

53. Ulrike Wöhr, “Discourses on Media and Modernity: Criticism of Japanese Women’s Magazines” in Ulrike Wöhr, Barbara Hamill Sato, and Sadami Suzuki, eds., *Gender and Modernity: Rereading Japanese Women’s Magazines* (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese, 1998), 15–37.

54. Some rural women shared magazines with their friends. See, for example, Miyake Kiyoko, “Watashitachi no ichinichi” (A day in our lives), *Fujin asahi* (July 1950): 45.

55. Itagaki Kuniko, *Shōwa senzen, senchūki no nōson seikatsu: zasshi ‘ie no hikari’ ni miru* (A look at daily life in farming villages in the prewar and wartime periods through the magazine *Ie no hikari*), (Tokyo: Sanreishobō, 1992), vii.

56. See, for example, Kusuhara Shigeru, “Tsuzurikata no jyōzu ni naru hō” (How to become skilled at writing), *Ie no hikari* (February 1937): 224–45, reprinted in *Ie no hikari* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1993), vol. 58.

57. Saiki Sachi, “Bibyō shinryōhō no kōhyō” (A report on how to cure nasal illnesses), *Ie no hikari* (December 1936): 190, reprinted in *Ie no hikari* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1993), vol. 58. For father figures, see, for example, Yunoki Uma, “Enpitsu no monogatari” (The tale of the pencil), *Ie no hikari* (November 1932): 192–98, reprinted in *Ie no hikari* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1993), vol. 34.

58. Kimura Tsuneyoshi, “Nihon zasshi hattatsu shi (2)” (A history of the development of Japanese magazines), in *Sōgō janarizumu kōza*, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Naigai shuppan, 1992), 245. Mochizuki Yuriko, who was born in Yamanashi Prefecture in 1900, also claims to have bought the first edition of the feminist magazine *Seitō* (Bluestocking) when she was a child. See Mochizuki Yuriko, in Okada, ed., *Kaze ni mukatta onnatachi*, 33–34.

59. Akiyama Kunio, “Bōgyaku America no seitai to hataraku” (Working with the true nature of the American tyranny); Fujimatsu Seishiro, “Tairiku no hanayome wo tazunete” (Visiting the

brides of the continent); Egawa Ryō, “Imorui zōsan no kyūsho” (The secret to increasing the yield of tubers); Katō Takeo, “Wa ga chi, wa ga tsuchi” (Our blood, our soil); and Kageyama Kume, “Kyūkyū sankakukin” (Emergency triangle bandages), all in *Ie no hikari* (March 1943): 26–29, 58–66, 62–67, 68–71, 86–87, reprinted in *Ie no hikari* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1993), vol. 91.

60. Various authors, *Ie no hikari* (July 1944): 1–23, 26–33, reprinted in *Ie no hikari* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1993), vol. 20.

61. Itagaki Kuniko, “Sōryoku sentaisei to nichijō seikatsu: nōson” (Total war and everyday life: Farming villages), in Hayakawa Noriyo, ed., *Sensō, bōryoku to josei* (War, violence, and women), vol. 2: Gunkoku no onnatachi (Women of the wartime state), 144–72.

62. See, for example, Tanaka Tetsuko, “Making Balloon Bombs,” in Haruko Taya and Theodore F. Cook, eds. and trans., *Japan at War: An Oral History* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 187–92.

63. See, for example, Matsumaru Keiko et al., “Fujinyō sweater to cardigan” (Women’s sweaters and cardigans); Koike Chieko, “Akikuchi ni kiru blouse to skirt” (Blouses and skirts to start off the fall season); Waseda University Press advertisement; and Tokyo School of Handicrafts, “Yōsō” (Western-style sewing) advertisement, all in *Ie no hikari* (September 1953): 212–17, 220–24, 127, 167.

64. Ōno Fumiko, *Watashitachi no ichinichi* (A day in our lives), *Fujin asahi* (July 1950), 40 (my translation).

65. Ōno, *Watashitachi no ichinichi*, 38.

66. Ōno, *Watashitachi no ichinichi*, 40 (my translation).

67. Mizoue Yasuko, *Nihon no teihen* (Japan’s base), (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1958), 11.

68. Benjamin C. Duke, *The History of Modern Japanese Education* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 160–61.

69. Duke, *The History of Modern Japanese Education*, 162, 170.

70. Maeda Takashi, *Onna ga ie wo tsugu toki* (When women continued the family), (Suita: Kansai University Press, 1992), 5–6.

71. Maeda, *Onna ga ie wo tsugu toki*, 4–5.

72. Kubota Ken’ichi, “‘Soaking’ Model for Learning: Analyzing Japanese Learning/Teaching Process from a Socio-Historical Perspective,” Kansai University publication, Education Resources Information Center (April 28, 2007): 1–6.

73. James McLendon, “The Office: Way Station or Blind Alley?” in David W. Plath, ed., *Work and Life Course in Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 156–82.

74. See, for example, Inaba, *Gokuhin no mura no kurashi*.

---

## From Compensating Comfort Women to Compensated Dating

Sharon Kinsella

The critical retraction of unpaid female labor—servicing, reproductive, caring, and sexual, resulting in a generalized “care deficit” (Allison 2009: 101)—permeated news journalism in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s. Female refusals, offensives, and fictive recuperations of freely provided care likewise permeated film, novels, and *manga*. This retraction of female service appeared to be having a corrosive impact on the strength of the family, labor force, and population, and it appeared from across national borders, too, in the form of the campaign for compensation of former “comfort women” (*ianfu*) that ran through the 1990s and the 2000s. Japan’s problem with women seeking more money was both literally and metaphorically bound up with government conduct of international relations, whether figured as a war-impact and international-relations problem in the wake of Japan’s Pan-Asian Empire or as a domestic gender-relations issue. It was entrenched in a thick and sometimes convoluted cultural symbolism accumulated through a long and particular history of prostitution that was keyed into class and colonial relations.

From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, entertaining and apparently frivolous news reportage and cultural production focused on a new story: schoolgirls selling sexual services on dates called *enjo kōsai*—variably translated as “compensated” or “assisted” dating. This article looks at the close interaction and slippage between the theme of comfort women and the media space given to compensated dating in the 1990s, as a means of exploring the network of metaphorical and symbolic language of reportage and culture. Underlying concerns about the present and ongoing conditions of the relationship

---

**Sharon Kinsella** has published on cuteness, the adult *manga* magazine industry (*Adult Manga 2000*), girls’ culture, and *otaku*, and her book *Schoolgirls, Money, and Rebellion: Male Imagination in Contemporary Japanese Culture* is forthcoming. She is a lecturer on Japanese visual culture in the School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom.





Figure 1: This article looking back over “Ten Years of Girl Prostitution: In the Wake of Compensated Dating” (April 8, 2003) uses the anonymous image of a barefoot girl in school uniform walking on the shore with cash in her hand as its headline photograph. Reproduced with kind permission of *Spa!* magazine.

between women and money charged both of these issues, and hinted at the challenge of generalized female retraction facing the Japanese state and economy. Not only were the issues elusively entwined, but compensated dating was also, perhaps effectively, a placebo news event through which compensating comfort women could be morally and politically managed and obscured.<sup>1</sup>

One of the core images of the media narrative on purportedly deviant schoolgirls in the 1990s was a schoolgirl grasping a wad of 10,000-yen notes in her small hand (Fig. 1). Following the seepage of news about schoolgirls involved in a new style of amateur sex work known as “compensated dating” into the broadsheet press in 1996, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s 1996 Youth Survey (TMG 1997) investigated the levels of involvement among schoolchildren in the capital region. The results of this

summer survey, widely reported in the media, suggested that 4 percent of high-school girls had done compensated dating. The statistic of 4 percent was derived from the individual responses of 37 high-school girl respondents among 1,291 self-completion surveys returned, from a total of 5,000 distributed. At points this statistic was defended as indicating little more than dinner dates for cash, but mostly it was suspected of being sexual intercourse for cash and goods. “There’s no misrepresenting the meaning of ‘Compensated dating at 4 percent’” claimed the *Sunday mainichi* (November 3, 1996), while *Kōhyō* journal presented the same single figure as a quality of all teenagers: “The Experiences of the ‘Compensated Dating 4 Percent Generation’” (*Kōhyō*, July 1997).

Sexual experience and experience with money were entwined taboos in imagery and reportage. In fact money and brand-name goods came to stand in for prostitution to such a degree that cash began to take on a sexual aura, while new purchases, especially

handbags and brand-name makeup pouches, were cast in the role of erotic bodies. The theme of sexual attraction to new purchases crossed over into English-language reportage, too. Mayumi Ohshima, “29, a Tokyo home-maker,” was cited in the *Wall Street Journal*, for example, as saying, “The economic slump doesn’t matter. Tonight, I’d like to sleep with this bag beside me” (September 23, 2003). Girls appeared everywhere and then seemed to disappear into their accessories as the focus of the camera moved to their phones, handbags, and other brand-name goods, thereby disaggregating the girls themselves into an assemblage of products—and reconfirming in a lateral manner, perhaps, Luce Irigaray’s 1977 thesis that the “*The virginal woman . . . is pure exchange value*. She is nothing but the possibility, the place, the sign of relations among men. In and of herself, she does not exist: she is a simple envelope veiling what is really at stake in social exchange” (Irigaray 1985: 185–86, emphasis in the original).

One of the devices used to structure reportage by magazine editorial and television crews was to ask girls to tip the contents of their bags or purses on to a square of red cloth laid on the ground, to show the camera their personal possessions. Reporters looked especially for cash, personal organizers, lists of telephone numbers, brand-name wallets, cell phones, and expensive cosmetic pouches and cosmetics. Merely the appearance of these items on a page or screen was enough to stimulate ideas about precocious acquisitiveness and prostitution. Through the lens, these examinations bore a resemblance to miniature sex scenes in which the jumble of sexual bodies on rumpled sheets had been exchanged for shiny brand-name objects caught flagrante on the rumpled red cloth. *Views* magazine featured this handbag investigation technique in early reportage in 1996, and listed the contents of one schoolgirl’s bag as a “makeup pouch, a system date book, mobile phone, and a wallet—containing condoms” (*Views*, April 26, 1996).

This school “pocket-inspection” style of surveillance recurred across both the entertainment and news media. In 1997, for example, an episode of the popular variety show *Japan: What a Weird Place! (Koko ga hen da yo Nihon!)*, hosted by Beat Takeshi, showed a documentary insert of high-school girls filmed on the streets to its home and studio audiences.<sup>2</sup> Footage showed the production team asking girls in *kogyaru*-style school uniforms to empty out their bags on the pavement and to explain their contents.<sup>3</sup> Through the camera, audience attention was focused on expensive items such as mobile phones, brand-name pouches, and . . . a Hermes bracelet. The owner of the bracelet was asked to calculate the total value of the items in her bag and replied succinctly, “About four hundred thousand yen.” The interview ends at this point, and the audience is left to

imagine and presume how the schoolgirl had bought or earned these expensive gadgets. Just as cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall suggested of British media representations of race, so in this reportage on girls, “what is visually produced, by the practices of representation, is only half the story. The other half—the deeper meaning—lies in *what is not being said, but is being fantasized, what is implied but cannot be shown*” (Hall 1997: 263, emphasis in original).

In televisual and photographic representations of compensated dating, it was *getting money* as much as *offering sex* that lay at the center of the fascination. Television producers plumped up their footage by excavating red-light districts in search of young women in school uniforms. For example, in late 1997 resident *combi* hosts of the variety show *Downtown (Dauntaun)* met a girl dressed in a classic sailor-suit school uniform in a red-light (*fūzoku*) establishment (Fig. 2). On the screen *telop*, lettering relayed to viewers that she could earn as much as “800,000 yen!” in one day. The woebegone state of the young woman, who appears to be nursing a broken arm in a cast, is not commented on in this television vaudeville. The Kansai-based mockumentary skit *Three Old Men (San nin no oyaji)*, aired in 1996, featured comical and explicitly “set up” (*yarase*) documentary-style encounters between rude young women and long-suffering older salarymen (Fig. 3). An annoyingly scruffy *kogyaru* squats on the paved pedestrian plaza with her friends and replies on cue to the “old bloke’s” predictable question “What is your dream?” with the equally scripted ironic quip, “I want to get rich!” Money-grubbing schoolgirls also became fashionable references in advertising and product design. The international sportswear manufacturer Fila marketed a snowboard in 1998 called the *Sexy Ranger*, designed by



Figure 2: Hosts of the television show *Downtown (Dauntaun)* discover that girls in school uniform earn big money—“800,000 yen!”—in a day. November 1997.



Figure 3: “Okanemochi ni naritai” (“I want to get rich!”) the grubby *kogyaru*-style young lady sitting on the pavement is scripted to say in a 1996 TV skit *Three Old Men (San nin no oyaji)*.

Tanaka Hideyuki. The “sexy ranger” is depicted in ads as a sassy schoolgirl character in micro-shorts uttering the slogan “Money, That’s all I want.”

The leading weekly current affairs magazine *Shūkan bunshun* presented another example of this ubiquitous *receiving money* motif in its weekly talent photo shoot (*gravura*) situated at the front of the magazine. For its November 27, 1997 issue, *Bunshun* commissioned Nakama Yurie, a seventeen-year-old media talent with a respectable image, to pose as a well-heeled quasi-schoolgirl figure interacting with anonymous businessmen. Wearing school-regulation-style knee socks and loafers, Nakama is shown serving waffle biscuits to male office workers on the roof of an uptown building. In another full-page shot, she appears as a slip of a girl dressed up as an adult (*otona-kei*) in a women’s business suit. She is clutching a shiny cardboard Chanel shopping bag, suggesting an expensive purchase, and reclines in a posture of gratitude and supplication against the stone wall of a bank-like edifice. Facing her and with his back to the camera is a virile suited male figure with whom she appears to have recently engaged in a secret exchange (*Shūkan bunshun*, November 27, 1997).<sup>4</sup> The vanity of schoolgirls chasing luxury handbags bearing haute bourgeois European brand names became distilled into a powerful and rigid national stereotype. The ugly materialist schoolgirl grasping a Chanel bag was the motif for the “character” of the Japanese people in a short 2010 animation lampooning consumerism, entitled *Japan—The Strange Country*, by Tanaka Ken’ichi.<sup>5</sup>

### **Hidden Connections between Images of Schoolgirls and Comfort Women**

Despite significant connections in the terminology and subject at hand, compensated dating (*enjo kōsai*) was rarely directly connected to the other inflammatory news story of these years—that of former Asian comfort women (*jūgun ianfu* or *moto ianfu*) who had been forced to provide sex for the Japanese military during the Pacific War, and who began making legal claims for apology and compensation from the Japanese government from December 1991 onward. But a number of intriguing connections suggest that there may have been an inchoate and camouflaged link between these two sex and compensation news stories of the 1990s and 2000s.

Let us investigate how these stories may have interacted by first of all returning to the official statistics on the numbers of girls involved in compensated dating. The percentage of schoolgirls stating that they had done compensated dating in the 1996 TMG Youth Survey carried out in Tokyo (TMG 1997) was widely interpreted as the most reliable statistical indicator of the extent of schoolgirl prostitution at a *national* level. Specialists

such as Miyadai Shinji even argued that compensated dating was less visible but more widespread in provincial backwaters and the “illusory suburbs” (Miyadai 1997). A quick calculation of what the implied situation would then have entailed at the national level in 1996 provides an intriguing social scenario. At the time the 1996 TMG Youth Survey was conducted, there were just over 2.25 million middle-school girls (2,213,163) and about the same number of high-school girls (2,263,214), for a total of about 4.5 million Japanese schoolgirls.<sup>6</sup> If the 3.4 percent of middle-school girls and 4.4 percent of high-school girls saying that they had done compensated dating in (the earlier and original count of) the 1996 TMG Youth Survey were applied to the national populations of middle- and high-school girls, respectively, the results would suggest that there were about 175,000 (174,829) middle- and high-school girls getting involved in compensated dating.

Moreover, if the claim of the fraction of respondents who indicated that they had done compensated dating—namely, that most of this dating activity had been carried out within the last one to three months—were factored into this calculation, the resulting projected scenario would be of just under 200,000 schoolgirls getting involved voluntarily with something considered close to amateur prostitution between April and June of 1996. This figure is substantial: equivalent to the population of a small city, almost four times the number of registered prostitutes in prewar Japan (Garon 1997: 94), or about the same as the higher-end figure given for the number of comfort women utilized by the Japanese Imperial Army between 1940 and 1945, which is frequently reckoned by historians to have been up to about 200,000 women (Yamazaki 1999: xxv; Yoshimi 2000: 91–96).

The public was de facto invited to consider the hypothetical scenario of perhaps 175,000 schoolgirls launching their careers as prostitutes—and each groping to find a way to meet customers for “compensated dates”—in the summer of 1996. The possible appearance of this summer offensive belonged not so much to the realm of institutional youth deviance studies as to that of a peculiar collective sexual fantasy. It was a fantasy unfailingly transmitted to entire households in teatime news broadcasts throughout 1996 and 1997. In relation to this, Miyadai Shinji wryly observed that “Information about murder, rape, and suicide are circulated in the news media quite freely. So long as it is labeled as *reportage* on an aspect of a subculture, the media has an excuse to circulate these themes as normal news and entertainment” (interview with Miyadai Shinji, Shibuya, February 5, 1999). It was also a fantasy that corresponded neatly to the cultural image of schoolgirls as an army of sexy rebels taking over the high streets and station shopping malls that prevailed in pop culture, film, and literature in the 1990s and 2000s.

Could this cultural fantasy have been fortified and stimulated at a subterranean level by the recently reawakened memories of wartime comfort women? The vision of a silent and mobile army of sexualized schoolgirl deviants—like the literal guerilla tactics of the schoolgirl revenge gang in the straight-to-video film *Bom!* (2002), or the strange offensive of ranks of suicidal schoolgirls in the film *Suicide Circle* (2001)—presented a distorted vision of the recently reawakened history of the several hundred thousand women who had been forced into sexual servitude as comfort women to the Japanese imperial forces.

The fact is that the first broadsheet articles about prematurely sexualized schoolgirls requesting compensation from Japanese men were not about fashionable schoolgirls strutting about Tokyo in the late 1990s. Articles on the nation’s schoolgirls engaged in selling their *buru-sera* gym pants to fetish shops,<sup>7</sup> and later “discovered” searching out compensation for sex, had been published in a slow trickle between 1989 and 1995, and coincided with the first controversial rash of articles involving new evidence, and the testimonies and claims, of former comfort women (*moto ianfu*) about what had happened to them when they were teenagers shipped to the garrisons of Imperial Japan. Liberal news sources printed shocking descriptions of the experiences of young Korean girls in the Pacific War—“Thirteen years old and alone in a truck” (*Asahi shinbun*, September 3, 1991)<sup>8</sup>—being brutally transported to labor in Japanese factories dotted across the continental Japanese empire, and “rounded up” for other more ambiguous sorts of “physical work” under the aegis of the Girls Labor Volunteers Corps (Joshi Teishin Kinrō Kai). In December 1991, the first named Korean plaintiff, Kim Hak-Soon, who had been sold to a Japanese comfort station in China when she was sixteen years old, filed for an apology and compensation in Tokyo High Court. On January 11, 1992, the *Asahi shinbun* newspaper stirred controversy, anger, and conservative reaction by announcing in headlines, “Comfort Stations, documents show military’s involvement” (Seaton 2006: 103).

New archival evidence uncovered by historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki showed that the Japanese military had systematically organized the abduction of girls to military comfort stations. Later in 1992, the jarring testimony of a former Japanese teacher, Ikeda Masae, who claimed to have been given orders to recruit girl students and to have himself been responsible for sending six of his female students from Bangsan elementary school, in Seoul, to become comfort women in Japan, was reported in broadsheets in Korea and Japan. Articles with titles such as “For Five Years Every Day Was Misery: At 16 Years Old I Was Molested by a Policeman” (*Mainichi shinbun*, March 5, 1992) and “At Fourteen My Body Was Broken” (*Asahi shinbun*, August 7, 1992) began to appear in both

special reports and regular columns dedicated to transmitting “Statements of the Reality of Sexual Labor” (serialized in *Mainichi shinbun* through to August 2004). Comfort women were typically teenagers and sometimes schoolgirls at the start of their bondage, and as Ueno Chizuko has remarked, there was a tendency within both the Korean and the Japanese media to discuss these women as though they were morally righteous to the degree that they were “immaculate victims,” namely, virgins before being enslaved in comfort stations (Ueno 2004: 89). In August 1993, Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei, a senior politician of the Liberal Democratic Party, acknowledged and apologized for the system of coerced labor and comfort stations,<sup>9</sup> marking the beginning of the emergence of a pugnacious nationalist reaction against the inglorious addition of comfort women into Japan’s official and taught national history.

Throughout this period and on into the later years of the 1990s, journalists also posed estimates about the potential financial cost of compensating surviving comfort women. In 1992, reports appeared about increasing pressure from the Korean government, under titles such as “Individual Compensation Payments to Former Comfort Women Considered” (*Asahi shinbun*, August 12, 1992). The fear of paying out from the national coffers an enormous sum of compensation money lay behind the stream of updates on court cases involving claims to compensation. A deep conflict and situation of counter-bidding also emerged between the Korean and Japanese governments, sparked by the refusal of the Japanese government to provide official government compensation (*hoshō*) to comfort women. The Korean government offered a different type of financial compensation (*seikatsushien*, *shienkin*) to Korean former comfort women who rejected the financial and welfare assistance offered to them by the Asian Women’s Foundation (AWF), the Japanese NGO established in 1997 to compensate former comfort women through public contributions combined with indirect government funding. Estimates were lodged about how much “life assistance money” might be appropriate.

The terms (and kanji characters) used to discuss the funding and compensating of comfort women (*shienkin*, *hojokin*) overlapped with but were not generally identical to the language alighted upon a few years later to describe compensation (*enjo*) of high-school girls. Take, for example, the *Yomiuri shinbun* article “Financial Support for Former Comfort Women of Korea” (*Kankoku, moto ianfu ni shienkin*), published on February 7, 1993. In other articles, however, it was precisely the term *enjo* that was used to describe compensation to comfort women. For instance, an article titled “Financial Compensation for Former Comfort Women” (*Moto ianfu ni kinsen enjo*) was printed in the *Asahi*

*shinbun* on March 30, 1993, and commentary on a “Bill to Provide Assistance to Former Comfort Women” (*Moto ianfu ni enjo hoan*) appeared in *Chūgoku shinbun* on April 11, 1993. The compensation indicated in these headlines referred to the amount of money that Korean government representatives had suggested that the Japanese government ought to pay out to each individual Korean comfort woman: 700,000 yen for each of the 135 qualified claimants who had come forward to make a claim at the time these articles were printed. In March 1998, ongoing tussles between the two national governments over the figures involved in compensation brought the topic back into the limelight. While the Korean government announced that 155 women should each receive 3.6 million yen each, the Japanese government responded that the Asian Women’s Foundation and not the Japanese government itself would compensate each woman who came forward with a single payment of 2 million yen plus free health care.

The narrative of prostitute schoolgirls willingly selling their clothes or bodies to Japanese men interacted on subtle and moral planes with the shocking disclosures in the news about the sexual slavery of comfort women (*ianfu*). (Both the girls and men involved, incidentally, were sometimes presented rather like wartime soldiers: as faceless and mindless ranks of salarymen or schoolgirls.) On close examination of this news field of soft metaphors, slippages, and sexual allusions, it becomes clear that the narrative of compensated dating is a perfect mirror inversion of the story of comfort women. The dominant narrative on *ianfu* is the story of innocent young women—many of them schoolgirls, and colonial subjects within the Japanese empire—who had been led away against their will and then brutally sexually exploited by guilty Japanese men, and who were now finally filing lawsuits against the Japanese government for a national apology and compensation. The narrative of *enjo kōsai*, in contrast, is about greedy young women—especially middle- and high-school girls, also under the direct jurisdiction of the Japanese state—who are guilty of voluntarily selling their bodies for large sums of compensation extorted from Japanese men, and who deserve stricter punishment for their unacceptable behavior. The later compensated dating story appears to rewrite the former one. Most significantly, it served to shift the focus of guilt from the government, and Japanese manhood in general, to opportunist girls in the Japanese domain. Interestingly, the number of news and journal articles published on both “comfort women” (*ianfu*) and on “compensated dating” (*enjo kōsai*) peaked in 1996 and 1997 (Fig. 4). Journalism on compensated dating appears to shadow dance with that on comfort women.<sup>10</sup>






Figure 4: A comparison of the number of news articles containing the terms “comfort women” (*ianfu*) and “compensated dating” (*enjo kōsai*) in their titles, between 1990 and 2007.

Producers, activists, and critics sympathetic to a broadly feminist perspective saw political and historical connections between exploited Asian women and Japanese schoolgirls. The Osaka branch of the international NGO End Child Prostitution and Pornography in Asian Tourism (ECPAT), founded in Bangkok in 1992, was active in campaigning against Asian sex tourism as well as domestic juvenile prostitution and pornography throughout the 1990s. From 1993 to 1994, ECPAT organized a campaign against what it defined as “child porn” in the weekly magazines (*shūkanshi*), especially *Shūkan Gendai* and *Shūkan Post*. It was principally opposed to the high-quality and sometimes scantily clad photo shoots of school-age upcoming female media stars (*tarento*) in these magazines. ECPAT was formative in pushing for an anti-child-prostitution law that would criminalize not only sex tourism, pornography, and child abuse by Japanese traveling in other Asian countries but child pornography, abuse, and prostitution in Japan as well (interview with Sonozaki Toshiko, Kansai ECPAT, January 26, 1999).

Disbursers of the Asian Women’s Fund (Ajia Jōsei Kikin) saw a similar issue at stake and released funds for extensive surveys on compensated dating that were carried out in the Tokyo region in 1997, in addition to funding research to gather evidence on comfort stations in former colonies. Professor Fukutomi Mamoru, the lead researcher of

the two-part 1997 AWF Survey on compensated dating (AWF 1998), suggested that, by 1997 at least, the goals of the AWF were to promote “gender equality” (*danjo byodo*) in the present as well as to compensate and atone for crimes against comfort women (email exchange via former AWF Survey research team member Iu Miyoko at Tsukuba University, February 7, 2008).<sup>11</sup> The AWF had thus extended its remit to funding research on “issues related to gender problems,” leading to the commissioning of a sociological exploration of “the phenomenon of ‘men who buy’ women [and schoolgirls]” in contemporary Japan, too (*ibid.*).

In a 1997 article titled “Fleeing from Compensated Dating and History,” prominent cultural creator, theorist, and commentator Ohtsuka Eiji argues that the common attitude attributed to schoolgirls—namely, that “selling themselves or their pants causes no one any trouble”—effectively implies that the men who buy these commodities don’t have any responsibility for the damage that might be caused by this exchange. He then draws a parallel between this fixed “picture of schoolgirls” (*joshikōseizō*) who feel free to sell themselves and the argument made by right-wing critics of history textbooks that the comfort women were prostitutes engaging in a business for which only they themselves could be held responsible: in both cases, the men who had sex with schoolgirls and the national army that ran comfort stations are made to appear external to these happenings. Ohtsuka argues that it is therefore critical to teach about comfort women in school textbooks: “Making middle-school girls learn about the existence of comfort women would be more effective than anything else in getting them to understand that being ‘free to sell pants’ is a product of a particular history” (Ohtsuka 1997: 32–33). The thread of logic in his argument may appear somewhat convoluted, but the final point of comparison is precise: the morality of or about schoolgirls must be connected consciously with the morality of using and denying comfort women.

The serious matters lurking close to the surface of topical and flamboyant cultural content on high-school girls’ antics appeared across a range of *manga*, films, and novels, too. In the leftist and idealistic film *Bounce Kogyaru!* (1997), militant schoolgirls who offer companion services with the intention of getting money from men without providing sex forge an instant alliance with a Chinese hostess, after being insulted and humiliated by their shared male client in the restroom of a nightclub. Later, the lead character, Lisa, walks out of a date with an elderly Japanese war veteran who has paid her to sit and listen to his self-adulatory reminiscences about how he selected and assigned ranks to comfort women during the war—according to their bone structure. In another compensated

dating film, *Love and Pop* (1998), based on Murakami Ryū's two-volume script, the lead schoolgirl is yelled at by Captain EO, an eloquent and abusive customer of her dating services, who finally throws 4 yen at her as she cowers in the shower, telling her that this is her payment because that is what she would be paid for child sex in India.

Rule-breaking schoolgirls and their immodest habits—putting on makeup on trains, for example—attracted the ire of rightist writers with broader platforms of reactionary gender and national politics. Hayashi Michiyoshi, the author of a series of articles on traditional parental roles and a book on *Reviving Fatherhood* (1996), criticized the poor and selfish mothering hovering in the psychological backgrounds of girls involved in comfort-seeking behavior such as compensated dating (Hayashi 1997: 8). Caricatures of comfort women and soliciting schoolgirls are featured alongside each other in Kobayashi Yoshinori's controversial rightist *manga* account of Japan's role in the Pacific War, entitled *On War* (*Sensōron*, 1998), which also presents, as its subtheme, a hostile and revisionist account of various "types" of women in Japan. The opening pages of Yoshinori's book depict a panoramic scene of a rotten society, with schoolgirls in *kogyaru* garb grubbing around seedy-looking salarymen at Shibuya crossing. Kobayashi sets the scene for his political comic on this double page: "Here is peace . . . festering a little here and there, a peace based on a foundation about which no one knows." This scene links the "rottenness" of deviant schoolgirls to the corrupt basis of postwar peace. Later in the same volume Kobayashi portrays comfort women as similarly opportunistic and sly-looking females who slouch with their legs open for business, and glean money from the "miserable earnings" of common soldiers by providing each of them with as little as "five or six seconds" of "wretched sex" (Kobayashi 1998: 280–81). In *On War* schoolgirls and comfort women alike are portrayed as cunning prostitutes who exploit men to earn hard cash.

### **Compensated Dating as a Metaphor for National Shame**

In articles with titles such as "Compensated Dating Is the Whole of Japan" (*Asahi shinbun*, April 20, 1997), "In the Land of Compensated Dating" (*Shūkan kinyōbi*, December 13, 1996), and "Japan the Embarrassing Nation" (*Asahi shinbun*, March 27, 1997), compensated dating was presented as an example of the shameful endpoint of a national moral pragmatism. The first of these listed above was written by the politician and novelist Tanaka Yasuo, and argues that since "the commercialization of sex" (*sei no shōhika*) permeates Japanese culture, from prewar Ginza to the use of military comfort women and onward in postwar corporate entertainment, it is an absurdity to remove

comfort women from middle-school textbooks. The story of *enjo kōsai* was repeatedly linked, if not quite literally then morally, etymologically, and metaphorically, to comfort women. One commentary on “The World in 1996” claimed that “compensated dating” was a slippery concept directly reminiscent of wartime euphemisms:

The art of the naming of “compensated dating” (*enjo kōsai*) is similar to that of “comfort women” (*ianfu*), and it highlights the ingenuity of the Japanese language. It incorporates a tradition formed half a century earlier in which realities such as “all soldiers were killed” were phrased as “all soldiers died a hero’s death,” and “retreat” was worded as “a strategic move,” and “the occupying force” was referred to as “the stationary force.” It is difficult for adults to argue that compensated dating is morally wrong because the customers of the girls are adults of their fathers’ generation. (*Asahi shinbun*, December 29, 1996)

Common and constant shifts of topic between “schoolgirls” in general and “Japanese schoolgirls” illustrated the oscillating focus of interest—between female shame and national shame. Schoolgirl prostitutes and national cultural symbols such as bonsai and pine trees are juxtaposed in Masuyama Hiroshi’s collage artwork.<sup>12</sup> Other artists who helped depict the schoolgirl as a cipher for national diplomacy and identity include Aida Makoto, whose 1995 *Beautiful Flag* (*Utsukushii hata*) shows a disheveled but righteous Japanese schoolgirl, in sailor-suit uniform and grasping the pole of a national flag, meeting her counterpart Korean schoolgirl in a wasteland. In a later painting, *Harakiri joshikōsei* (1999), in this series, War Picture Returns, Aida painted a *kogyaru*-style uniformed schoolgirl committing *seppuku* (self-immolation) and “imagined her having austere values like a samurai” (interview with Aida Makoto, June 30, 2010). Acclaimed female artist Tabaimo, in contrast, put a cartoon of a disrespectful schoolgirl defecating the national flag out of her bottom in her work *Japanese Zebra Crossing* (2000).

Although “compensated dating” (*enjo kōsai*) per se was an obscure early postwar term with a limited circulation until its revival as a keyword in 1996, it works as a witty variation on the widely used technical and legal term for “aid” and “compensation” (*enjo*). Moreover, the pleasurable *jouissance* discernable in the term “compensated dating” is contingent on the insincere undertones of its anchor term, “compensation.” *Enjo* was used in the Meiji period to describe Japanese financial investments in raw-materials extraction in colonial regions. In 1918, for example, an entire department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was devoted to the “Department of Economic Assistance to Siberia” (*Siberia keizai enjobu*). In the postwar period and on into the 1950s, *enjo* was used to

refer to the various forms of “supplies aid” (*busshi enjo*), financial aid, and “development assistance” (*kaihatsu enjo*) that Japan received from the United States. Between 1946 and 1952, Japan received 2 billion dollars of such compensation from the U.S. (Nishigaki and Shimomura 1993: 141). In 1953, *enjo* was also used to describe the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Sōgō Boei Enjo Keikaku) implemented in the wake of the passage of the 1951 AMPO treaty. The term *enjo kōsai* in its earliest traced usage, in 1953, referred to the innovation of one-off paid dates (Maruta 2000: 212), and was almost certainly a topical play on words reflecting the irony with which the mutual defense program and American *enjo* in general may have been viewed in the 1950s. In glib jokes about the “compensated dating of nations,” the nuances of corruption embedded in the idea of “compensation” were rehearsed.<sup>13</sup>

Hints of the ongoing suspicion about the financial aspects of Japan’s relationship with the U.S. continued to lurk within aspects of the storytelling about compensated dating in the 1990s. For example, Hayami Yukiko’s 1996 breakthrough news article “Drunk/Tiger Girls” starts with the story of a high-school girl interviewee called Eriko, who had begun her career as an amateur prostitute a year earlier, after being approached by an American man in Shibuya who said, “I like schoolgirls. If I pay you, will you be my girlfriend?” (Hayami 1996: 62). The article seems to imply that compensated dating continues the psycho-national tradition of a feminine Japan being led and sexually consumed by a masculine America.<sup>14</sup> In the U.S., *Newsweek* magazine unwittingly reconfirmed its own role as an American counterpart in this international erotic subplot on the front cover of its Christmas Day 1996 issue, which featured the words “Japan’s Dirty Secret: Schoolgirls Selling Sex,” and a photograph of Japanese schoolgirls in *kogyaru*-style uniforms. Japan’s international shame over its treatment of women had slipped from the issue of comfort women to that of national schoolgirls.

Drawing from the official notion of a compensatory assistance (*enjo*), *enjo kōsai* also became a metaphor for corrupt and impure relations in general, and for corrupt international relations in particular. Thus an anti-colonialist article published in a minor magazine, *Impaction* (*Inpakushon*), insisted that “Japan should stop doing compensated dating with Asia!” (Pakuiru 1998). The article argues that the governments of Asian states such as South Korea have muffled and repressed domestic political and feminist movements—especially those seeking justice for comfort women, which would have disturbed their own comfortable governmental relations with Japan—in exchange for receiving much-needed financial *enjo*, or “compensation.” The writer argues that

increasing sums of compensation doled out until 1993—108 million dollars to Indonesia, 78 million to China, 64 million to the Philippines, 48 million to Thailand, 21 million to Malaysia, and 14 million to South Korea—have ensured that anti-Japanese movements have been gagged. The article lampoons the complicity of these dealings and further insists that “Japanese economic assistance to the Asian despots with which it must keep a relationship is no different than older men doing compensated dating with the young girls they simply *have* to have dates with” (Pakuiru 1998: 49). Stretching the connection even farther, the article goes on to compare the sudden vocality of Asian governments about comfort women after 1993 to the hypocritical clamor of schoolgirls criticizing older men for their indecent solicitations, yet (apparently) only after they have had their dates with them and gotten their cash.

Somewhat echoing the resistance of Korean comfort women to accepting financial assistance from the Asian Women’s Foundation, the debate about schoolgirls in the 1990s and early 2000s reveals that “receiving compensation” continued to be understood as a sign of a “political sellout” or of a compromising “complicity with an enemy.” Kuronuma Katsushi and Murakami Ryū, for example, compare the presumed attitude of girls at this time to the attitudes of their own generation in the 1960s: “We thought of adult society and money as approximately the same thing, and we had the notion that both money and adult society were dirty. The precise point was a bit vague, but receiving money from adults was unpleasant and controlling money was not cool,” leads in Kuronuma. “But now,” interjects Murakami, “They never imagine it as receiving emergency rations from their enemy” (Murakami and Kuronuma 1997: 297).

### Conclusion

Troubled thoughts about the cost of adequately compensating the former comfort women (*ianfu*) who were engaged in legal battles against the Japanese government from 1991 on—and coterminous thoughts about the cost of adequately compensating Japanese women heretofore unpaid for their domestic labor and roles as child-bearers and caregivers to the elderly—ran in close parallel with conversations about schoolgirls and their compensation in the 1990s and 2000s. In the context of these multiple discussions about compensating women, radical feminist Wakao Noriko argued a case for a legal recognition of the unofficial “compensation” earned by women through sexual work (Wakao 2003: 192–93). The notion of support or compensation ran through these concerns about care and reproduction. In 2009, for example, an innovative local “Welfare Bank” (*Fukushi*

*ginkō*) was launched in Kobe to which younger individuals could offer 30-minute units of “life assistance” (*seikatsu enjo*), mainly cooking and cleaning, to old and infirm members. The issue of legal or financial compensation for the underpaid or unpaid labor of women past, present, and future was moot on multiple levels, and has continued to be through the 2000s, as evidenced, for example, in one the key policies of the Democratic Party (DPJ) elected to power in August 2009, which was to provide a generous child benefit (*kodomoteate, joseikin*) of 26,000 yen a month per child to the guardians of each child under the age of fifteen years.<sup>15</sup>

Compensated dating can be understood as an extraordinarily resonant, influential, and profitable cultural fiction about teenage female deviancy that emerged from a particular history of negative stereotypes and cultural narratives about unmanageable young women. But there was also something more complicated and deceptive at play. Compensated dating operated as a placebo news event that both distracted from and reversed the meaning of other, less easily digestible (and less “entertaining”) questions of compensation and gender. Whereas the most significant aim of the campaign of former comfort women for apology and retribution was that they would not die with the label “prostitutes” still attached to them, the narrative of compensated dating insisted that schoolgirls in uniform—and hence likewise under state regulation—were all too willing to prostitute themselves. Media parades of images of and statements about “compensated dating” generated emotional and moral reactions, in which Japanese manhood and institutions took a strong moral high ground. Ironically, this news story had the effect of reversing the damaging impact of the comfort women testimonies on national moral status, rescuing Japan from that particular past national shame, if only domestically. Comfort women—who remain entirely absent from television entertainment, art, and film, despite relatively consistent news reportage—may thus have been pushed to the edges of public conscience and consciousness by the thrilling cacophony of news about teenage prostitutes.

### **Acknowledgments**

I would like to thank James Robidoux, Akiko Kuroda, and Julia Brady for special help and snippets of information.

**Works Cited**

- Allison, Anne. 2001. “Memoirs of the Orient.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 27, no. 2: 381–98.
- . 2009. “The Cool Brand: Affective Activism and Japanese Youth.” *Theory, Culture and Society* 26, no. 2/3 (March): 89–111.
- Asahi shinbun*. September 3, 1991. “Joshi kōin ‘Egi’” (Factory-hand girl “Egi”).
- . August 7, 1992. “14 sai . . . watashi no karada wa chigirareta” (At fourteen my body was broken).
- . August 12, 1992. “Moto ianfu ni dokuji hoshō wo kentō” (Individual compensation payments to former comfort women considered).
- . March 30, 1993. “Moto ianfu ni kinsen enjo” (Financial compensation for former comfort women).
- . December 29, 1996. “Sesō 1996: ano hitokotoba ni chotto hitokotoba” (The world in 1996: A word about that word).
- . March 27, 1997. “Hazukashii kuni Nihon” (Japan the embarrassing nation).
- . April 20, 1997. “Nihon zentai ga ‘Enjo kōsai’” (Compensated dating is the whole of Japan). By Tanaka Yasuo.
- Asian Women’s Foundation (AWF). 1998. *Enjo kōsai ni tai suru joshi kōkōsei no ishiki to haikei yōi* (Environment factors influencing high-school girls and their consciousness in relation to compensated dating). March. Referred to herein as “the 1997 AWF Survey.”
- Bornoff, Nicholas. 2002. “Sex and Consumerism: the State of the Arts.” In Fran Lloyd, ed., *Consuming Bodies: Sex and Contemporary Japanese Art*. London: Reaktion.
- Chūgoku shinbun*. April 11, 1993. “Moto ianfu ni enjo hoan” (Bill to provide assistance to former comfort women).
- Dower, John. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company / The New Press.
- Früstück, Sabine. 2003. *Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan*. London, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Garon, Sheldon. 1997. *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- The Guardian*. See under Higgins below.
- Hall, Stuart. 1997. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. London and California: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Hayami Yukiko. 1996. “Toragyaru osorubeki enjo kōsai: Joshikōsei saisentan rupo” (The horrifying compensated dating of the drunk/tiger girls). *AERA* 9, no. 16,: 62–65.
- Hayashi Michiyoshi. 1996. *Fusei no fukken* (Reviving fatherhood). Tokyo: Chūō shinsho.
- . 1997. “Fusei no fukken wa dekiru! Kawai Hayao shi e no hanron” (Reviving fatherhood is possible! A rebuttal of Kawai Hayao). *Shokun!* (December).
- Higgins, Andrew. October 30, 1996. “Teenage Kicks.” *The Guardian*, p. 4.
- Irigaray, Luce. 1985. *This Sex Which is Not One*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. First published in 1977.



- Kinsella, Sharon. Forthcoming. *Schoolgirls, Money, and Rebellion: Male Imagination in Contemporary Japanese Culture*. Under review.
- Kobayashi Yoshinori. 1998. *Shin Gōmanism Sengen Special: Sensōron* (New audacity manifesto: On war). Tokyo: Gentōsha.
- Kōhyō*. July 1997. “‘Enjo kōsai 4% sedai’ ga yobikakeru taiken” (The experiences of the ‘Compensated dating 4 percent generation’). Vol. 34, no. 6: 26.
- Leheny, David. 2004. *Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Mainichi shinbun*. March 5, 1992. “Kuyashii hinichi gonengan mo, 16 sai no toki ni keikan ni ranbō saretā” (For five years every day was misery: At 16 years old I was molested by a policeman).
- Maruta Koji. 2000. “Giji-ibento to shite no enjo kōsai” (Compensated dating as a pseudo-event). *Osaka jogakuin tankidaigaku kiyō* 30: 209–22.
- Miyadai Shinji. 1997. *Maboroshi no kōgai* (Illusory suburbia). Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha,.
- Murakami Ryū and Kuronuma Katsushi. 1997. “Joshikōsei to bungaku no kiken” (The danger of schoolgirls and literature). *Bungakkai* (January): 282–97.
- Newsweek*. December 25, 1996. “Japan’s Dirty Secret: Schoolgirls Selling Sex.” Front cover and p. 15.
- Nishigaki Akira and Shimomura Yasutani. 1993. *Kaihatsu enjo no keizaigaku* (The economics of developmental aid). Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Ohtsuka Eiji. 1997. “Enjo Kōsai to rekishi kara no tōsō” (Fleeing from compensated dating and history). *Ronza* 3, no. 6 (July): 30–35.
- Pakuiru. 1998. “Nihon wa Asia to no ‘enjo kōsai’ wo yameyo” (Japan should stop doing compensated dating with Asia). *Inpakushon* (Impaction) 110 (October): 32–52.
- Seaton, Philip. 2006. “Reporting the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue, 1991–1992: Japan’s Contested War Memories in the National Press.” *Japanese Studies* 26, no.1 (May): 99–112.
- Shūkan bunshun*. November 27, 1997. [Photo shoot with Nakame Yurie; no title or captions], pp. 5–7.
- Shūkan kinyōbi*. December 13, 1996. “Enjo kōsai no kuni ni” (In the land of compensated dating), p. 62.
- Spa!* April 8, 2003. “Shōjo baishun no Jū nen shi: enjo kōsai tachi no sono ato” (Ten years of girl prostitution: In the wake of compensated dating), pp. 24–28.
- Sunday mainichi*. November 3, 1996. “‘Enjo kōsai 4%’ no imi wo miayamarumai” (There is no misrepresenting the meaning of “Compensated dating at 4 percent”). Vol. 75, No. 50, p. 138.
- Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). 1997. *Seishōnen kenzen ikusei kihon chōsa [Heisei 8]* (Basic survey into youth health and development 1996). Tokyo: Seikatsubunkaka. Referred to herein as “the 1996 TMG Youth Survey.”
- Tsukuru. 1995. *Joshi kōsei to iu kigō* (The schoolgirl symbol). Tokyo: Tsukurusha.
- Tsurumi, Patricia. 1990. *Factory Girls: Women in the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ueno, Chizuko. 2004. *Nationalism and Gender*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Views*. April 26, 1996. “Joshikōsei zadankai: Enjokōsai tengoku, kyōfu wa oyabare dake”

(Discussions with high-school girls: Compensated dating is heaven—the only fear is being discovered by parents), pp. 26–29.

Wakao Noriko. 2003. “Baibaishun to jiko kettei: Gender ni binkan na shiten kara” (Prostitution and self-determination: A gender-sensitive perspective). *Jurist* 12, no. 37: 184–93.

Yamazaki, Tomoko. 1999. *Sandakan Brothel No. 8: An Episode in the History of Lower-Class Japanese Women*. Translated by Karen Colloigan-Taylor. London and New York: M. E. Sharpe.

*Yomiuri shinbun*. February 7, 1993. “Kankoku, moto ianfu ni shienkin” (Financial support for former comfort women of Korea).

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. 2000. *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II. Asia Perspectives*. Translated by Suzanne O’Brien. New York: Columbia University Press.

## Notes

1. Extended evidence for this argument and its fuller ramifications are explored in sections of my forthcoming *Schoolgirls, Money, and Rebellion*.

2. *Koko ga hen da yo Nihon!: Hen na joshi kōsei*, Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS), October 8, 1997, 9 p.m.

3. *Kogyaru* was an important term in the second half of the 1990s. In media coverage and girls’ fashion and lifestyle magazines, it identified glamorous, streetwise, and fashionably loose-looking schoolgirls wearing sexy clothes and customized school uniforms with baggy white “fall down” socks.

4. A keen interest in Japanese girls with money to spend on brand-name products was not limited to the Tokyo-based media. Andrew Higgins reported in the British broadsheet *The Guardian* that “The young women are not poor, but want money to indulge lavish tastes in a country where consumerism runs wild” (Higgins, “Teenage Kicks,” October 30, 1996).

5. This animation can be viewed at <http://vimeo.com/9873910>.

6. Population Census, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications. Figures accessed in 2005 at [http://www.jin-japan.org/stat/category\\_16.html](http://www.jin-japan.org/stat/category_16.html).

7. *Buru-sera* is derived from “bloomers” (blue gym pants) and “sailor” (from sailor suits, the traditional uniform of Japanese schoolgirls).

8. This article is titled “Factory-Hand Girl ‘Egi’” (Joshi kōin “Egi”) and was one in a series in *Asahi shinbun* on “Asian Women in the Pacific War.”

9. LDP politician Kōno Yōhei’s 1993 statements were seen as a grave mistake by future LDP leaders. Prime Minister Asō Tarō controversially attempted to reverse this earlier acknowledgment of comfort stations in 2007.

10. In his analysis of newspaper reportage on *ianfu*, Philip Seaton also comments on the power of the comfort women issue to set the style and theme of subsequent reportage: “The reporting of the ‘comfort women’ issue in 1991 and 1992 indicates many of the recurrent themes throughout the 1990s: documentary evidence vs. survivor testimony, moral responsibility vs. legal

responsibility, disputes over what apologies and compensation are necessary, and human rights vs. national pride” (Seaton 2006: 111).

11. Iu Miyoko was a junior researcher working on Fukutomi Mamoru’s team. She forwarded my list of questions to him and he sent his replies to her, and she sent them back to me. I asked Professor Fukutomi how the decision was reached in the AWF to begin handing out money for contemporary and domestic projects other than comfort women, he replied that he did not know about such matters because he had merely been commissioned for that survey.

12. See examples of Masuyama Hiroshi’s work in Nicholas Bornoff, “Sex and Consumerism.”

13. David Leheny (2004: 75) cites one instance of Buddhist writer Sawada Kantoku suggesting, rather counterintuitively, that Japan was the compensated dating partner of the U.S. because the U.S. financed the American bases in Japan.

14. See Allison 2001 for a summary of the ongoing metaphor of Japan as the *femme fatale* in a risqué interracial courtship between a vulnerable Orient and an infatuated and insistent Western man.

15. Details are located on the official DJP website at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/01.html>, accessed October 2009.

---

# A Room of Their Own: Time, Space, and the Self-Perceptions of Married Couples in Japan

Dalit Bloch

Ōnishi: I've never seen my parents holding hands as a couple, you know.

Dalit: And how about yourself? Do you sometimes hold hands with your wife outside the home?

Ōnishi: Well, now I don't . . . . Now we have the children so, you know. . . .

We hold hands as a family, but not any more just the two of us.

(子供がいるとあまりしないんですけど。...家族で手つなぐ、二人でっていうのは、もうないですね。)

Ōnishi Akihiro, 37 years old,  
husband of Mayumi and father of two

## What Makes Two People a “Couple” in Japan?

What exactly makes two people a couple? Is it something they do, or have? Must they be legally married, or deeply in love? Must they be young and childless, as implied in Ōnishi's words above? The answers to these questions are, of course, culture-bound and vary across societies, regions, and time. In English, the word “couple” means two people together, not necessarily married. It involves a taken-for-granted understanding that there is a *socially recognized* unit of two people that exists in its own right. In Japanese, *fūfu* is the most common word for a married couple.<sup>1</sup> But if we look beyond the formal

---

**Dalit Bloch** received her Ph.D. in 2010 from the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel. Her dissertation explores couple relations among young men and women who live in urban contemporary Japan. It probes their subjective interpretations about their own relationships and those of others, their day-to-day handling of responsibilities, and the management of emotions, closeness, and intimacy within the relationship. A postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel-Aviv University, Dalit also teaches in the Department for Asian Studies and the Unit for Culture Research there.

framework of marriage, are there other “elements” that two people need in order to think of themselves and be socially recognized as a couple, and to feel free to behave accordingly (for example, to hold hands in public), in present-day urban Japan?<sup>2</sup>

Much of the literature available on couples and relationships tends to provide scales, indexes, and models to measure components of close relationships, thereby providing clear-cut answers to the questions above.<sup>3</sup> For example, Huston (2000) offers that marital companionship should be assessed by the extent to which spouses talk to each other and spend leisure time together.<sup>4</sup> His perspective on communication as verbal, direct, and daily is clearly based on an America-centric conceptualization of relationships that cannot be easily adjusted to non-Western perspectives (see Dewaele 2008). Such prêt-à-porter models are thus of limited help in cases of phenomenological research such as the current study, which focuses on Japanese modern society, though it might be applicable to other places as well. Different individuals may form various kinds of spouseships: they may spend very little time together; they may live separately, as in the case of *tanshin-funin* (unaccompanied job transfers; Bassani 2007); they may have no sexual relations for some time (Shinomi 2001, Katō 2003, Kawakami 2007); and they may hardly converse—but do any of these variations make them less of a “couple”? In my view, the answer is “no.” I propose exploring the individual private experience of intimate relationships on the basis of what people say about their subjective experiences, so that concepts such as private space may mean more than one thing, and a relationship can do well with—or without—leisure activities together, heart-to-heart midnight talks, or vibrant sexuality. I argue that the spouses handle these and other elements in various ways, and that it is not just what they do (or do not do) that defines them as a couple, but their subjective interpretation and self-perception (*ishiki*) as such. Spouses may exercise their agency vis-à-vis social norms and constraints and create their own “togetherness” (following Beck-Gernsheim 1999) or, as Berger and Hill (1998: 20) put it, their own “bricolage” or “micro identity.”

Adapting the famous contention of Virginia Woolf, I use the phrase “room of their own” to describe this personal bricolage of couplehood. It pulls together various elements that reappeared in the words of my interlocutors, such as privacy; space; communication in its wider sense, including attentiveness, awareness, and sexuality; and resources such as time and money. The word “room” may be misleading, since it does not necessarily imply actual architectonic space within the house, measurable in square meters or tatami mats. Rather, it could be a metaphorical space that the couple may have. Accordingly, my interest goes beyond the actual availability of a master bedroom or of habitual couple’s

outings and recreation; I argue that a couple does not necessary need specific space in the house, or pre-decided time during which money is paid to a babysitter while they go out together without their children. Even in the absence of exclusive recreation time and separate sleeping space, they can still produce a “room of their own” in various other ways. To illuminate this claim I discuss four elements/aspects of this “room”: (1) sleeping arrangements, (2) spousal communication, (3) leisure activities, and (4) the way the partners perceive themselves (their *ishiki*). As mentioned above, I wish to go beyond legal or demographic aspects of couplehood (which have already received wide academic attention)<sup>5</sup> to the realm of subjective and personal meanings of the partners themselves.

### **The Couple as a New Social Category in Japan**

Before we delve into the metaphorical “room” of the couple, let me briefly discuss the word “couple,” which is a key concept in this study. The term describes two individuals who have an exclusive relationship with each other, and who together form a semi-independent, socially recognized unit that is separated from the wider familial unit to which they traditionally belong. Ideally speaking, the partners share responsibility toward their children and parents, and toward society at large; they also share material property (house, bank account, loans and debts) and emotional property (such as future plans and past memories), as well as intimacy, attachment, and care that they can “produce” and exchange in their mutual relationship. Following Argyle and Henderson (1984 and 1985, cited in Ting-Toomey 1991: 30), the interpersonal relationship itself is expected to be rewarding and not task-focused. I see the couple as a mode of life together, based on a sense of chosen<sup>6</sup> partnership that centers intensely on the house as the locus of the partnership.

Although subjective and private, my study explores couple relations against a wide range of transformations that are still molding and having an effect on contemporary Japanese society, including changes in the workplace and patterns of employment (Brinton 1989; Dasgupta 2003; Gill 2000; Honda 2004; Mathews 2004; Morimoto, Maruyama, and Seto 2006; Ogasawara 2003; Slater 2010), shifts in gender relations and balance (Ishii-Kuntz 1994, 2003; Ishii-Kuntz et al. 2004; Nakatani 2006; North 2009; Yazawa, Kunihiro, and Tendō 2003: 138–69), changes within the family and inter-generational relations (Mathews and White 2004; Yoshizumi 1995, 2003), major demographical developments (Raymo and Iwasawa 2008; Rebick and Takenaka 2006; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001), emerging social trends (“Yellow Cubs,” Kelsky 1994; “Cuties,”

Kinsella 1995; “Beautification,” Miller 2003; “Parasite Singles,” Yamada 2001; see also Eades, Gill, and Befu 2000), and shifts in the norms and discourses relating to values (Allison 2000; Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda 1995; Hirakawa 2004; Kumagai 1996; Iwao 1993; Matthews 2003; Orpett Long 2005).

I propose to see the “couple” as a social category, which, in its present form, is a new category in Japanese society that has taken shape during the last two decades against the background of the above-mentioned social changes in Japan and in response to parallel tendencies around the world.<sup>7</sup> Viewing the couple as a new social category may require clarification, since one may justifiably assert that there have always been husbands and wives in Japan and there is nothing new about their being a couple. However, my focus is not on the existence of the social categories of “husband” or “wife,” which are indeed not new. Nor do I mean the category of *fūfu*—the Japanese term for couple, which is made up of the combination of the character for “husband” and that for “wife” (夫 + 婦 = 夫婦), thereby conveying the meaning of a “*husbandwife*” unit. I argue that while there were always husbands and wives in Japan, over the generations their relationships have changed and have come to embody different meanings in private and popular perception. Conjugal partnership in the past tended to be more hierarchical, pragmatic, or functional, and often emerged from strict social norms and family pressure to marry (unlike the ideal of a “couple” described above).

In present-day Japan the family has been undergoing various changes, including in structure, size, intra-family relations, boundaries, and relations with the community and the state (e.g., Jolivet 1997; Hashimoto and Traphagan 2008; Ochiai 1997; Rebick and Takenaka 2006; Yamada 1998; Yoshizumi 2003). However, we should bear in mind that for a very long time the family, and particularly couple relations, were sites of tradition and conservatism.<sup>8</sup> As in other Confucian cultures such as China, Korea, and Vietnam, in Japan the extended family was the foundation on which nation and society rested (Cho and Yada 1994). Traditionally, marriage in Japan, as in many East Asian societies, was seen as a means of forming relations between families, whose best interests exceeded any private concerns of the two individuals involved in the marriage itself (Tsuya 1994; Huang 2005). This notion was very powerful in shaping marriage and relationships in the past, and some customs that originated in the *ie* (traditional Japanese family system, sometimes translated as “household”) survived for many years after its formal abolishment.<sup>9</sup>

Many writers (e.g., Hendry 1981; Yamada 1998, 2003; Yuzawa 1994) tend to see the end of the Second World War as a watershed in the history of couplehood in modern Japan.

In the 1970s the rise of feminist awareness, together with the images of romantic love and ideals such as the “friends-couple” (*tomodachi-fūfu*), which emphasized friendship and equality in marriage, flourished in Japan (Ochiai 1997) and placed more weight both on the couple’s self-sufficiency and on affection and partnership in marriage. Yuzawa (1994) asserted that marital relations in Japan after 1975 were characterized by both partners’ emphasis on “emotional satisfaction” and “equal partnership” as highly important factors in relationships. However, these ideals remained mostly unrealized because most couples led separate lives in two parallel worlds in terms of space, role, and gender: the man as breadwinner, and the woman as professional housewife (*salariman* and *senkyō-shufu*, respectively). Thus, ideal marital relationships were described as stable, reliable, and as taking their shape in the course of time, based on “mutual recognition of the need for a supportive relationship, commitment to the family, and genuine affection” (Iwao 1993: 75).

The postwar Japanese urban family was depicted by and large as revolving around the axis of mother-and-children rather than husband-and-wife, and this was the dominant image in the literature until the early 1990s or even later (Iwao 1993; Lebra 1984; Ochiai 1997; Osada 1987, cited in Moroi 2003: 66; Vogel 1968; Yamada 2003). Bassani (2007: 120) even writes that, unlike the spouse-centered family associated with modern Western societies, the Japanese family has been and *continues to be* child-centered, that is, the axis of the Japanese family is the mother-child dyadic relationship. However, she emphasizes the changes of the last two decades and asserts that “as individualistic values become increasingly normalized in Japanese society, family roles and relations are necessarily being reshaped. In particular, an increase in love-based marriage and a decrease in social and economic filial duty-based marriage suggest that the husband-wife relationship will be strengthened and set centrally within the family” (ibid., 126). Using these observations as a point of departure, I would like to focus specifically on how the spouses “produce” themselves and perceive themselves as a “couple.”

### **Methodology**

This analysis is based on field research during a period of three years (2001–4) in Yokohama, Tokyo, and vicinity, and embraces three major fields: observation through daily life (fieldwork), in-depth interviews, and analysis of popular-culture products. The men and women I interviewed were by and large in their thirties. They were mostly middle class, and all were heterosexual, born to Japanese parents and raised in Japan, and had married or were dating a Japanese partner.<sup>10</sup>



Here I focus only on those couples who had children, since their being parents emphasizes the questions raised above concerning couple awareness and parental awareness, and highlights gradual shifts in deeply rooted perceptions, such as that of the “child’s best interests,” which are resistant to change (see Yamada 1998 for what he terms “for-the-children’s-sake” ideology). Couples with children have to work harder to construct themselves as a couple, which cannot in any case be taken for granted. Thus I focused on young parents in their thirties—a strenuous stage in one’s life course, replete with professional demands, financial (e.g., mortgage) pressures, and family-related obligations (aging parents, small children)—so that their efforts to actually create “space” for themselves as a couple should be seen in the light of these onerous conditions.

### **Sleeping Arrangements: *Kawa-no-ji* or “Master Bedroom”?**

This family-way-of thinking and couple-way-of thinking, I think they are not the same in Japan. Before the children are born, this is a couple; but as soon as you get pregnant, this is a family.

ファミリの考え方とカップルの考え方っていうのが、日本の場合一緒にはならないかなと思います。子供ができる前はカップルですけど、できたとたんにファミリになってしまう。

Ōnishi Akihiro

Childbirth turns the partners into a mother and a father, social roles that extend beyond mere biological fact and bear heavily on every aspect of the partner’s life. Couples who raise a child or children cope with a different situation than childless couples, which of course is not unique to Japan. However, before I heard statements such as the quotation above, I did not realize how much Japanese spouses’ perception of themselves as a couple, and the way they are looked at by society, is connected to their family status (unmarried, married, parents, childless, etc.). From Ōnishi’s words above, it appears that “as soon as you get pregnant” (*dekita totan ni* できたとたんに), the spouses are not seen as a couple any more, but rather as a family.<sup>11</sup> Does this mean they cease to be a couple, or do they have—in addition to their parental consciousness and roles, which have already received wide coverage in the literature<sup>12</sup>—something that can be termed “couple awareness”? If the answer is “yes,” then how is this awareness expressed? In Israel, where I come from, young middle-class adults often maintain such “couple awareness” (or “identity”) by allocating time, space, and financial resources for that purpose. The assumption that underlies these practices is that a couple is not just two individuals who fulfill familial

roles as a mother and a father; rather, they are indeed a *couple*, and as such, they have their own needs. However, shortly after we settled in Japan and embarked on a routine family life, I became increasingly aware of the apparent lack of private “couple time” and “couple space” in the lives of my new Japanese acquaintances.

Had I asked Ezra Vogel about it fifty years ago, I suppose he would have told me that in Japan, parental-familial obligations override the couple’s needs. In his pioneering ethnography on middle-class families in Tokyo, conducted in the late 1950s, he wrote that in the past,

When the ideals of the *ie* were still strong and the bride belonged to the *ie* and not to her husband, no great value was placed on the privacy of the married couple. In the evenings, if free time were left after the bride finished her work, while others were awake, it was thought improper for the young couple to leave the family circle and retire to their own room, if, indeed, they had a room of their own. (Vogel 1968: 216)

Although drastic changes have taken place since these words were written, I nevertheless came to realize, through casual exchanges, daily encounters, and visits in friends’ houses, that many couples share their sleeping space with their children. And since this seems to contradict the notion of private “couple space,” or perhaps to indicate a lack of “couple awareness,” it deserves more careful observation. Using one example from my fieldwork, I would like to argue that “couple awareness” does not necessarily dependent on the availability of share time and space.

Mayumi and Akihiro Ōnishi, both in their thirties, co-slept with their children, a five-year-old son and three-year-old daughter. Mayumi was a housewife and Akihiro a corporate white-collar worker, living in a *jutaku-gai* (residential district) in the Tokyo suburbs. Akihiro told me that “all the family sleeps together, in one shared room. Our older son is five years old but he still sleeps in between us.” I told him that many of the people I’d met co-slept with their infant children. “Yes,” said Mr. Ōnishi decisively. “Everyone you ask, you’ll get the same answer!” By saying this, he placed a question mark next to things that seemed natural and obvious to me. “Everyone is like that!” implied that I was asking about something common and obvious—too obvious to explain. There was a moment of silence and then I asked, “But, I wonder: Don’t you think the couple need some time for themselves (*fūfu no jikan*), too?” To this Mr. Ōnishi immediately replied: “We worry (*Shimpai desuyo ne*) . . . if you can’t see the children—for instance, if they suddenly get a high fever in the middle of the night, become feverish, or something like

that.” He then told me about an incident two weeks before, when their youngest daughter had begun shivering all of a sudden in the middle of the night, and they had had to give her emergency medical treatment. “Had we slept in a separate room at that time, I really don’t know [what would have happened]. Therefore, on the contrary, I wonder what do the people in Europe do in case like that?”

Although Israel is not in Europe, I understood that his question was directed to me: What do *you* do when *you* sleep in a separate room, and *your* child is not well or is in urgent need? What do we do? It is very common to use a “BabySense” (a respiratory movement monitor),<sup>13</sup> which is thought to be efficient in preventing sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) and is in use during a baby’s first year (or two) in private homes as well as in hospitals. Mr. Ōnishi listened patiently to my explanation but obviously wasn’t convinced by my words. Finally, he concluded the subject by saying: “Well, anyway, it’s worrying” (*Yappari, shimpai desu yo*).

This exchange made me realize that being anxious about one’s child can have very different expressions. In my view, it was perfectly safe to put a baby in a separate bed, where a monitor would follow his or her breath and warn us in case of distress. This solution was perceived by Mr. Ōnishi with reservation and criticism that—despite his politeness—he found hard to conceal. In his view, the main argument in favor of joint parent-children sleeping arrangements is concern (*shimpai*) for the children.

In his explanation, we hear the echoes of the imperative concerning motherhood and proper child care, namely, that only direct and unmediated parental contact and protection can defend young children from various dangers to which they are exposed. This perception is reflected in the sleeping arrangements of two adults guarding their offspring from both sides. It is reminiscent of the character *kawa* 川, which signifies a river—the two long side lines are the parents, and the short middle line is the child—and it is therefore called in Japanese *kawa-no-ji* (literally, “the ideograph for river”). It seems that the Ōnishis have extended this perception to the idea that both parents are responsible together for providing a caring, secure, warm environment by their close physical proximity to their children during the night. The joint parent-children sleeping arrangement is seen as a manifestation of responsible parenthood, and it expresses, according to Caudill and Plath (1974: 277), “a strong cultural emphasis upon the nurturing aspects of family life and a correlative de-emphasis of its sexual aspects.”

This familial “togetherness” is not only reflected in sleeping arrangements but also shapes the “spatial configuration in the domestic space,” as Ozaki puts it. Ozaki’s

work treats housing forms as reflections of socio-cultural values, and contrasts Japan’s “family centered privacy” or “family-centeredness” with the “home-centeredness and a norm of individual privacy” (and probably conjugal privacy as well) in England (Ozaki 2001: 340). The interwar period in England and Japan saw two different housing forms. In England, “the typical family structure of the husband and wife and two or three children was reflected in the typical house form . . . with a *master bedroom* and rooms for children.” In Japan, however, “the term ‘privacy’ implied ‘familial privacy,’ because the family, not the individual, was the basic unit of society” (ibid.: 354; emphasis mine).<sup>14</sup> The introduction of personal space had to wait until the idea of personal privacy became common after World War II. Growing awareness of personal privacy in recent years in Japan has led to some changes in house plans, such as rapid increase in Western-style bedrooms with solid walls and a door, rather than removable paper walls (ibid.: 355). However, my impression is that among young middle-class parents, these notions are still not very common, and architectonically speaking, their expression is quite limited.

It should be emphasized that the questions discussed here are not merely architectural. It is not merely a question of whether or not the parents have a master bedroom, but more broadly whether they have “a space of their own.” Surely, a couple can have such a space even if they sleep together with their children—for example, they may sit in the living room or otherwise spend time together after their children go to sleep. I argue that what may initially seem to be two opposing conceptions—the one emphasizing the privacy of the couple and requiring the creation of a private, intimate space for them, and the other emphasizing the care and protection of the children by staying next to them throughout the night—may actually be compatible. In what follows I would like to show how the Ōnishi managed this seeming contradiction and constructed a private “metaphorical space.” I first explain how they turn their parental responsibility toward their children into a “site of closeness,” and then elaborate on the role of communication in their relationship.

### **Parents’ Responsibility as a “Site of Closeness”**

The theme of couple closeness regardless of external constraints was repeated in Mr. Ōnishi’s words. When I asked about the time he and his wife spend together daily, Mr. Ōnishi answered that every morning they spend about an hour together, with their children, before he leaves to work, and usually they also have time together after he returns from work and the children go to sleep—in the evening and during the night.

Dalit: And what do you usually do during that time?

Ōnishi: Lately we mostly talk. Mostly about the future, about what will happen next. . . . You see, my wife thinks that she would have liked to start working again, and I, too, I'm not happy with my present work. . . . This is why we discuss these things among us, and what will we do in the future (だから、お互いにそう言うところでこれからどうしようかっつと). And since we have kids, we cannot engage ourselves in adventures, can we? (で、子供がいると、なかなか冒険はできないじゃないですか) . . . It's scary. For example, what if a situation occurred and I wasn't able to provide food for my kids? The company I'm currently working for is my fourth [workplace]. But maybe I'll no longer be able to afford to change my workplace. Considering the best interests of the kids, it's probably best to remain in the same company for some time.

Here the heavy parental responsibility shows itself in anxieties concerning the financial future of the family and concerns about what choices the parents ought to make to secure the future of their children. On the one hand, it seems that the father's role as breadwinner has remained unchanged; on the other hand, the fact that he shares these fears with his wife, and talks with her about it almost every day, turns it into a shared responsibility. Planning the family's financial strategy—when will she return to work; should he or shouldn't he leave his job; who will take care of the children, and until what age—all these questions, when dealt with together by the couple, constitute a strong point of convergence between them. This in turn enhances exclusive and private communication, which reaffirms their exclusive partnership.

### **Communication as a “Place” of Couplehood**

Gathering my information about the Ōnishis, I realized that the role of communication looms large in their relationship. They met as biology students who worked under the supervision of the same professor. When they decided to get married they discussed their mutual future, and they continue to do so on a daily basis when their children are asleep. When he told me about this, Mr. Ōnishi said that his wife's way of reasoning is similar to his, and that their communication is very easy and fruitful. In fact, out of countless good attributes that he could have mentioned, he chose to mention first and foremost the fact that he and his wife think alike, and that they have good communication. Likewise, he said that, in times of disagreement, “We talk. First each one of us goes in a different direction, but later we move closer to each other.” Thus words and communication, even when they take time and effort, have tremendous power to solve problems for the Ōnishis.

As already mentioned, it appears that Mr. Ōnishi shares his work-related concerns with his wife. I realized that other people who told me they talked a lot with their partners actually refrained from talking about work-related matters and problems. But when I asked Mr. Ōnishi, he said:

Sure I do [talk to her about my work]. Perhaps I even tell her too much. I talk to her about everything openly, so my own stress and pressure become also her stress and pressure, which is not so great (話しますね。逆に、しすぎ。何でもオープンに話しちゃうんで、自分のストレスとかプレッシャーは彼女もストレス プレッシャーになっちゃうんで) . . . As I told you earlier, I’m not satisfied with my work right now. I started it three years ago, and now there’s this talk about my being manager there. . . . So, when I take all that talk about work and so on and bring it home and talk to her, she, too, listens to me, she’s together with me (そう言う話をうちに持ってきて彼女に話すと彼女も一緒に聞くんですよね). She says her stomach aches to hear all that (胃が痛くなるって).

The way Mr. Ōnishi said that he talks his stress out and his wife listens and shares it so somatically, and that it also happens the other way around, reminded me of the phrase “*a-un-no-kokyu*,” which refers to the subtle feeling of thinking something in common, in accord and harmony. When I brought this up, he said:

We have it often, yeah. We only see each other’s face and we already know. Since we got married, our thoughts and the way we see things have gotten so similar (うちはすごいありますね。お互いは顔見ただけでも結構わかりますし。結婚してからやっぱり考えること、あとは思いつくことがものすごい似ているんで). Even if we don’t say, “Oh, now you’re thinking about this and that,” we nevertheless know it. . . . If one of us says, “You think so-and-so, right?” then the other replies, “Yeah, you’re right.”

This description resonates with the ideal of husband and wife as one-heart-same-body (*isshindōtai*;—Lebra 1984, 2004), yet is markedly different from the pattern of communication described by Iwao (1993), Lebra (1984, 2004), Salomon (1975), and others, in which wives toil to communicate with taciturn and aloof husbands. In contrast, here we witness reciprocal and somatic communication that both partners value very much. A feeling of this shared communication surfaced from Mr. Ōnishi’s answers, so that I could almost hear the echoes of their nocturnal talks mentioned earlier. His use of words such as *otagai* (“each other” or “mutually”), and his use of the

suggestion form of the verb (*Dō shiyō ka*; “What shall we do?”) further emphasized their shared, mutual communication.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed, it is not surprising that in response to my question as to whether there is something he is particularly happy about in his marriage, Mr. Ōnishi said, “That I can tell her everything and she won’t get hysterical or depressed. . . . Good things, bad things, I tell her everything, she listens and comments.”

Three issues emerged from my conversation with Mr. Ōnishi: (1) the parent-children joint sleeping, and family-oriented rather than couple-oriented forms of recreation; (2) the heavy parental financial responsibility to provide for the children and the burden that this puts upon the husband, as the main breadwinner; and (3) the communication between the partners. Mr. Ōnishi, a broadminded, well-educated man, is an articulate and expressive person. His invitation to me to come and converse with him at his home, (rather than at his workplace, during working hours) was a sort of a statement that he found my research interesting and was willing to discuss it at length. My impression of him as an attentive and acute interlocutor was in accord with his repeated remarks concerning the importance that he ascribes to good communication between himself and his wife. I suggest that for the Ōnishis, communication is much more than a mechanism of household administration or child rearing—it is a sort of “metaphorical place.” For them, this private, somatic communication is a place of their own.

### **Parents versus Partners? Sexuality and Parental Care for Children**

In previous sections I discussed sleeping arrangements among couples who are also parents of young children, and mentioned that the need to provide a safe environment for infant children was raised by my interlocutors as an explanation for co-sleeping. The accepted wisdom is that the lack of private space will affect the couple’s sexuality (see Vogel 1968; Caudill and Plath 1974: 303). However, I suggest that we not conflate sleeping arrangements with intimacy and couple closeness. The mode of sleeping in itself does not necessarily indicate the level of intimacy between the spouses but only the common, socially sanctioned sleeping arrangement. Co-sleeping with their children does not automatically indicate distance between spouses, any more than sleeping in a double bed indicates closeness between them.

During my research, I met parents of infants who co-slept with their children but at the same time invested efforts and resources in their couplehood relations. Such was the case with the Kitanos—Midori and Shigeo—parents of three little children. Both spouses

work as designers: the wife, Midori, worked in a city office, and the husband, Shigeo, worked from home. Being at home during the daytime, he took many housework chores upon himself, since his wife was the main breadwinner. All five family members slept on mattresses (*futon*) laid on the tatami mats in one room, in the form mentioned earlier as *kawa-no-ji*. The sleeping arrangement was discussed in my conversation with Kitano Midori because I met the couple in their home and talked to Midori soon after she had put her children to sleep. She said that all the family slept in the same room, and added that it is said that when the child is still small, the family sleeps in the form of the character *river* (*chiisai uchi ni wa, kawa no ji ni natte neru tte iu'n desuyo*).

Since the Kitanos were unusual in how they managed their house and shared household chores, and because I had seen their spacious home in the suburbs and heard how they spoke about their relationship, I had somehow thought they would have their own separate sleeping space. I asked Midori: “Don’t you want to have your own room?” She replied:

Well, how shall I put it, they sleep very deeply, and once they fall asleep they don’t wake up again (寝りがふかいんで、寝ちゃうと全然もうおきないので). And besides, I suppose pretty soon they’re about to start saying they’ve had enough of it and they don’t want to sleep with us any longer (そのうちイヤでも自分たちと一緒に寝たくないって言いはじめると思うんで). But until this happens, we’re together. . . . Yeah. I really think it’s not going to take very much longer. . . . Anyway, I feel I do want to sleep with them now, you know (一緒に寝っていたいな〜と).

Midori told me with a smile that when the children fall asleep, they sleep very tightly and never wake up until the morning, and I understood her words to refer not so much to her children as to her relations with her husband. She may have presumed that I would make the connection and understand that sleeping together with the children does not necessarily imply giving up sexual relations. If the children are fast asleep, the parents may get by without a separate room of their own.

However, since I do not hold “space” to be the only or the most important factor to indicate closeness and intimacy, I wanted to observe other aspects of the spouses’ shared lives, such as shared time, communication, and couplehood awareness. When I asked about time the Kitanos spend together, Shigeo said:

We certainly have time together. Even after the children were born. My wife’s mother, our son is her first grandson. She loves the kids (すごい可愛がって



くれて), and every now and then she takes them for the weekend, and then the two of us, we have time for ourselves. . . . The children also love them—their grandmother and grandfather—very much, and they themselves ask to go there and sleep there. In this regard, we are entirely calm, and we can go, just the two of us, to eat somewhere or to a movie.

As a couple who is not well-off financially and who need to closely calculate their expenses, and as the parents of three young children,<sup>16</sup> the Kitanos take advantage of the precious resource provided to them by Midori's parents, who live nearby, in order to gain some “couple time.” For that to happen, the couple must first express interest in spending time together, and that, as I have seen, is not always the case. But it is not just the amount or quality of time they spend together; it is a matter of couple consciousness, as highlighted in the following. I asked Shigeo what advice would he give to a friend who was about to get married, since he was an experienced man, married for more than eight years, and he and his wife had dated for about eight years before they got married. He replied:

It's easy. First of all, to talk. That is, communication. . . . And there is something else: you often hear about men who mess around when their wives are pregnant (例えば、そう、奥さんが妊娠しているときに浮気とかよく聞きますネ), and I think that this is totally out of the question (そういうのは絶対しっちゃいけない). Well, the whole idea of messing around when you are married is unacceptable to me. I also think that when the woman is pregnant, it is so interesting, and she is beautiful when she is pregnant.

His view of the pregnant woman as beautiful and attractive stands in contrast to a common discourse in Japan about the lack or decrease of sexuality among married couples.<sup>17</sup> But Shigeo criticized men who engage in extramarital relationships (*uwaki*) when their wives are pregnant, and fiercely negated the very idea of *uwaki*. It may very well be that most men would have at least give lip service to the idea that a man should not have an affair while his wife is pregnant. However, Shigeo raised this issue himself, not in response to a question I posed. My impression is that he was truly expressing his beliefs, which fits well with his general attitude and all the other things I saw and heard from him and his wife.<sup>18</sup>

This impression was further strengthened when he added: “I would also have advised him not to call each other ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’” (お父さんお母さんとか、あれはやめた方がいい). Calling partners by their familial role was a common practice among the Japanese people I met. When the child was present, in the public domain (most of my

encounters took place in the public domain, or when I was a guest in private houses), most couples would call each other “Papa” or “Mama” (*Okā-san* or *Otō-san*). This practice is not unique to Japan, but in Japan these names coincide with the Japanese emphasis on parental roles in the family, and on the “child-oriented society,” in Bassani’s (2007) words. These names are residues from the extended family (*ie*) period, and they are also in line with the tendency to conceal private relationships from anyone outside the family (Lebra 1984).<sup>19</sup> Actually, Shigeo’s words coincide with, and perhaps even reflect, advice given by what Alexy (2011) calls “divorce professionals,” especially marriage counselors, as well as popular marital advice books and television programs.<sup>20</sup>

However, my daily experience stood in sharp contradiction to this advice, and taught me that this is still a very common practice. I therefore asked Shigeo: “So, what should they call each other?” He said: “In our case, we have known each other for a long time, so we have nicknames . . . .” “And why, in fact, do you say that one should not call his/her spouse ‘Mama’ or ‘Papa’?” I asked. He laughed and answered: “Because she is not my mother, of course.”

Shigeo said this in a somewhat grotesque way on purpose, and I therefore understood that for him and his wife, couple identity is not entirely subjugated to the parental identity or role. This conscious choice is part of their “couple awareness” and of the way they see themselves as a couple. And it is in line with their joint pastimes, their shared hobbies and profession, their conversations and mutual attempts to be attentive to each other’s needs, and the unusual way they manage their house and family.<sup>21</sup>

### **Why Not a Babysitter?**

In the general literature available on couplehood and relationships, it is common to measure companionship and closeness between the spouses by “the extent to which spouses talk to each other and spend leisure time together” (Huston 2000: 304). However, my own ethnographic materials suggest a different interpretation. In line with my arguments concerning couple awareness, I contend that it is not a product of, nor can it be measured by, the frequency or amount of time the two people spend together. To illuminate this, I discuss the issue of utilizing babysitting services among the people I met in Japan.

Recreation requires resources—time and money—and if the couple is to take time for themselves, someone must care for the children. This, too, is not merely a technical problem but a cultural and social issue that depends on the spouses themselves. The Kitano, for example, were quite unusual in this respect because they had babysitting

support from their family. In my conversations I often asked people whether they spent time alone with their spouses, what they enjoyed doing together, and how they managed to find time to be together. Mr. Ōnishi replied:

We both love music. My wife plays the piano, and I used to play in a band. Before the kids were born we used to go to brass-orchestra concerts. This is also one of the reasons we chose to live here—there are many jazz clubs around here, and we wanted to go out and hear music in the evenings. Well, [he smiles,] we now have the kids. You know how it is (ちょっと子供がいるとやっぱりね) . . .

My own immediate reaction to such a statement would probably have been to suggest that he and his wife hire a babysitter, and thus occasionally renew their days as fans of live jazz. However, this conversation took place after I had already spent enough time in Japan to know that this solution is usually unacceptable for Japanese couples. So I said: “In Japan people usually don’t call a babysitter, do they?” “Yes, this is how it is in Japan,” answered Mr. Ōnishi. “We have an Australian friend who teaches English here, and he always asks us, ‘Why don’t you simply call a babysitter?’ But we don’t (なんでベビーシッター頼まないのって言われるんですけど、そういうのはない). He says that he can’t understand it,” said Mr. Ōnishi.

“Yes, we can’t understand it,” I admitted, and found some comfort in his Australian friend. “You know,” Mr. Ōnishi proceeded, “for example, next week this teacher is organizing a party. And he told me: ‘Why doesn’t your wife come over, too? She can get someone to be with the kids and come along!’” (なんで奥さん来ないのって。子供を預けてなんで来ないのって) “Sure,” I told him, encouraged by the unexpected support from his Australian friend. “In such cases we leave the kids with someone. For instance, I ask my mother, and we both go out for a movie or something.” “Lucky you!” said Mr. Ōnishi.

From his words, we understand that it’s not that Mr. Ōnishi and his wife have not thought about using a babysitter. They are well aware of this option, as we see from his conversation with his Australian friend, who urges them to do so. Yet they decline it altogether. At the same time, when I told him about my mother’s support and the time I can thus spend with my partner, Mr. Ōnishi, whose parents and in-laws live a considerable distance away, did not conceal his envy.

He told me then that before their children were born, he and his wife went out often, but “then she [Mayumi] became pregnant, and our life changed completely (子供ができてからやっぱり生活が完全に変わったんですけどね) . . . Indeed, sometimes I would

have liked the children to be left at home, and for us, just the two of us (fūfu dake de 夫婦だけで), to go out to a concert, or to travel abroad.”

On the one hand, his words express a longing for togetherness; on the other hand, they convey acceptance of the present situation, in which there are almost no opportunities for spending time together. However, when asked if he feels that their time together is too scarce, or whether is it okay for him, he replied: “Now it’s quite okay for me. I’m quite happy (今はまあ、いいんじゃないかなと。あまり不満ではないですね). You see, on weekends the kids are also present, of course, but we spend time together, in family recreation.” (土日はまあ、子供も一緒ですけど、一緒に家族で過ごしてますから).<sup>22</sup>

Thus, the Ōnishis do not have a separate bedroom, and they have not gone out together as a couple since their first son was born. Nevertheless, this situation in itself does not tell us much about their relationship. They make daily efforts to spend time together at home, to produce private and special time just for the two of them. They talk with each other, plan their future, and support each other. Akihiro also told me he never drinks with colleagues after work but rather returns home, and if he wishes to drink, he enjoys it all the more when he has a drink at home with his wife. The scarce time they can spend together is handled carefully; family recreation focused on their young children takes precedence, and their longing for couplehood waits for the future. Stated differently, another characteristic of couple relationships of parents with small children is that their couplehood is put “on hold,” until their children grow up.

### “Couplehood Awareness” Held Back until the Children Grow Up

This essay asks whether, in Japan, a couple with children is first and foremost a “couple” or a “family.” As a couple, the partners emphasize “couple elements” such as having private time and pursuing “romantic” pastimes together, while as a family they are expected to stress the child-oriented elements of their parental role, such as care for the children and concern about the future. Mr. Ōnishi had told me that the moment you get pregnant, you become a family, but does this mean that you cease to be a couple? In an attempt to better understand, I asked him whether he had an image of a couple that he would like to emulate in his own partnership with his wife. His answer was as follows: “Yes. I would have liked us to be the kind of couple that engages itself in joint hobbies; I would have liked us to travel abroad again as a couple, after the children have grown up and left the house” (子供が大きくなって家を出るようになったら、また夫婦で海外旅行とかいろいろなホビー、趣味も一緒に出来るような夫婦になりたいですね).

I had expected an answer built on “model images” of couplehood, as seen in popular movies and on TV shows. Mr. Ōnishi, however, took my question in a different direction: for him, the ideal is that he and his wife return, once again (*mata*), to being a couple after their children grew up, became well-established in the social world, and left the house. Their couplehood, which is halted, or “on leave,” as long as the children are young and dependent, will be set free. Only when the children are grown will he and his wife be able to return to being a couple (*mata fūfu de* また夫婦で). Mr. Ōnishi’s emphasis on the word *fūfu de* clearly indicates that he is not longing simply for more spare time for his hobbies or for vacation abroad, but for high-quality couple time—for being a couple again in the full sense of this word.

One may also read in Mr. Ōnishi’s words a clear acceptance that this couplehood is impossible as long as the children are young and dependent. The contrast between his *ideal* form of couplehood and the *real* form of couplehood that he and his wife currently have emphasizes the tension between their “couple mode” and their “family life course.” Akihiro and Mayumi Ōnishi were in their late thirties at the time we spoke, but their older son was only five years old.<sup>23</sup> This fact determined their identity as a family rather than a couple. Mr. Ōnishi seemed to be very self-aware of this situation. He stated:

[Now] our consciousness as a family (ファミリっていう意識) is stronger than our consciousness as couple. We don’t feel that we are a couple, that we are together the two of us. Do you understand? But I am certain that once the children have grown up, we will feel like a couple again. (夫婦っていうよりも、今はファミリっていう意識の方が強いんですね。二人っていう意識はあまりないですね。でも、子供が大きくなったらやっぱり又夫婦でっていう気持ちはありますよね)。... This is why I told you that I don’t feel any need to find myself in a situation in which I call in a babysitter (だから、ベビーシッター頼むまでいく必要をかんじない)。

His use of the word *made* まで emphasizes the radical meaning, in his view, of calling in a babysitter. He further emphasized, “I would definitely like to avoid such a far-reaching situation, as a couple” (そこまでして夫婦でいきたいとは思わない). From his perspective, this is a line he would not like to cross. Instead, he said, “If we go somewhere, I would prefer that . . . we go as a family” (*famiri de ikitai*). And by using the term *ishiki* 意識 (“awareness” or “consciousness”) in the quotation extracted above, Mr. Ōnishi clearly articulated that “our consciousness as a family is stronger than our consciousness as a couple. We don’t feel that we are a couple, that we are together the two of us.”

I thus believe that his reluctance to use babysitter should be understood not as a sacrifice, full of effort and perseverance (*gaman*), or as an indication that he has lost his wish to enjoy a joint pastime with his wife. Rather, Mr. Ōnishi firmly believes that *this is not the time* for it, although the time will come in the future. It seems that while he does invest some effort in being content with the present need to put his family first, he chooses to do so wholeheartedly, since it reflects his most basic conceptions of parenthood, couplehood, family—and the relations between them.

I actually heard similar thing from other people too, such as Ayako Fujita, a 35-year-old wife and mother of two who was a university graduate, housewife, and part-time worker at a research institute. I asked how she and her husband spent the weekends, and she responded:

We often used to go out together on the weekends, but now we have the kids, so on weekends we only go around here, in the neighborhood. . . . Even if I think sometimes that I would like to have dinner just the two of us, I know we have our little ones, and we can’t do it for at least five years now (たまに二人で食事をしたいなあっと思っても、小さいのがいるので後五年は無理かなっていう).

These words reveal not only what Ayako and her family do on the weekends, but also what she accepts as obvious and taken for granted, such as the age up to which children cannot be left alone and the social expectations of a young couple who have children, both of which are established and well-known social norms and categories. Parents are expected to subjugate their sexuality and couplehood to what is perceived as “the children’s needs,” and this is so obvious that Ayako does not even feel a need to explain it to me, the foreigner.

When I asked about hiring a babysitter service, it appeared that Ayako places her children in a nursery room occasionally (she said it is cheaper than having a babysitter). Encouraged by her answer, I asked whether she sometimes uses these services in order to make time for her and her husband (二人の時間). “Oh, that would be impossible I guess. I’ve never done such a thing” (それは無理かな。それはしたことがない). Then in a different voice she said: “But, you know, we do talk about the time when we get old. . . . We say how after we get older we’ll travel abroad, the two of us together. . . . And, our house is really a lovely house for old age. . . . We think it’s a place you can lead an ideal life in (理想的の生活ができる場所). . . . Oh, that’s how I’d like the future to be. That is what I think, absent-mindedly, you know.”

She said this with a sigh. And for me, the listener, it seemed strange that a woman in her early thirties would fantasize about her old age, when she will be able to spend time with her husband. More than longing for her partner to be retired, she waits for her children to leave home and free her from her motherly role.

It appears, therefore, that the Fujitas are able to spend very little time together as a couple during this phase of their lives. Nevertheless, here again, it is important to distinguish between the scant time spent together and what it may imply about the couple's relationship. From my long conversation with Ayako I got a vivid picture of a stable, self-sustaining couplehood and family. The fact that Ayako could talk with her husband about her daily problems as well as her dreams, and that he listens to her patiently and tries to help her (even if he does not speak much himself), supports the impression that she views him as an attentive partner. Moreover, it appears that the Fujitas, like other couples such as the Ōnishis, are aware that the scarcity of the time they can spend together as a couple is a *temporary* condition, resulting from the overload that characterizes this period of their lives. They remember that things were different in the past, and they know that they will be different in the future.<sup>24</sup>

The above discussion further illuminates my choice to focus on these men and women in their thirties. This choice helps shed light on the years when the pressures on a couple are at their highest, the resources available to them are often limited, and the efforts they are required to make are the most far-reaching and visible.

### **Private Room, or Make Room for Privacy?**

A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction.

Virginia Woolf

*A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas*<sup>25</sup>

Adapting the idea of Virginia Woolf, this essay raises the question whether a couple also needs “a room of their own,” physical or metaphorical. I inquired whether a couple, too, needs certain resources—Woolf mentions money; I ask also about effort, willingness, awareness—to allow for its existence as a couple.

This essay is part of a wider study that attempts to shed light on the emergence in recent decades of the couple as a new social category. This process includes shifts in practices, personal attitudes, and public discourse; the trend toward growing “couple awareness” and recognition of a couple's own needs should be seen as part of this development.

As noted earlier, I had, perhaps unavoidably, my own assumptions in this matter, which were influenced by my background and personal history, and which I could not eradicate. Nevertheless, I did not embark on my fieldwork armed with a list of ingredients, or delude myself that I would complete this project with a recipe for a “couple’s intimacy cake” at my disposal. Accordingly, in this essay I have examined various aspects of the couple relationship without contending that they are necessary for this relationship or that there is only one way to enact them (for instance, only one pattern of communication). Therefore, unlike Virginia Woolf, who argues that a women *must have* a room of her own and money (“three guineas”) if she is to write, this essay illustrates that not all couples *need* these elements. Some couples do not engage in many conversations, or one partner is not very talkative; it may be that sex is not what they are missing right now, or is not central to their current relationship; and perhaps family pastimes are so enjoyable for them that they do not go out as a couple but only as a family; in addition, there may be a role differentiation between them. However, the couple may certainly be content with this pattern of relationship, and from their perspective — which is what counts most — they definitely constitute a “couple.”

To a certain degree, this description is compatible with the pattern of relationship that was prevalent in Japan until several decades ago (“rarefied relationships,” as Iwao 1993 puts it). Many people told me similar stories about the relations between their own parents, one generation earlier. But the difference lies in the way the couple perceive themselves, and in their efforts to produce space, time, and channels of communication even in the absence of favorable conditions and in the face of popular discourse that emphasizes the “family’s best interests.” This is not to say that the pattern of couplehood has changed completely over the last years, but rather that it is invested with different interpretations.

It is important to remember that my study deals with people in their thirties, and examines couples’ relationships during a period that is marked by many constraints. For many couples, this is a time of intensive and demanding parenthood. The challenges of economic subsistence and the overload associated with establishing oneself and progressing in the workplace are heavy, and have a significant influence on the couple’s resources, especially in terms of time, money, and energy. This is why the picture portrayed here represents a very specific phase in my interlocutors’ life, and does not represent earlier (or probably also later) periods in their lives.

This point emerged clearly when I talked with people about privacy and pastimes as a couple. Married couples with preschool children (on whom my study focused) were in



a situation in which their partner “competed” with their children, in a sense, for the same limited resources: time, attention, space, and usually also money. Yet in another sense there was no competition, since social norms regulated individual expectations and practices.

In many cases, my impression from the couple was that their couplehood had “stopped” in some ways with childbirth, or perhaps just switched into a different mode. The partners testified that they had led their joint life in a particular way before the children were born (for example, they went out together), and that when the children are grown they will be able “to be a couple again,” in their words. This description portrays couplehood as “put on hold,” mostly due to considerations that have to do with social norms concerning care for one’s children (such as the issue of hiring a babysitter).

Yet even though becoming a mother and father does change the couple’s recreation patterns, this does not mean that they do not wish to spend time together. They spend time together *differently*—for example, by having a drink together at home, talking, watching television together—and testify that they enjoy their pastimes as a family, together with their children. Even without a substantial space of their own, they create “sites of closeness” or “metaphorical rooms” for themselves, for instance by means of the communication between them, which becomes more important in their relationship than before. For some couples, the communication between them is much more than a medium for conveying information, and as such it constitutes a joint “space” that fulfills the needs of both of the partners and reconfirms the exclusiveness of their relationship (see the Ōnishis, for example).

This essay has shed light on various pressures and constraints that these couples face. It has also shown, however, that there is still room for individual agency and personal conceptions of intimacy. The willingness to invest effort and resources; to help each other and often face various social responses as a result; and to endorse a more flexible view on gender roles, since the couple’s interpretation of gender roles may in fact be more important than the roles themselves—all these are intimately connected to the spouses’ own *ishiki*, the way they perceive themselves. All these may bypass the constraining circumstances and strict frameworks of their lives as thirty-somethings and allow the couples, or some couples, to delineate a space, or a “room,” of their own—not only as parents or as a family, but indeed as a couple.

### Acknowledgments

I am indebted to my supervisors, Niza Yanay of Ben-Gurion University in Beer-Sheva, and David H. Slater of Sophia University in Tokyo, whose support was irreplaceable indeed. I am very grateful to Iwao Sumiko for her valuable help. I also thank the Japan Foundation for granting me their fellowship, and Ben-Gurion University for their scholarship. I deeply thank all the people who let me study from their lives. I would also like to extend a special thank you to Miriam Murase and to Sally A. Hastings of the *U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal* for their encouragement and enlightening observations. The essay also benefitted from the comments of two anonymous readers, to whom I am grateful.

### Works Cited

- Alexy, Allison. 2011. “Intimate Dependence and Its Risks in Neoliberal Japan.” *Anthropological Quarterly* 84, no. 4: 895–918.
- Allison, Anne. 2000. *Permitted and Prohibited Desires: Mothers, Comics and Censorship in Japan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Argyle, M., and M. Henderson. 1984. “The Rules of Friendship.” *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships* 1: 211–37.
- — —. 1985. “The Rules of Relationships.” In S. Duck, ed., *Understanding Personal Relationships: An Interdisciplinary Approach*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Baibikov, Elena. 2006. “Russian Wives in Japan: Identity Re-construction and Its Implication for Social Integration of Foreign Spouse.” *Shakai shisutem kenkyū* (Social System Research), no. 9 (February).
- Bassani, Chrylynn D. 2007. “The Japanese *Tanshin-funin*: A Neglected Family Type.” *Community, Work and Family* 10, no. 1: 111–31.
- Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. 1999. “On the Way to the Post-Familial Family—From a Community of Need to Elective Affinities.” In Mike Featherstone, ed., *Love and Eroticism*, 53–70. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications. (Simultaneously published as vol. 15 of *Theory, Culture and Society*.)
- Berger, R., and R. Hill. 1998. “Introducing Mixed Marriage.” In R. Berger and R. Hill, eds., *Cross-Cultural Marriage: Identity and Choice*, 1–32. Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers.
- Bloch, Dalit. 2010. “Intimate Matters: An Ethnographic Perspective on Couplehood in Japan.” Ph.D. dissertation, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel.
- Brinton, M. C. 1989. “Gender Stratification in Contemporary Japan.” *American Sociological Review* 54: 549–64.
- Carroll, Tessa. 2006. “Changing Language, Gender and Family Relations in Japan.” In Marcus Rebeck and Ayumi Takenaka, eds., *The Changing Japanese Family*, 109–26. London and New York: Routledge.
- Caudill, William, and David W. Plath. 1974. “Who Sleeps by Whom? Parent-Child Involvement in Urban Japanese Families.” In S. Takie Lebra and William P. Lebra, eds., *Japanese Culture and Behavior: Selected Readings*, 277–312. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

- Cho, Lee-Jay, and Motō Yada, eds. 1994. *Tradition and Change in the Asian Family*. Honolulu: East-West Center.
- Dasgupta, Romit. 2003. "Creating Corporate Warriors: The *Salaryman* and Masculinity in Japan." In K. Louie and M. Low, eds., *Asian Masculinities—The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and Japan*, 118–33. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Dewaele, J. M. 2008. "The emotional weight of *I love you* in multilinguals' languages." *London: Birkbeck ePrints*. Available at: <http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000709>, accessed 7/28/2009.
- Eades, J. S., Tom Gill, and Harumi Befu. 2000. *Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press (Japanese Society Series).
- Fair, L. 2007. "Filipina Migrants in Rural Japan and Their Profession of Love," *American Ethnologist* 34, no. 1: 148–62.
- Fujimura-Fanselow, Kumiko, and Atsuko Kameda, eds. 1995. *Japanese Women—New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present and Future*. New York: Feminist Press.
- Gill, Tom. 2000. "Yoseba and Ninpudashi: Changing Patterns of Employment on the Fringes of the Japanese Economy" In: J. S. Eades, Tom Gill, and Harumi Befu, *Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan*, 123–42. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press (Japanese Society Series).
- Hashimoto, Akiko, and John W. Traphagan. 2008. "Changing Japanese Families." In Akiko Hashimoto and John W. Traphagan, eds., *Imagined Families, Lived Families Culture and Kinship in Contemporary Japan*, 1–12. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hendry, Joy. 1981. *Marriage in Changing Japan, Community and Society*. London: Croom Helm.
- Hirakawa, Hiroko. 2004. "Give me one good reason to marry a Japanese man: Japanese Women Debating Ideal Lifestyles." *Women's Studies* 33: 423–51.
- Hirata, Anna. 1997. "Emotions of *Hazukashii* in Reunion Situations for the Japanese." *Psychoanalytic Review* 84, no. 2: 257–71
- Honda, Yuki. 2004. "The Formation and Transformation of the Japanese System of Transition from School to Work." *Social Science Japan Journal* 7, no. 1: 103–15.
- Huang, Wei-Jen. 2005. "An Asian Perspective on Relationship and Marriage." *Family Processes* 44, no. 2: 161–72.
- Huston, Ted L. 2000. "The Social Ecology of Marriage and Other Intimate Unions." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 62: 298–320.
- Ishii-Kuntz, Masako. 1994. "Paternal Involvement and Perception toward Fathers' Roles: A Comparison Between Japan and the United States." *Journal of Family Issues* 15, no. 1: 30–49.
- — —. 2003. "Balancing Fatherhood and Work: Emergence of Diverse Masculinities in Contemporary Japan." In J. Robertson and N. Suzuki, eds., *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan*, 198–216. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Ishii-Kuntz, Masako, Katsuko Makino, Kuniko Kato, and Michiko Tsuchiya. 2004. "Japanese Fathers of Preschoolers and Their Involvement in Child Care." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66, no. 3: 779–92.

- Iwao, Sumiko. 1993. *The Japanese Woman: Traditional Image and Changing Reality*. New York: The Free Press.
- Iwasawa, Miho. 2004. “Partnership Transition in Contemporary Japan: Prevalence of Childless Non-Cohabiting Couples.” *The Japanese Journal of Population* 2, no. 1: 76–92.
- Jolivet, Muriel. 1997. *Japan: The Childless Society? The Crisis of Motherhood*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Katō Itsuko. 2003. “Sekushuariti kara mita fūfu mondai” (Couple’s problems observed from the perspective of sexuality). In Yoshizumi Kyōko, ed., *Kekkon to paatonaa kankei: Toi-naosareru fūfu* (Marriage and partnership: Revisiting the married couple), 191–21. Kyoto: Minerva Shobō.
- Kawakami, Sumie. 2007. *Goodbye Madame Butterfly: Sex, Marriage and the Modern Japanese Woman*. Seattle: Chin Music Press.
- Kawanishi, Yuko. 2009. “What Do Sexless Marriages Tell Us About Men and Women in Japan?” In Yuko Kawanishi, *Mental Health Challenges Facing Contemporary Japanese Society: The “Lonely People,”* 82–88. Folkestone, U.K.: Global Oriental Ltd..
- Kelsky, Karen. 1994. “Intimate Ideologies: Transnational Theory and Japan’s ‘Yellow Cabs.’” *Public Culture* 6, no. 3 (Spring): 465–78.
- . 2001. “Who Sleeps with Whom, or How (Not) to Want the West in Japan.” *Qualitative Inquiry* 7, no. 4: 418–35.
- Kinsella, Sharon. 1995. “Cuties in Japan.” In Lise Skov and Brian Moeran, eds., *Women Media and Consumption in Japan*, 220–54. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
- Kumagai, Fumie. 1996. *Unmasking Japan Today: The Impact of Traditional Values on Modern Japanese Society*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers.
- Lebra, Sugiyama Takie. 1984. *Japanese Women: Constraint and Fulfillment*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
- . 2004. *The Japanese Self in Cultural Logic*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
- Maree, Claire. 2004. “Same-Sex Partnerships in Japan: Bypasses and Other Alternatives.” *Women’s Studies* 33: 541–49.
- “Marriage.” 2005. Special Issue of *Social Science Japan Newsletter* of the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, No. 33 (December) <http://newslet.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>, accessed 1/7/2009.
- Mathews Gordon. 2003. “Can a real man live for his family? *Ikigai* and Masculinity in Today’s Japan.” In J. Robertson and N. Suzuki, eds., *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan*, 109–25. London: Routledge Curzon.
- . 2004. “Seeking Career, Finding a Job: How Young People Enter and Resist the Japanese World of Work.” In Gordon Mathews and Bruce White, eds. *Japan’s Changing Generations: Are Young People Creating a New Society?* 121–36. New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Mathews, Gordon, and Bruce White, eds. 2004. *Japan’s Changing Generations: Are Young People Creating a New Society?* New York: Routledge Curzon.
- McLelland, M. J. 2004. “From Sailor-Suits to Sadists: ‘Lesbos Love’ as Reflected in Japan’s Postwar ‘Perverse Press.’” *U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal* no. 27: 3–26.

- Miller, Laura. 2003. "Male Beauty Work in Japan." In James E. Robertson and Nobue Suzuki, eds., *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan*, 37–58. New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Miyake, Yoshimi. 2000. "Gazing at Body and Sexuality: Two Japanese Women Writers." Lecture at departmental seminar, Department of East Asian Studies, Tel-Aviv University, March 7, 2000.
- Morimoto, K., S. Maruyama, and M. Seto. 2006. "Work and Family Life of Childrearing Women Workers in Japan." *Journal of Occupational Health* 48, no. 3: 183–91.
- Moroi Katsuhide. 2003. *Fūfu-gaku e no izanai: Yureugoku fūfu-kankei* (An invitation to partnership studies: Vacillating husband-wife relations). Kyoto: Nakanishiya Publishers.
- Nagase, Nobuko. 2006. "Japanese Youth's Attitude towards Marriage and Child Rearing." In Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka, eds., *The Changing Japanese Family*, 39–53. London and New York: Routledge.
- Nakatani, Ayumi. 2006. "The Emergence of 'Nurturing Fathers': Discourses and Practices of Fatherhood in Contemporary Japan." In Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka, eds., *The Changing Japanese Family*, 94–108. London and New York: Routledge.
- North, Scott. 2009. "Negotiating What's 'Natural': Persistent Domestic Gender Role Inequality in Japan." *Social Science Japan Journal* 12, no. 1: 23–44.
- Nozawa, Mieko. 2004. "Development of Intimacy Scale for Infertile Couples." *Japanese Journal of Nursing Research* 37, no. 7: 595–605.
- Ochiai, Emiko. 1997. *The Japanese Family System in Transition—A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan*. Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation.
- Ogasawara, Yuko. 2003. "Kappuru kyariaa—sono kanosei to kadai" (Couple-career: Possibilities and problems). Lecture at Sophia University, June 25, 2003.
- Oppenheim, Mason K., N. Tsuya, and Choe M. Kim, eds. 1998. *The Changing Family in Comparative Perspective: Asia and the United States*. Honolulu: East-West Center.
- Orpett Long, Susan. 2005. "Constrained Person and Active Agent: A Dying Student's Narrative of Self and Others." In Jennifer Robertson, ed., *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan*, 380–99. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Osada Masaki, ed. 1987. *Nihon no shakai kōzō kazoku kankei* (Japan's social structure and family relations). Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan.
- Ozaki, Ritsuko. 2001. "Society and Housing Form: Home-Centeredness in England vs. Family Centeredness in Japan." Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 337–57.
- Raymo, James M., and Miho Iwasawa. 2008. "Bridal Pregnancy and Spouse Pairing Patterns in Japan." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 70: 847–60.
- Raymo, James M., and Hiromi Ono. 2007. "Coresidence with Parents, Women's Economic Resources, and the Transition to Marriage in Japan." *Journal of Family Issues* 28, no. 5 (May): 653–81.
- Rebick, Marcus, and Ayumi Takenaka, eds. 2006. *The Changing Japanese Family*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Retherford, R., N. Ogawa, and R. Matsukura. 2001. "Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan." *Population and Development Review* 27 (March): 65.

- Roberson, James E., and Nobue Suzuki, eds. 2003. *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan—Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Russell, John. 1991. “Race and Reflexivity: The Black Other in Contemporary Japanese Mass Culture.” *Cultural Anthropology* 6, no. 1: 3–25.
- Salomon, Sonya. 1975. “Male Chauvinism as a Manifestation of Love in Marriage.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 10, no. 1–2 : 20–31.
- Slater, David H. 2010. “The Making of Japan’s New Working Class: ‘Freeters’ and the Progression from Middle School to the Labor Market.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 1-1-10. [http://japanfocus.org/-David\\_H\\_Slater/3279](http://japanfocus.org/-David_H_Slater/3279), accessed 8/1/2010.
- Shinomi Kazue. 2001. “Gendai kazoku ni okeru fufu kankei henyō: sekusuresu no gensetsuka o meguru jimeisei no saikō” (The transition of relationships of couples in the modern family: Reconsidering the axiom of “sexless” discourse). *Kazoku kenkyū nenpo* (Annals of family studies) 26: 31–40.
- Suzuki Nobue. 2003. “Of Love and the Marriage Market: Masculinity Politics and Filipina-Japanese Marriage in Japan.” In James E. Robertson and Nobue Suzuki, eds., *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan*, 91–108. London: Routledge Curzon.
- — —. 2004. “Inside the Home: Power and Negotiation in Filipina-Japanese Marriage.” *Women’s Studies* 33: 481–506.
- Ting-Toomey, Stella. 1991. “Intimacy Expressions in Three Cultures: France, Japan, and the United States.” *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 15, no. 1: 29–46.
- Tsuya, O. Noriko. 1994. “Changing Attitudes towards Marriage and the Family in Japan.” In Lee-Jay Cho and Motō Yada, eds., *Tradition and Change in the Asian Family*, 91–119. Honolulu: East-West Center.
- Valentine, James. 1997. “Skirting and Suiting Stereotypes: Representations of Marginalized Sexualities in Japan.” *Theory, Culture and Society* 14, no. 3: 57–85.
- Vogel, Ezra F. 1968 [1963]. *Japan’s New Middle Class: The Salary-man and His Family in Tokyo Suburbs*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Woolf, Virginia. 1989 [1929]. *A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas*. New York: Harcourt and Brace.
- Yamada Masahiro. 1998. *The Japanese Family in Transition*. About Asia Series, number 19. Tokyo: Foreign Press Center.
- — —. 2001. “Parasite Singles Feed on Family System.” *Japan Quarterly* (January–March): 10–16.
- — —. 2003. “Kekkon no genzaiteki imi” (The modern meanings of marriage). In Yoshizumi Kyōko, ed., *Kekkon to paatonaa kankei: Toi-naosareru fūfu* (Marriage and partnership: Revisiting the married couple), 56–80. Kyōto: Minerva Shobō.
- Yazawa Sumiko, Kunihiro Yōko, and Tendō Mutsuko. 2003. *Toshi kankyō to ko-sodate* (Urban environment and child care). Tokyo: Keisō Shobō Publishing.
- Yoshizumi, Kyōko. 1995. “Marriage and the Family: Past and Present.” In K. Fujimura-Fanselow and A. Kameda, eds., *Japanese Women—New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present and Future*, 183–98. New York: Feminist Press.

- — —, ed. 2003. *Kekkon to paatonaa kankei: Toi-naosareru fūfu* (Marriage and partnership: Revisiting the married couple). Kyoto: Minerva Shobō.
- Yuzawa Yasuhiko. 1994. “Will a ‘Contemporary’ Marital Relationship Mature in Japan?” *Kazoku shakaigaku kenkyū* (Japanese journal of family sociology) 6: 29–36. In Japanese.

## Notes

1. *Kappuru* カップル, which is borrowed from the English word “couple,” usually refers to unmarried couples, while *fūfu* 夫婦 is the standard word for a married husband and wife.
2. Hirata decodes holding hands in public as “*amae* behavior,” which is not allowed among adults in Japan (Hirata 1997: 266). But in recent years one can see more and more couples holding hands in public.
3. Nozawa’s research on Japanese couples receiving fertility treatment makes use of an “intimacy scale with 57 items and five subscales” and draws on a “Quality of Marriage Index” and the “UCLA Loneliness Scale” (Nozawa 2004).
4. Huston’s all-embracing analytical model offers “to create summary indices of various aspects of marriage, including: (a) marital *role patterns* (as shown by spouses’ participation in household and child care activities); (b) marital *companionship* (as reflected in the extent to which spouses talk to each other and spend leisure time together); (c) *socioemotional patterns* (as evident in how affectionate spouses are with each other, how often they express negativity, and the frequency with which they have sexual intercourse); and (d) *spouses’ involvement with friends and kin* (as reflected in the amount of time they spend engaging in recreational activities and conversation)” (Huston 2000: 304, emphasis in original).
5. These aspects were widely explored by others; see, for example, Tsuya 1994; Oppenheim, Tsuya and Kim 1998; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001; Iwasawa 2004; Nagase 2006; and Rebeck and Takenaka 2006, as well as “Marriage” (2005), a special issue of *Social Science Japan*.
6. Today much more than in the past, young people in Japan can choose among several options, including marriage, singlehood, divorce, remarriage, delayed marriage, and cohabitation. The social-normative necessity to marry at any cost, which for women has economic implications, has given way to a variety of alternatives. Thus marriage itself is exposed to a new discourse in which partnership, equal sharing, affection, and free choice play a central role (Yuzawa 1994). Nevertheless, these options, too, are not free of social considerations and norms.
7. I elaborate this argument in my doctoral dissertation, which tracks the shifts in couplehood, its practices, subjective interpretations, and the associated public discourse in Japan (Bloch 2010).
8. Even during the Meiji period (1868–1912), when Japan was engaged in large-scale absorption of ideas from Western, mostly European, countries, the family “remained independent of Western influence” (Kumagai 1996: 2–3).
9. Even after the Second World War, when new family laws replaced the Meiji family code, “most scholars agree that traditional Japanese family values have remained essentially unchanged” (Cho and Yada 1994: 10).
10. Today’s Japan does have a wider variety of families and lifestyles. Yet single-parent

households, same-sex partnerships, and “patchwork families” are still quite rare in Japan, and my impression is that they call for a separate study that would encompass their unique characteristics. For research on same-sex couples and the images of marginal sexualities and legal rights, see Maree 2004 (on “marriage” and rights), Valentine 1997 (on images of gays and lesbians on Japanese television), and McLelland 2004. For studies on couples where one of the spouses (or the object of desire) is non-Japanese, see Suzuki 2003, 2004 and Fair 2007 (on Filipina wives in rural Japan and Filipina entertainment and sex workers); Baibikov 2006 (on wives from former Soviet Russia); Kelsky 1994, 2001 and Russell 1991 (on sexual “use” of Afro-American men, associated with the racist stereotypes of hypersexuality); and Miyake 2000 and Hirakawa 2004 (on the image of Western versus Japanese man).

11. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive terms, and the partners are at one and the same time husband-and-wife and mother-and-father. But I would like to emphasize here the spouses’ own feelings and awareness, not a given piece of biological data or legal status.

12. There is a vast body of literature in both Japanese and English, by native and foreign social researchers alike, on parental behavior and roles, which until recent years has seemed to be the focus of family studies in Japan. See, for example, the two most important journals in Japanese concerning family studies, *Kazoku shakaigaku kenkyū* (Japanese journal of family sociology) and *Kazoku kenkyū nenpo* (Annals of family studies). The wide range of topics concerning motherhood was recently boosted with the growing interest in fatherhood and men studies (e.g., Ishii-Kuntz 1994, 2003; Nakatani 2006).

13. “BabySense is a highly sensitive and non-touch device that monitors the baby’s breathing and movements through the mattress during sleep. . . . If, for whatever reason, the baby’s movement stops for 20 seconds, or slows to less than 10 movements per minute, an audible alarm will sound. On hearing this alarm, a parent or caretaker is alerted to come to the aid of the sleeping baby.” <http://www.babysense.net/How-Hisense-Babysense-works.asp>.

14. Ozaki (2001) refers to individual versus familial privacy, but my reading is that conjugal privacy is highly associated with notions of individual privacy and individualism.

15. Indeed, one may say that in his conversation with me, Mr. Ōnishi wanted to stress their good communication rather than delve into conflicts and disagreements, and therefore emphasized or even overemphasized positive elements in their relationship. I took this into consideration and, of course, do not try to portray an ideal picture of their partnership, or underplay conflicts, disagreements, and other difficulties. All these elements have already received wide academic attention, whereas this essay endeavors to shed light on the shared aspects of couples’ construction of themselves as a couple.

16. To these one should also add the socio-economic context, which refers to three aspects: (1) the continuous recession in Japan since the early 1990s, which created an economic environment of uncertainty; (2) the rising expenses of an average Japanese family with one or two children; and (3) the economic structure of most Japanese families, in which the man remained the sole breadwinner. These circumstances affect all layers of Japanese society, but they were particularly tangible among the age group represented in my research—adults in their late twenties to late thirties who face mounting economic pressures.



17. This “sexless” discourse (*sekusuresu no gensetsu* セックスレス言説), as Shinomi (2001), among others, calls it, was echoed in the wordings of several of the people I met, and Kitano’s words stand in contrast to it. See also Kawanishi’s analysis that “sexlessness can be an expression of resentment that they [the husband and the wife] are not even fully aware of. It can be a subtle form of aggression and hostility toward the other person.” To protect themselves they “remain psychologically uninvolved in the relationship” (Kawanishi 2009: 86–87).

18. During my study I also came across men who said they would have been happy to have such an experience, and at least one woman who told me that she had experienced a marital crisis following an affair that her husband had.

19. Carroll (2006: 113–16) says that Lebra already noticed a shift among her younger informants toward using given names or nicknames. Carroll also points out changing usages among today’s young couples who address each other by their family name, given name, nickname, imported terms such as *waifu* (wife) and other terms to avoid the subservience implied in *shujin* or *danna* (husband, but also master), or gender roles such as *kanai* (the term for wife; literally, “inside the house”). See also Ishii-Kuntz 2003 for Japanese men who told the researcher they address their wives by the term “partner.”

20. I am indebted to an anonymous reader who drew my attention to Alexy’s intriguing essay.

21. It is fascinating to compare Shigeo’s answer to the answer given by Osada-san, Alexy’s informant who said, “After marriage, I was called ‘Mommy.’ I was called ‘Mommy, Mommy!’ *I am not your mommy!*” (Alexy 2011: 908–9). Alexy maintains that “these common denotational practices are now seen as dangerous because they enable a dependence that conflicts with burgeoning neoliberal ideals of independent autonomy” (ibid., 896). However, as we usually hear discontent voices concerning this pattern of communication especially from women, I find it illuminating that a young man such as Shigeo spells out this notion loud and clear.

22. Mr. Ōnishi nevertheless emphasized that in cases of necessity, when he needs to go to work over the weekend, his wife openly expresses her discontent. From her dissatisfaction one can understand that she feels the weekends should be devoted to the family, not to work.

23. Mr. Ōnishi told me that his wife had had difficulty getting pregnant and had to have fertility treatments for several years.

24. At the time I met Ayako, such things were completely unimaginable for her, but if I had met her several years later, after her children were grown, or several years before she had children, I might have gotten a different picture. See also Midori’s answer above, which emphasizes the *temporary* aspect of her family’s sleeping arrangements, and hence supports my arguments with respect to the life course of a couple.

25. Woolf (1989 [1929]), 4.

---

## Young Women / “Bad Girls” in Kirino Natsuo’s *Real World*

Barbara E. Thornbury

Novels are closer to real life . . . it’s like they show you the real world with one layer peeled away, a reality you can’t see otherwise.

Kirino Natsuo, *Real World*<sup>1</sup>

Best-selling Japanese novelist Kirino Natsuo (b. 1951) is a powerful voice in current “global” conversations on women and women’s literature. Over the past decade, translations of her work have been commissioned and are being widely circulated in the U.S. (and elsewhere) by mainstream publishers such as Knopf and Random House.<sup>2</sup> *Real World* (*Riaru wārudo*, 2003)<sup>3</sup> presents the individual and interrelated life-stories of four young women and that of the previously unknown young man who abruptly transforms their world after he bludgeons his mother to death. The plot of *Real World* sets the stage for complex evocations of disintegrating and unreliable social structures—the family being chief among them—that destabilize the lives of young adults in Japan today. The English term “real world”—phonetically transcribed into Japanese using the katakana syllabary—is a complex signifier that simultaneously expresses resigned acceptance and angry resistance. As high school seniors, the main characters are on the precipice of full adulthood, forced to navigate multiple and conflicting real worlds while trying to figure out who they are and where life is taking them.

---

**Barbara E. Thornbury** is an associate professor of Japanese studies in the Department of Critical Languages at Temple University, Philadelphia, where she teaches courses on Japanese literature and film. Her recent published work includes “History, Adaptation, Japan: Haruki Murakami’s ‘Tony Takitani’ and Jun Ichikawa’s *Tony Takitani*,” *Journal of Adaptation in Film and Performance* 4, no. 2 (August 2011): 159–71, and “Re-imagining Ozu: Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s *Café Lumière* and the Contemporary Tokyo Woman,” *Proceedings of the Association for Japanese Literary Studies* 11 (Summer 2010): 365–76.

My particular focus is on how the four young women of *Real World* embody the debilitating sense of fragmentation and loss that has become increasingly manifest with the passage of time. In the first part of the essay I examine the anxiety and rage fueling the bad-girlness that is deployed against the compassionless, isolating hyper-competitiveness and hyper-consumerism in which young Japanese women are expected to forge their identities. Bad-girlness is both the product of and gives rise to the intergenerational tensions that pervade the novel. I then look at the setting—Tokyo—as the stage on which the bad-girlness is enacted. In the final section I address the metaphorical significances of “real world” within the framework of issues each of Kirino’s main characters personifies and confronts. This leads me to argue that, ultimately, given the fractured and destabilized postmodern urban society in which the young women of *Real World* are growing up, being “bad” is perhaps an altogether reasonable and inevitable response to the “real” world.

### **Anxiety and Rage**

An especially interesting and important aspect of *Real World* is the very thin line that Kirino draws between the overtly violent “bad boy” whose act of matricide is the precipitating event of the narrative and the no less angry but more behaviorally circumspect (that is, less physically aggressive) “bad girls” who assist him in evading immediate capture. “When high school girls like us freak out, people are always able to overpower us before we do something stupid, like hijacking a bus or running around with a knife. Which is why girls arm themselves beforehand so they don’t get caught up in something like that. Boys probably aren’t so good at protecting themselves.”<sup>4</sup> The girls’ primary armaments, so to speak, include their networks of supportive friends, the steady stream of lies and other linguistic manipulations that characterize their interactions with adults, and even their database-evading fake names. In Natsume Sōseki’s *Kokoro* (1914), the student narrator rejects the authority of his parents and classroom teachers in favor of an altogether different “sensei”—one who the student believes can give him the guidance he needs to navigate his way in the lonely and alienating modern world. Almost a century later, the female student narrators in Kirino’s novel, who give voice to the kind of era-defining “widespread girls’ discontent”<sup>5</sup> to which Laura Miller and Jan Bardsley have referred, have no corresponding “sensei” they feel they can trust: “We’re different from our parents, a completely different species from our teachers. And kids who are one grade apart from you are in a different world altogether. In other words, we’re basically surrounded by enemies and have to make it on our own.”<sup>6</sup>

“The Bad Girl,” as Miller and Bardsley have observed, “is often the unwilling product of her society.”<sup>7</sup> Bad girls act transgressively in some way, violating mainstream norms and expectations. Even the apparently “good” daughters of educated, financially well-off families—those who, like the character Toshiko in *Real World*, basically get along with their parents, compliantly do their household chores, and willingly go to cram school to improve their chances of getting into competitive universities—develop “bad” attitudes and behavior as adaptive strategies. The anxiety and rage that grip Kirino’s young women are articulated in multiple examples of bad-girl thinking and action throughout the novel. Because she “didn’t like the look in [the] eyes” of the two detectives—one an “elderly” man, the other a “middle-aged” woman—who question her, Toshiko falsely denies seeing or hearing anything related to the killing.<sup>8</sup> Well aware that she can be accused of “knowingly aiding and abetting” a criminal by not divulging to the authorities what she knows, Toshiko nevertheless rationalizes her refusal in light of her terror “of the police, and the adult world.” On the verge at one point of opening up to her parents about what happened, she pulls back. The neighbor may be dead, but life in her family reassuringly continues along its normal course. Toshiko is content that her mother can be counted on to serve as “a buffer between [her] and the police and the adult world.”<sup>9</sup>

On the surface, at least, *Real World*’s cohort of four seventeen- and eighteen-year-old women—Yamanaka Toshiko, Terauchi Kazuko, Kaibara Kiyomi, and Higashiyama Kirari—are among the fortunate. Children of the “central Tokyo” middle class, their families can afford to send them to private schools and summer and after-school programs so they can gain academic advantage, and each of the four has her own room in a comfortable house, her own cell phone (and the other necessities of teenage life), and ample spending money. There is no mention of part-time jobs. The fathers and the mothers who work outside the home are professionally employed.

Beneath the surface, however, the situation is less positive. The boy who commits the murder—dubbed “Worm” by the girls—is the only child of an ascot-wearing doctor who has his own small clinic and a stay-at-home, success- and status-obsessed mother. Pushed over the edge by what he sees as his mother’s demands on him, Worm kills her with a metal baseball bat. In what can broadly be described as individually motivated acts of defiance against the adult world, three of the four girls help him materially (one gives him her bicycle and buys him a new cell phone) and psychologically (one joins him on the run; the others speak with him on the phone). Even the one who eventually calls the police to reveal his whereabouts can be said to do so out of defiance.

*Real World* is divided into separate segments of first-person narration delivered individually in the voices of each of the girls (plus Worm), an effective technique for constructing an intimate psychological interiority that reveals the characters' anxiety and rage. The opening and closing portions are titled "Hori Ninna," the pseudonym Toshiko uses when she is asked to give her name but does not want her interlocutor to know what it actually is. She and her parents live next door to Worm and his mother and father. It is a crowded but nice residential area in Tokyo's Suginami Ward, occupied by busy, successful people who know little about their neighbors. The "old, larger houses"—ones that presumably used to provide communal shelter for extended families over a span of generations—have now been "replaced by smaller single-family homes and apartments" suitable for contemporary society's nuclear families, childless couples, and individuals living on their own. The real estate is expensive, and some people flaunt their wealth: "I heard the family two houses down from us had so much trouble parking their Mercedes-Benz in their garage that they ended up getting rid of it."<sup>10</sup> Worm enters Toshiko's field of vision only after the news of the murder breaks and she discovers that he stole her bicycle, along with the cell phone she accidentally left in the basket, from the parking lot at the train station.

Toshiko is a kind of anchor figure in the novel, though a strangely disquieting one who never breaks her silence about the murder even when that silence means that she herself is breaking the law. "I live in a world," as she says, "where I think I'm right."<sup>11</sup> She lives harmoniously with and respects her parents—people who lead their own lives but have a stable marriage and are protective of their child, as shown when they rush home after hearing about the killing to make sure that Toshiko is okay. Her father works for a computer software company. Her mother and a business partner run a home nursing service that helps alleviate the stress on families caring for elderly people in Japan's rapidly aging society. Toshiko can depend on her parents, but she rails against the adult world in general. Like her friends, she muses about the "tons of people I hate so much that I wouldn't mind taking them out. . . . But killing them wouldn't get me anywhere—that's the conclusion I always come to."<sup>12</sup> She is contemptuously aware of how Japanese society ranks its winners. Accosted in public spaces by marketers with clipboards, Toshiko might flippantly tell them, if the mood strikes her, that she is among the most elite of the elites, a University of Tokyo student. She responds to the queries of cram school tutors by proclaiming that she is aiming for the almost equally elite Sophia and Keio universities. She is constantly wary of the world around her—the bullies, the older men who prey on

young women, and everyone who is trying to sell her something: “The sense of danger we [young people] all feel is something my mother can’t comprehend. My mom’s generation still believes in beautiful things like justice and considering other people’s feelings.”<sup>13</sup>

The family dynamics of Toshiko’s three friends are far less stable and secure. Terauchi, as Kazuko is known to her friends, is the most troubled, taking her own life at the end of the novel. At the heart of the suicide letter she writes to Toshiko is a disquisition on the transformation of families (*kazoku no henyō*), “something mankind’s never experienced before, with the role of the family getting more messed up than anybody imagines, changing day by day, growing more and more complicated and individualistic, something nobody can really comprehend.”<sup>14</sup> In an earlier segment Terauchi had already expounded on her theory of the “irreparable” (*torikaeshi no tsukanai koto*): “Killing somebody”—a reference to the teenage boy Worm who murders his mother—“is just payback motivated by all your anger, humiliation, and desires, and since it doesn’t put an end to problems, it doesn’t fit in the category of an irreparable action. Something that’s really irreparable is more like this: a horribly frightening feeling that keeps building up inside you forever until your heart is devoured. People who carry around the burden of something that can’t be undone will one day be destroyed.”<sup>15</sup> What is irreparable in Terauchi’s life stems directly from the utter psychological dissolution of her own family: “Because I love somebody I don’t trust anymore”—a reference to her mother—“I’ve lost all faith in myself. . . . This is what I mean by something *irreparable*.”<sup>16</sup>

The main source of Terauchi’s pain is her knowledge that her mother, a business consultant, is having an affair with a man in her office. Adhering to her husband’s wish that she not go back to work until the younger of their two children (Terauchi’s brother) began elementary school, Terauchi’s mother eagerly re-entered the workforce as soon as the agreed-upon period was up. Leaving the symbolic space of the home, she exercised the sexual autonomy typically associated with males—especially given the fact that her partner is her subordinate at work. Like all affairs, this one is conducted on family time, involving late nights out and vaguely explained “business trips.” Terauchi cannot abide her mother’s disconnection when she is at home with her, her father (a banker who seems resigned to tolerating his wife’s double life), and her younger brother: “I sensed that when she was at home, her mind was on some destination far away from us. . . . Every time Mom went on a trip I was afraid she’d never come back and I had terrible nightmares. . . . I thought I’d never see her again, which made me so sad I couldn’t stand it. . . . I still needed her. . . . Adults did such stupid things, yet they remained a mystery, making me suffer.”<sup>17</sup>

As if replicating her mother's behavior, Terauchi becomes a "cheater" herself. Acknowledged by the other girls as the brightest in their group, Terauchi unabashedly games the system, as her friends well know: "Whenever we had to write a book report, she copied parts of some published essay on the book without the teachers ever catching on."<sup>18</sup> Describing herself as "constantly holding [her]self in check" on an emotional level, she has given up on studying: "I figured out long ago that studying for exams is nothing more than figuring out how to work the system."<sup>19</sup> Her cynicism also finds an outlet in the way she and her brother interact with their father. Infuriated at his apparent weakness in the face of their mother's dishonesty, they essentially ignore him when he comes home after a day of work. The conventional phrases of family life ("I'm home," "Welcome back") go unsaid. Terauchi does not protest when her brother mutters: "Maybe if we're lucky he'll be hit by a taxi."<sup>20</sup>

What Terauchi fears, Yuzan<sup>21</sup> (Kiyomi's adopted name) has already experienced: the loss of her mother, who succumbed to ovarian cancer when Yuzan was in her last year of junior high. As if trying to gain control of the situation when her mother was dying, Yuzan angrily refused to see her at the end: "I finally decided to abandon her. I decided in my heart that the moment she became sick was the moment she died."<sup>22</sup> Although she lives with her father, who is a photographer, and her grandparents, she feels a stifling loneliness—the product of her mother's death as well as the fact that she does not know how to reconcile her homosexuality with the world as it exists around her: "I was faced with two choices: either deceive everybody, or come out of the closet. But I still hadn't decided which route to take."<sup>23</sup> She went on answer-seeking forays to a lesbian bar in Shinjuku in the summer before her senior year of high school "to make sure I wasn't the only one who was like me."<sup>24</sup> On the night that she had decided "would be the last time during summer vacation I'd come home at dawn and make my dad go ballistic," she had a violent encounter in the street with an adult male transvestite who mocked her biological female-ness and berated her for coming "to a man's part of town."<sup>25</sup> The physical bruises healed, but she was left feeling that she had no one—family or friends—in whom to confide her psychic pain. She is drawn to the motherless Worm, despite the fact that he committed murder: "I feel so alone. And there's a good reason for this. Mom's death only made me lonelier, lonelier than anybody. Worm felt a little lonely and killed his mom, perfecting his solitude. I don't know how I'm going to do it, but I want to perfect mine, too. Maybe life would be easier then."<sup>26</sup> Although Worm inevitably fails to meet her expectations, Yuzan believes that he somehow holds the key to all that she does not comprehend. If he

can tell her why he wanted to kill his mother, she reasons, it would help her understand the uncontrollable aspects of her own life: “I was just waiting, and hoping, that he’d get his head together and let me in on something important, something I had to know.”<sup>27</sup>

Kirarin (the “-rin” sound transforming Kirari’s name into a trendy-cute female nickname) is perfectly mobile and utterly reckless, whether traversing actual streets or the virtual space of online chat rooms. She is free to go wherever she wants, whenever she wants. Supplied with credit cards and money by a father who has had at least one affair and a mother who ineffectually complains when her daughter is out too long, she uses her sexuality to validate her self-worth. Even though she is disappointed by her encounters, it is a game she cannot quit. “Fooling around with guys is thrilling, like walking next to a busy highway. If you fall off the curb, it’s all over.”<sup>28</sup> She acutely feels that “this is the best time of my life” as a “serious and ‘healthy’ sexy high school girl.” Besides Toshiko, Terauchi, and Yuzan, she has another, secret set of friends—“Good Time girls [who] never talk about the future or anything even remotely serious. It’s clothes, makeup, and guys, twenty-four/seven.”<sup>29</sup> Everything for them is “now.” The Good Time girls offer a beguiling alternative to pressurized, goal-oriented concerns about schoolwork and getting into college. Kirarin embarks on her most daring escapade when the fleeing Worm says he wants to meet her. She transforms herself from one who is followed into one who follows. In a stunning display of delusional confidence that she can control any situation she faces, she declares to a friend: “The guy’s a murderer. Wouldn’t *you* like to meet him?”<sup>30</sup> It is a decision that, as it turns out, fatally lays bare all her weaknesses and self-deceptions.

The overtly violent, asocial behavior of the novel’s bad boy, Worm, thrusts him to “the fringe of the patriarchal symbolic order,” a subject of research on Japanese women’s fiction by Maryellen T. Mori.<sup>31</sup> Face to face with Kirarin, he asserts: “I don’t need any women at all. I’ve been *transformed*.”<sup>32</sup> Having been pushed by his mother toward a life in the ranks of the elite, he has been able to win admission to a top high school. However, he is a mediocre student there—continually reminded by his low place in the class rankings that he is not really good enough. At the same time, his awakened sexuality takes him off track, leaving him isolated and shamed. When Worm lived with his family in an apartment, the building’s thin walls provided no aural barrier between his room and that of the young married couple next door. He is observed foolishly trying to turn the late-night sounds he hears into tangible reality by attempting to take the neighboring wife’s underwear from the laundry left to dry on her veranda. Following the subsequent move to the house next to Toshiko and her parents, he finds a vantage point that allows



him to view Toshiko unclothed—only to be discovered in the act by his mother. His violence appears to stem, at least in part, from a textbook case of a controlling mother who “finds emotional satisfaction in excessive expectations of the children’s success”<sup>33</sup> and a father who remains silent and remote. Worm harbors growing and uncontrollable rage as he begins to lose his way on the path to sexual maturation and to lag in the competition to win a coveted place in society.

Capitalist society’s core belief that individual “effort” is the key to success is encapsulated in the lectures Worm’s mother repeatedly gave him and in the study-until-you-bleed advice of the college students who are invited to be guest instructors at Toshiko’s cram school. However, it is often not clear what the goal of such effort is, except to come out as high as possible in the rankings. In the end, the fierce competition produces all too many losers—in terms of damage done to individuals’ emotional and psychological well-being. A salient feature of *Real World* is that all the main characters believe that no one does—or can possibly—understand them. As Terauchi declares, “the only one who really understands me is *me*.”<sup>34</sup> In the final section of the novel, after Terauchi has taken her life, Toshiko gives voice to her deceased friend by quoting the full text of the suicide letter Terauchi addressed to her. Like Sensei in Sōseki’s *Kokoro*, Terauchi wrote the letter because she simply wanted “someone to understand me” before she died.<sup>35</sup> Yuzan found a temporary confidante at the Shinjuku bar where she had spent time during the same summer she was attacked in the street, but that person disappeared—she went off to Canada, her mother said—perhaps because the competition in school was too much. Having no release valve for their anxiety and rage, the characters turn in on themselves. They are in a general sense like Ōta in Mori Ōgai’s “The Dancing Girl” (the topic of one of Terauchi’s plagiarized assignments), for whom, as Christopher Hill has pointed out, “resentment emerges as a constitutive characteristic.” If, as Hill has written, Ōgai’s story “was a forceful contribution to efforts to transform the populace of the Japanese archipelago into a ‘nation’ mobilized with a commonly held purpose,”<sup>36</sup> Kirino’s novel can in turn be interpreted as a scathing, latter-day critique of the deleterious effect on young people of such unrelenting efforts by families, schools, and society in general—as well as of the empty-seeming “rhetoric of effort” itself.

### “Bad Girls” and the City

In *Real World* the postmodern global city as represented by Tokyo is, crucially, not a place of young people’s empowerment. Life in the highly networked infrastructure is

characterized by frustration and bewilderment. True refuge seems impossible to find. “The postmodern urban sensibility,” Elizabeth Wilson has observed, “is typically described in negative terms as a form of disorientation, meaninglessness and fragmentation.”<sup>37</sup> Kirino telegraphs this point at the start of the novel. It is summer in Tokyo—suffocatingly hot and oppressive. In the opening paragraph of the first chapter the daily smog-alert siren goes off, followed by a warning delivered over a loudspeaker by a disembodied woman’s voice that an air pollution advisory has been issued. As Toshiko says, “Nobody does anything because of [the advisories]. Everyone kind of goes, Oh, *that* again. What I’d like to know is where they hide those speakers. To me, that’s creepier and weirder than anything about smog.”<sup>38</sup> Just as globalization cannot be understood without reference to the urban centers that are the nodes in the processes and flows that define the concept, so Kirino evokes an almost dystopian Tokyo as the broad stage on which the young women’s “bad-girlness” emerges and is enacted in response to the challenges they face.

It is particularly through Terauchi that Kirino uncovers the dark side of the city, shattering the wishful thought that little children at least are immune from danger. In her portion of the narrative, Terauchi recalls being made to commute by train to attend the private elementary school in Shibuya that her parents thought would help give her the best opportunity to succeed in life. Her experiences included being shoved and pushed, falling, and being injured “on the metal clasp of a woman’s handbag.” Often the train was so crowded that she could not get off at the station she wanted, forcing her to go to the next one and then take another train back: “But never once did any adult try to help me.” As she gets older, she becomes “easy prey for perverts. . . . Even though I was only in grade school, it taught me a painful lesson—that adult men are dirty and my enemies.” She complains to her parents that she does not want to go to school or ride the train, “But I never told them the real reason. I worried about them finding out that they’d put me in a situation where I had to suffer like this.” She finally learns that when men target her she can drive them away with the sound of “bad” maniacal laughter—an example of the armaments the four young women develop to protect themselves against the adult world. However, it is a discovery that changes “something inside”<sup>39</sup> of her—indicating that she must forever be on her guard, that she is always vulnerable.

Teenagers may be better equipped than little children to handle themselves in the urban environment, but the novel underscores the point that many of the possibilities promised them by the city are illusory. In the voice of Toshiko, Kirino writes: “It’s not easy for a young girl to get past the crowds outside of a station without something

happening. When I mentioned this to my mother, she sighed and said, ‘It wasn’t like that in my day. So many dangers out there now.’ She’s got that right. In Tokyo today young girls are seen as either easy marks for sales or as ‘marketing leaders’ to help companies get a grasp on what new products are going to sell. They want to get our opinions for free. Which makes us another kind of easy mark, I guess.”<sup>40</sup>

Kirino names specific sections of Tokyo that stand out among its zones of risk and danger—enticing places where young women can find an alternative to or an escape from their ordinary “good” lives. The “2-chōme” neighborhood of Shinjuku, the center of Tokyo’s gay and lesbian subculture, is where Yuzan spent time at the bar and where she was attacked trying to walk home at night after the trains stopped running. “I never set foot in the 2-chōme district again,” she says. “It wasn’t so much that I was afraid of the place itself, but I was afraid of the creatures who masqueraded as people.”<sup>41</sup> As it turns out, however, Yuzan does wind up back there. For her the family home ceases to be, if it ever was, a locus of refuge. It is merely a place where her father “couldn’t tell the difference between keeping an eye on me and standing guard” and her grandparents’ “hopes and sympathies are all directed at me. Which is a royal pain, too, and kind of disgusting. Every night I said a little prayer that they might die soon.”<sup>42</sup> Following the death of Kirarin and then of Terauchi, Yuzan decides to leave mainstream society. She feels that to survive into adulthood she has no choice but to flee back to a part of the city that can potentially provide a new home for her. As Toshiko says in the last pages of the novel, “After Terauchi’s funeral, Yuzan fell off the grid. Once she called from a bar in Shinjuku 2-chōme and said she had a new girlfriend and wouldn’t be coming home anytime soon. . . . She was apparently going to lean on her new lover and heal that way. It was also clear that Yuzan had decided to come out of the closet.”<sup>43</sup>

Kirarin typifies the media-constructed “bad girl” of the city. Like scores of young women, Kirarin is attracted to Shibuya to “play around”<sup>44</sup>—going to hotels with guys, though never for money, she says.<sup>45</sup> “I remembered, when I was a freshman in high school, how middle-aged guys in Shibuya used to call out to me, trying to pick me up.”<sup>46</sup> Such memories are directly connected to the events that lead to her death. Kirino expresses through Kirarin a Japan-equivalent of what A. Susan Owen, Sarah R. Stein, and Leah R. Vende Berg have referred to as the “cultural ambivalence” that marks gender relations—“a state in which a society as a collectivity faces enduring oppositions that cannot be resolved, cannot be cognitively and emotionally eliminated except through amnesia or suppression, and continue to make demands upon individuals’ thoughts and

behavior.”<sup>47</sup> When playing with patriarchal society’s men and soon-to-be-men in the streets of Shibuya, Kirarin was buoyed by confidence in her youth and beauty. However, she seemed always to suspect—rightly so—that she was ultimately not the one in control. Having left her accustomed territory in the center of Tokyo to join Worm as a fugitive under the looming shadow of Karuizawa’s primal, volcanic Mt. Asama, she develops a new perspective on the life she was leading in the city. She sees Worm’s psychological decline as an opportunity to deploy what she believes is her “real” strength—that of a woman who can manipulate men. Although it is already too late, she takes a measure of satisfaction in thinking of herself as a “bad woman” (*iya na onna*): “Maybe I’d finally discovered my real identity.”<sup>48</sup>

### “Real World” as Metaphor

In her suicide letter Terauchi revises the philosophy she had earlier espoused: “the idea of something that can’t be undone seemed an internal emotion, etched in the hearts of the living. But when I realized I’d lost Kirarin . . . this was something *real* that truly was irreparable. . . . The world I’d thought was real collapsed, and out of it another reality appeared. A meta-reality.” At the conclusion of the letter, after saying “good-bye to everybody,” she writes: “I’m off on a journey to the real world. ’Cause within this meta-reality what’s *real* is this—my death.” For every instance of “real” in this portion of the translation, Kirino wrote “*riaru*” in the corresponding lines of the Japanese text—phonetically transcribing the English word “real.” “Real world” here is “*riaru wārudo*.”<sup>49</sup>

Kirino’s “real world” is not a single, fixed concept but one that carries with it multiple, shifting meanings that range from an adult-like, clear-eyed recognition of life’s frustrations and disappointments to a childlike wish to seize control by creating a make-believe alternative universe. As Toshiko says in a pretend-dialogue with Worm’s father, “It was like a game we were playing with Worm. And your wife’s murder was part of the game we were enjoying.”<sup>50</sup> The idea of “real world” both stands in contrast to and mirrors the characters’ private, innermost selves—the secret realm of their yearnings and fears. In addition to *riaru* and *riaru wārudo*, Kirino uses the Japanese term *genjitsu*, as when Yuzan asks Worm in a phone conversation, “D’ya feel like you wanna go back to the real world?” and he replies that he cannot do so because “this is my reality now.”<sup>51</sup> At the point that Terauchi talks about the torment she experienced commuting by train as a child, she says, “This was my reality.” Again, it is a translation of *genjitsu*.<sup>52</sup> However, when

Terauchi confesses “I was in a self-induced depression. Welcome to my Real World,” Kirino renders the phrase *riaru wārudo*.<sup>53</sup> Thus the English-language expression, “spelled out” in katakana in Terauchi’s segment of the narration and in her suicide letter, seems to communicate the desperation the character feels more forcefully than the relatively neutral-sounding term *genjitsu* can.

The world (*yo no naka*), in Toshiko’s view, is manifestly “twisted” and “rotten”—an observation she caps off with the comment “*Kore wa hontō da*,” meaning that she is speaking the truth, that she is talking about what is real—a sentence skillfully condensed in the translation to “Let’s face it.”<sup>54</sup> The teenagers see their peers’ egregious behavior as an understandable reaction to, or as simply consistent with, the harsh and confounding “real world” around them. Speaking about the fact that Terauchi cheats on her school assignments, Toshiko describes herself as being “a little too honest”<sup>55</sup> to take that same route. Ruefully acknowledging that she therefore needs more time to do her homework and does not get as good grades, she nevertheless sees her friend as clever rather than dishonest. Yuzan’s temporary confidante, a girl who called herself Dahmer, after the American serial killer, “was interested in cruel murders and dead bodies.” She was “a top student in an elite high school.”<sup>56</sup> A fellow student at Worm’s high school wrote and distributed a pornographic manga featuring a young man who raped a little girl who looked up to him as a big brother: “The guy who wrote this is a superbrain, the kind you know could get into Tokyo University Law Department.”<sup>57</sup>

With the adult world rapidly closing in, one solution for the young women is to take pseudonyms—allowing them in a way to become avatars in the “game” of real life. Without her alternate name (Hori Ninna), Toshiko says, “I couldn’t keep myself together, couldn’t survive. It isn’t much, but it’s the least I can do to arm myself.”<sup>58</sup> Fake names exist at one end of a continuum of disguises. At the other end are the more obvious disguises used by the girls who hide in plain sight on the streets of Shibuya and Harajuku—girls whose dyed hair, tanning-salon-darkened skin, and hyper-feminized clothing are obsessively documented by the media. Rejecting the alienating world with their own public acts of visual alienation, they are, as Miller and Bardsley have noted, society’s “scandalously visible” who “push girlish behavior to extremes.”<sup>59</sup> Kirino, in fact, gives a place in her novel to the scandalously visible by inserting an “off-stage” character, named Haru, who has created a new reality by transforming her body. She shows up to cram school “even tanner than before, her hair dyed almost totally blond, her nails manicured an eye-catching white. She had on heavy blue eye shadow and oversize false eyelashes, plus a gaudy red

spaghetti-strap dress with pink polka dots.”<sup>60</sup> Toshiko—who was “pretty good friends” with Haru when they were both in junior high—understandingly observes: “Like the fake names my friends and I use, Haru’s disguise is her weapon. By becoming a Kogyaru or Yamamba or whatever they’re called, I think Haru found a place where she could be totally accepted.”<sup>61</sup>

Haru represents the iconic bad girls of Japan who pay a price for their nonconformity in the “real world.” “Young women today,” Yau Ching has written, “heavily guarded and wounded by glocalized capitalist, modernist, paternalistic, chauvinistic, and nationalist values, often find themselves punished for acts and behaviors in which they seek to explore creative ways to perform their subjectivity in response to their societies.”<sup>62</sup> However, just because Toshiko does not stand out does not mean that she fits in either. She is fully aware, following Miller and Bardsley’s analysis, that “women who defy patriarchies, whether they are interpreted as liberatory models or serious malefactors, provoke intense concern, censure, and public debate.”<sup>63</sup> Toshiko may declare that she “feel[s] put off by those kinds of outrageous outfits and makeup” and “just want[s] to wear ordinary clothes and not stand out.”<sup>64</sup> Yet the fact that she deliberately and repeatedly scorns adult society by not revealing what she knows about the boy who murdered his mother is an extraordinary act of resistance that, if revealed, would cause her to stand out more than any wild makeup or frilly costume.

Toshiko and Yuzan construct a cell-phone-mediated virtual world with Worm at its center. Kirarin makes that world “real” by joining him in person, and Terauchi helps hasten its violent end. “It was strange,” thought Worm, “why all these weird girls like Yuzan and Toshi were interested in me. Was I their hero? That was enough to cheer me up.”<sup>65</sup> Killer though he was, he was a teenager who forcefully pushed back against the adult world—and that made him a kind of “hero.” Even in the eyes of Terauchi’s cynical brother, Worm is a hero “‘cause he’s an elite kid who fell.”<sup>66</sup> In the scene leading up to Kirarin’s meeting with Worm at a train station, she plays cat and mouse with him by cell phone, believing that she can draw him out and anonymously walk away if his appearance does not please her. But he plays her game too well, catching up with her before she has a chance to assess him. Even though she can scream for help or run, a new world has formed and she willingly goes along. It is the last game she will play in the series of increasingly intense games she has pursued in her life. For Kirarin, dating relationships have already escalated to the level of make-believe marriage. When her boyfriend Wataru “cheated” on her, it was as if she had been fatally deceived. With Teru, a twenty-one-year-old gay man

who befriended her in Shibuya and who seems genuinely concerned about her welfare, she jokes “about pretending to be married.”<sup>67</sup> In the end, Kirarin provides Worm’s initiation into a sexual relationship of equals. But her own fate is sealed. “We’re not dating, we’re a *couple*,”<sup>68</sup> Kirarin tells the taxi driver moments before the crash that kills both her and the driver, and injures Worm.

Of the four young women, only Toshiko is left at the end of the novel to carry on any semblance of the life she led at the start of the narrative. Kirarin and Terauchi have died, and Yuzan decides to come to terms with her own real world by finding a new home. But Toshiko needs to change, too. “A sudden thought hit me. The next time I go to karaoke, I’m through with using a fake name. No more Ninna Hori. Tears welled up in my eyes, and my name written by Terauchi on the envelope—*Miss Toshiko Yamanaka*—was blurry.”<sup>69</sup> Her return to her original name marks her conscious transition to the real world of adulthood and to what she hopes will be a sustainable path forward.

### Conclusion

It is Worm who says that “novels are closer to real life,” the line quoted at the beginning of this essay. The boy who murders his mother praises Takami Kōshun’s *Battle Royale* (*Batoru rowaiaru*, 1999) and Stephen King’s *The Running Man* (1982) and *The Long Walk* (1979)—all novels of social collapse and totalitarian control. King’s *Carrie* (1974)—about a daughter who has been tormented by her mother—is on his reading list as well. In every one of these works, adults cannot be trusted; they can only be feared. Individuals kill others in order to survive. Everyone has turned “bad.” In *Real World*, as in her fiction in general, Kirino makes clear the “hardship” women face in “making [their] way through life in Japan.” She sees in the lives of younger generations of women in particular “impatience and powerlessness.”<sup>70</sup>

Kirino joins other contemporary writers such as Ishida Ira in making Tokyo a stage on which “bad-girl” (and “bad-boy”) behavior plays out within the context of family life gone awry. In the title story of Ishida’s *Ikebukuro West Gate Park* (*Ikebukuro uesto gēto pāku*, 1998), the teenage Hikaru is a merchant in Tokyo’s marketplace of sex. She is a facilitator who “introduces” schoolgirl prostitutes to middle-aged male clients. Like the principal characters of *Real World*, she is contemptuously dismissive of adult authority—school, her parents, and the police (“*gakkō mo oya mo keisatsu mo hetchara da yo*”).<sup>71</sup> Ishida’s Hikaru is the daughter of a powerful bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance who, with the knowledge of her mother, has been sexually abusing his daughter since she was

in kindergarten. Yamai, the young man she co-opts to kill the girl she is afraid will reveal her secrets, is the son of a violently alcoholic father. Although the high school students in Kirino’s novel have not encountered the same degree of vicious cruelty in their lives, the emotional and psychological torments inflicted on them by adults nevertheless fill them with a comparable level of anxiety and rage.

A particularly fraught relationship that Kirino explores is that between young women and adult men. The men are distant figures—fathers who come home late (including Toshiko’s) and have left all the “hands-on” child-rearing to the mothers. Even when Yuzan’s father starts spending more time at home following his wife’s death, it is too late to begin a connection of trust with his daughter. Although Worm’s father eventually circulates through the entire neighborhood apologizing for the actions of his son, he is initially described by Toshiko as a man who “ignored me as if I didn’t even exist. Once I went out to get the evening paper when he was just coming home. I nodded to him but he gazed off into the distance like I was invisible.”<sup>72</sup> In Kirarin’s and Terauchi’s experience, older men are figures who view the bodies of girls and young women as objects of sexual interest and desire. As Kirarin says: “They could try to pick us up, girls the same age as their own daughters, because they thought we were fools. Their daughters were in this nice world, they thought, but girls like me were in a fallen world. They made a clear distinction between the two.”<sup>73</sup>

At the end of the novel, following the funeral for Terauchi, the detectives working on the case speak with Toshiko. It is clear that they have figured out the chain of events that led to Kirarin’s death, Worm’s capture, and Terauchi’s suicide. Toshiko denies knowing anything. “I was taken aback. It sounded so stupid when someone else put it into words. Which is exactly why I had to lie. Not to protect myself so much as to protect the truth about how all of us felt when we first heard about Worm. Or to protect what Worm felt in the instant he murdered his mother. Because it was something nobody else could know.” She is shocked and tearful, yet she has the presence of mind to say to the police: “Don’t you think that’s taking it a little too far?” The female detective agrees: “I don’t think even you all would do something that stupid.” Toshiko hears the sarcasm in her voice, “but it didn’t bother me. I’d seen her close her notepad, so I knew she’d given up on pursuing it further.”<sup>74</sup>

The police, to use Rebecca Copeland’s description of them in her study of Kirino’s *The Night Overlooked by Angels* (*Tenshi ni misuterareta yoru*, 1994), are “pillars of patriarchal law and enforcers of institutional ignorance.” When the policewoman who is at



the center of that novel allows the murderer “to evade ‘justice,’” it is a “transgressive” act.<sup>75</sup> However, the situation in *Real World* is different. The police are secondary characters who essentially meet their match in Toshiko, the good young woman who unhesitatingly becomes so bad when she pushes back at them. As in Kirino’s *OUT (OUT [Auto], 1997)*—also a novel that focuses on four women—the detectives could conceivably have gone further in their investigation, but they have gone far enough to allow Kirino to keep the reader’s focus on the fact that concepts of crime and punishment have little meaning when society is so utterly fragmented. In *Real World* the promises of individual empowerment have dissolved into anger, frustration, and bewilderment. Schools are merely part of a larger system primarily intent on separating arbitrarily defined winners from losers, and many families are damaged beyond repair. Being “bad” seems to be not only a reasonable and inevitable response to the “real” world, but also a desperate and sometimes futile attempt to survive there.

#### Notes

1. Natsuo Kirino, *Real World*, trans. Philip Gabriel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 64.
2. Other translated novels include *OUT*, trans. Stephen Snyder (New York: Vintage International [a division of Random House], 2005), and *Grotesque*, trans. Rebecca Copeland (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007). The English-language edition of *OUT* was originally released by Kodansha International in 2003. Kirino’s short fiction is also starting to be published in translation. For example, there is “Tokyo Island,” trans. Philip Gabriel, *Granta: The Magazine of New Writing* 110 (Spring 2010): 31–50. English-language scholarship on Kirino’s work includes Amanda C. Seaman, “Inside *OUT*: Space, Gender, and Power in Kirino Natsuo,” *Japanese Language and Literature* 40, no. 2 (October 2006): 197–217; Rebecca Copeland, “Woman Uncovered: Pornography and Power in the Detective Fiction of Kirino Natsuo,” *Japan Forum* 16, no. 2 (2004): 249–69; and material in Amanda C. Seaman, *Bodies of Evidence: Women, Society, and Detective Fiction in 1990s Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004).
3. Kirino Natsuo, *Riaru wārudo* (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2003). The paperback (*bunko*) edition, also published by Shūeisha, came out in 2006.
4. Kirino, *Real World*, 21.
5. Laura Miller and Jan Bardsley, “Introduction,” in Miller and Bardsley, eds., *Bad Girls of Japan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2.
6. Kirino, *Real World*, 22.
7. Miller and Bardsley, “Introduction,” 4.
8. Kirino, *Real World*, 20.
9. Kirino, *Real World*, 27–28.
10. Kirino, *Real World*, 3.

11 Kirino, *Real World*, 21–22.

12 Kirino, *Real World*, 30.

13 Kirino, *Real World*, 15.

14 Kirino, *Real World*, 183.

15 Kirino, *Real World*, 135.

16 Kirino, *Real World*, 156.

17 Kirino, *Real World*, 154.

18 Kirino, *Real World*, 7.

19 Kirino, *Real World*, 135–36.

20 Kirino, *Real World*, 143.

21 The macron over the “u” in Yūzan’s name is omitted in the published English translation.

For the sake of consistency, I have omitted the macron here as well.

22 Kirino, *Real World*, 57.

23 Kirino, *Real World*, 54.

24 Kirino, *Real World*, 42.

25 Kirino, *Real World*, 47–48.

26 Kirino, *Real World*, 39–40.

27 Kirino, *Real World*, 61.

28 Kirino, *Real World*, 92.

29 Kirino, *Real World*, 93.

30 Kirino, *Real World*, 99.

31 Maryellen T. Mori, “The Liminal Male as Liberatory Figure in Japanese Women’s Fiction,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 60, no. 2 (December 2000): 542.

32 Kirino, *Real World*, 113.

33 Yoshio Sugimoto, *An Introduction to Japanese Society, Third Edition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 179.

34 Kirino, *Real World*, 137.

35 Kirino, *Real World*, 182.

36 Christopher Hill, “Mori Ōgai’s Resentful Narrator: Trauma and the National Subject in ‘The Dancing Girl,’” *positions: east asia cultures critique* 10, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 366.

37 Elizabeth Wilson, *The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women* (London: Virago Press, 1991), 135.

38 Kirino, *Real World*, 3.

39 Kirino, *Real World*, 148–51.

40 Kirino, *Real World*, 11–12.

41 Kirino, *Real World*, 49.

42 Kirino, *Real World*, 50.

43 Kirino, *Real World*, 200.

44 Kirino, *Real World*, 100.

45 Kirino, *Real World*, 92.

46 Kirino, *Real World*, 178.

47. A. Susan Owen, Sarah R. Stein, and Leah R. Vande Berg, *Bad Girls: Cultural Politics and Media Representations of Transgressive Women* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 7.
48. Kirino, *Real World*, 166.
49. Kirino, *Real World*, 185–86, and Kirino, *Riaru wārudo*, 233–34.
50. Kirino, *Real World*, 194.
51. Kirino, *Real World*, 52, and Kirino, *Riaru wārudo*, 69.
52. Kirino, *Real World*, 149, and Kirino, *Riaru wārudo*, 189.
53. Kirino, *Real World*, 148, and Kirino, *Riaru wārudo*, 187.
54. Kirino, *Real World*, 12, and Kirino, *Riaru wārudo*, 18–19.
55. Kirino, *Real World*, 7.
56. Kirino, *Real World*, 42 and 43.
57. Kirino, *Real World*, 113.
58. Kirino, *Real World*, 16.
59. Miller and Bardsley, “Introduction,” 8 and 9.
60. Kirino, *Real World*, 16.
61. Kirino, *Real World*, 17.
62. Yau Ching, “Performing Contradictions, Performing Bad-Girlness in Japan,” in Kathy E. Ferguson and Monique Mironesco, eds., *Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pacific: Method, Practice, Theory* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 156.
63. Miller and Bardsley, “Introduction,” 1.
64. Kirino, *Real World*, 17.
65. Kirino, *Real World*, 76.
66. Kirino, *Real World*, 141.
67. Kirino, *Real World*, 94. As noted by Rebecca Copeland in her study of Kirino’s as yet untranslated 1994 novel, *The Night Overlooked by Angels* (*Tenshi ni misuterareta yoru*), Kirino has shown interest in the social implications of “the ‘gay boom’ of the 1990s [which] idealized the companionship between straight women and gay men and led to an increase in ‘counterfeit marriages’ between such couples.” Copeland, “Woman Uncovered,” 263.
68. Kirino, *Real World*, 175.
69. Kirino, *Real World*, 208.
70. “Interviews: Natsuo Kirino,” [http://www.japanreview.net/interview\\_Natsuo\\_Kirino.htm](http://www.japanreview.net/interview_Natsuo_Kirino.htm) (accessed November 15, 2011).
71. Ishida Ira, *Ikebukuro uesto gēto pāku* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1998), 62.
72. Kirino, *Real World*, 5.
73. Kirino, *Real World*, 178.
74. Kirino, *Real World*, 205.
75. Copeland, “Woman Uncovered,” 266.

## Subscription Information

### U.S.-Japan Women's Journal

ISSN 1059-9770		International	
Volume	Domestic	Institutions	Individuals
No. 1	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 2	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 3	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 4	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 5	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 6	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 7	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 8	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 9	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 10	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 11	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 12	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 13	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 14	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 15	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 16	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 17	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 18	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 19	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
Nos. 20-21 (Special issue)	¥5,000	\$70.00	\$30.00
No. 22	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 23	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 24	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 25	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 26	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 27	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 28	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 29	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50

ISSN 1059-9770		International	
Volume	Domestic	Institutions	Individuals
Nos. 30-31 (Special issue)	¥5,000	\$70.00	\$30.00
No. 32	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 33	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 34	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 35	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 36	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 37	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 38	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 39	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 40	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50
No. 41	¥2,500	\$35.00	\$17.50

#### ■Subscriptions inside Japan

##### \*購読申込および問い合わせ先:

城西大学国際学術文化振興センター

〒350-0295 埼玉県坂戸市けやき台1-1

TEL: 049-271-7731 FAX: 049-271-7981

E-mail: kokusai@stf.josai.ac.jp

\*購読料振込先: 郵便振替00160-7-62423/埼玉りそな銀行坂戸支店 学校法人城西大学普通預金口座56700

\*15% discount for international orders of 6 issues or more of the U.S.-Japan Women's Journal.

#### ■Subscriptions outside Japan

Send check to Jōsai International Center for the Promotion of Art and Science, Jōsai University

1-1 Keyaki-dai, Sakado-shi, Saitama 350-0295 JAPAN

FAX: +81-49-271-7981 E-mail: rev-jou@josai.ac.jp

## Subscription Information

### 日米女性ジャーナル

ISSN 0898-8900		International	
Volume	Domestic	Institutions	Individuals
No. 1	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 2	out of print		
No. 3	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 4	out of print		
No. 5			
No. 6			
No. 7			
No. 8			
No. 9	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 10	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 11	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 12	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 13	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 14	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 15	¥2,000	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 16	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 17	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 18	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 19	¥2,300	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 20	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 21	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 22	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 23	out of print		
No. 24	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 25	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 26	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00
No. 27	¥2,500	\$25.00	\$20.00

#### ■Subscriptions inside Japan

\* 購読申込および問い合わせ先：  
 城西大学国際学術文化振興センター  
 〒350-0295  
 埼玉県坂戸市けやき台 1-1  
 TEL: 049-271-7731  
 FAX: 049-271-7981  
 E-mail: kokusai@stf.josai.ac.jp

#### \* 購読料振込先：

郵便振替 00160-762423  
 埼玉りそな銀行坂戸支店  
 学校法人城西大学普通預金  
 口座56700

#### ■Subscriptions outside Japan

Send check to Jōsai International Center  
 for the Promotion of Art and Science,  
 Jōsai University  
 1-1 Keyaki-dai, Sakado-shi, Saitama  
 350-0295 JAPAN  
 FAX: +81-49-271-7981  
 E-mail: rev-jou@josai.ac.jp

**\*15% discount for international  
 orders of 6 issues or more of the  
 Nichibei Josei Journal**

**\* Nichibei Josei Journal  
 was terminated at vol. no. 27.**

# USJWJ Style Sheet for Manuscript Submissions

The *U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal* follows *The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th Edition* (hereafter *CMS*), with some exceptions and special considerations because so many essays discuss work in translation. When in doubt, consult *CMS* and use the most recent issue of *USJWJ* as your guide.

## DATES

*USJWJ* uses the traditional format: November 12, 1991.

## PUNCTUATION

*USJWJ* always uses the serial comma. For example, “The paper was presented to a group of scholars, laypeople, and graduate students” (not “scholars, laypeople and graduate students”).

## NONSEXIST, NONRACIST LANGUAGE

When discussing a person whose gender is unknown, use “he or she,” not just “he.” Do not use *Oriental* to refer to Asians; use “Native American,” not *Indian*; and use “African American” (“Black American” is also permissible), not *black*. Do not hyphenate “Japanese American” unless it is used as an adjective. But do not alter direct quotes to conform to nonsexist or nonracist usage.

## ENDNOTE GUIDELINES

We generally use author-title style (author’s last name plus short title) for works that have been cited in full in previous notes (or that appear in the Works Cited), though the author-date style is appropriate when references are given in author-date style in parentheses in the article itself. Below are examples of the author-title style for several types of documents.

### Book:

1. Citation in Works Cited:

Roche, John P. *The Quest for the Dream: The Development of Civil Rights and Human Relations in Modern America*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.

2. First citation in endnotes if there is no separate Works Cited:

John P. Roche, *The Quest for the Dream: The Development of Civil Rights and Human Relations in Modern America* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), 204–6.

3. Short title form in subsequent endnotes (or in all endnotes if there is a Works Cited section):

Roche, *Quest for the Dream*, 204–6.

Note that page numbers are listed without “p.” preceding them and are in abbreviated form (see *CMS 15th ed.*, 9.64).

### **Part of a Book:**

Dorothy Van Ghent, "The Dickens World: A View from Todger's," in George H. Ford and Lauriat Lane, Jr., eds., *The Dickens Critics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), 213–32.

Short title: Van Ghent, "The Dickens World," 213–32.

### **Multivolume Book:**

Wendell C. Bennett, ed., *A Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 4: 33–87.

Short title: Bennett, *Reappraisal of Peruvian Archaeology* 4: 33–87.

Note that volume number is separated from the page reference by a colon, and that there is a space after the colon.

### **Journal Article:**

Marshall Brown, "Mozart and After: The Revolution in Musical Consciousness," *Critical Inquiry* 7 (Summer 1981): 694.

Short title: Brown, "Mozart and After," 694.

The volume is given first (7 in the example above), followed by the date, a colon followed by a space, and the page number(s). If an issue number is available, it follows the volume number and is separated from it by a comma:

*Critical Inquiry* 7, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 694.

or, if the year is given elsewhere and no season or month is given:

*Critical Inquiry* 7 (3): 694.

Where issue numbers are available for journals, please provide them in your Works Cited and endnotes.

### **Newspaper:**

*New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1991.

Months can be abbreviated. Page numbers are rarely provided for newspapers, but please include section numbers (e.g., sec. 3) whenever possible.

### **Frequently Cited Works:**

When a work is cited frequently in an article, or when the title of the work cannot be conveniently shortened, use the following format in the first citation in endnotes:

Genevieve Wilson, *Letters, Autobiographical Notes, and Informal Essays* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 45 (hereafter cited as *Letters*).

A subsequent reference would read:

Wilson, *Letters*, 22.

## FOREIGN-LANGUAGE TITLES

Japanese-language titles should appear as follows in the Works Cited:

Imai Chie. “Josei shokuin kara mita senjū rōdō to seikyō undō” (Full-time employment and cooperative activities from the view of female cooperative staff). In Satō Yoshiyuki, Amano Masako, and Nasu Hisashi, eds., *Joseitachi no seikatsusha undō* (Women’s cooperative movement), Tokyo: Marujusha, 1995.

Kohiyama Rui. *Amerika fujin senkyōshi: rainichi no haikai to sono eikyō* (American women missionaries). Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1992.

Japanese-language titles appear this way in endnotes:

Imai Chie, “Josei shokuin kara mita senjū rōdō to seikyō undō” (Full-time employment and cooperative activities from the view of female cooperative staff), in Satō Yoshiyuki, Amano Masako, and Nasu Hisashi, eds., *Joseitachi no seikatsusha undō* (Women’s cooperative movement), (Tokyo: Marujusha, 1995).

Kohiyama Rui, *Amerika fujin senkyōshi: rainichi no haikai to sono eikyō* (American women missionaries), (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1992).

Saegusa Mitsuko, “Jendā toshintai no gensetsu,” in *Jendā no Nihon bungaku* (Tokyo: Kanrin shobō, 1998), 42.

## CAPITALIZATION

The first letter of the first word of a romanized Japanese title is always capitalized (“initial capped”), as are all proper nouns and names. Similarly, only the first word in a Japanese publisher’s name (e.g., “Kanrin shobō” above) is initial capped.

For weekly periodicals such as *Shūkan Yomiuri* and for newspapers such as *Asahi Shinbun*, capitalize the first letter of both words, but for monthly magazine titles such as *Fujin koron*, only the first word is capitalized.

In endnotes and in the text of an article, the Japanese-language title is followed by a translation in parentheses with only the first word and any proper nouns capitalized (i.e., use sentence-style capitalization, not headline-style):

*Amerika fujin senkyōshi* (American women missionaries)

Japanese translations of English titles are also capped sentence-style in parentheses:

*American Women Missionaries* (Amerika fujin senkyōshi)

## JAPANESE WORDS, TRANSLATIONS

Italicize Japanese terms. If a translation is given, it can be treated in one of two ways:

*yōchien* (preschool)      translation given in parentheses

*yōchien*, or “preschool,”      translation given in quotes

When the English term is given first, this is treated as follows:

the preschool (*yōchien*)



Japanese proper nouns are set in roman type when they are capitalized but in italics when they are lowercased and used as a translation. Note that every word in a group's name is capitalized. For example:

the "Ten-Yen Milk Campaign" (*kyūen gyūnyū undō*)

the Federation of Japan Cooperative Society (Nihon Seikyō Renmei)

Workers Collectives (Wākāzu Korekutibu)

the Network or Proxy Movement (Dairinin Undō)

the Japan Work Cooperative Union (Nihon Wāku Koopereitebu Yunion)

Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sōrengō (All-Japan Federation of Self-Governing Student Associations, abbreviated in Japanese as Zengakuren)

For titles of articles, books, newspapers, and journals, the Japanese title is followed by an English translation in parentheses, with only the first word and any proper names capitalized (sentence-style capitalization):

*Amerika fujin senkyōshi* (American women missionaries)

When the English translation stands alone, it is treated like any other title in English:

For example, "A Song on the Wife of a Gold Mountain Man" is a well-known form of . . .

Kohiyama's *American Women Missionaries* is a fascinating study.

## JAPANESE NAMES

When the work was written in Japanese, Japanese authors' names appear in the Japanese name order (surname first followed by given name, with no comma in between) both in endnotes and in Works Cited:

Kohiyama Rui. *Amerika fujin senkyōshi: rainichi no haikai to sono eikyo* (American women missionaries). Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1992.

But when the work was written in English, use a comma between the surname and given name in the Works Cited to reflect the English name order:

Aoki, Yayoi. "Interview." In Sandra Buckley, ed., *Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, 3–17.

## DIACRITICAL MARKS

Japanese and Korean diacritical marks can be indicated with carats if necessary; these will be converted to the proper macrons (long marks) and breves (short marks, for Korean romanization) during editing.

## NUMBERS

The following are generally spelled out in ordinary text:

1. Whole numbers from one through twenty

2. Whole numbers followed by “hundred,” “thousand,” “million,” etc., except for measurements (e.g., “thirty thousand soldiers” but “300 miles”)

For all measurements and other numbers, figures (numerals) are used.

Percentages are expressed as follows:

60 percent

If a series of numbers is given, and some must be numerals while others would otherwise be spelled out, give all as numerals:

The ages of the six members of the city council are 64, 54, 46, 44, 20, and 15.

## **HEADINGS**

First-level headings (i.e., major headings) are flush left; second-level subheadings are paragraph-indented.

## **SPACING**

Only one space is used after periods, colons, etc. (not two).

Ellipses have a single space on either side of them, and are preceded by a period if the material that precedes them consists of a grammatically complete sentence (whether or not the sentence ends at that point in the original text):

She was thorough and painstaking. . . . Her brother was neither.

She was thorough and painstaking . . . but, ironically, had no thought of tomorrow.

## **ORDER OF ITEMS SUBMITTED**

Please send all the elements of your article (in a single file, if possible) in the following order:

1. Author’s biographical sketch on a separate first page.
2. Body of the article.
3. Acknowledgments (if any).
4. Works Cited (if chosen instead of full reference at first citation in endnotes).
5. Endnotes (in author-title form).
6. Any tables
7. Captions for any figures or illustrations.

The title of your article in Japanese kanji is also required.

## **TABLES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND IMAGES**

Please submit any and all tables and images each as a separate file. For images, please sent in TIFF or JPEG format with at least 300 dpi resolution. Thank you.

## MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION TO THE *U.S.–JAPAN WOMEN’S JOURNAL*

### GUIDELINES:

The purpose of the *U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal* is to exchange scholarship on women and gender between the U.S., Japan, and other countries; to disseminate information on Japanese women to the U.S. and other countries; and to stimulate comparative study of women’s issues. The editors of USJWJ welcome contributions consistent with its purpose.

1. The manuscript should be written in a style accessible to general readers. The readers of USJWJ comprise general readers as well as scholars in various fields. Papers using advanced statistical methods are not preferred.
2. Frequent use of headings is preferred to structure the paper and make it easy to follow (see past issues of the Journal). For general guidelines on appropriate style and format, see Kate L. Turabian’s *A Manual for Writers* or *The Chicago Manual of Style*.
3. Materials under consideration elsewhere will not be accepted.
4. Submit your manuscript as a digital file, preferably in Word, to Dr. Jan Bardsley at [bardsley@email.unc.edu](mailto:bardsley@email.unc.edu) (Department of Asian Studies, 121 New West, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3267).
  - a. The manuscript should be double-spaced and no more than 35 pages long (including references and notes). Notes should be kept to a minimum and should appear as endnotes at the end of (and separate from) the text; the notes section can be preceded by a list of references if needed.
  - b. If you do not have a font that uses macrons (long marks) over letters in romanized Japanese words, please use carats (^) instead.
  - c. Please consult the USJWJ Style Sheet and follow it as closely as possible in your original submission. For a pdf copy of the Style Sheet, please go to <http://www.josai.jp/jicpas/usjwj/> or email your request to Dr. Bardsley ([bardsley@email.unc.edu](mailto:bardsley@email.unc.edu)).

### EDITORIAL PROCEDURES:

Submitted manuscripts are reviewed by the editors of USJWJ or anonymously by outside reviewers. The review process takes about 3 months.

U.S.–Japan Women’s Journal  
日米女性ジャーナル

NUMBER 41 2011

- 
- “The Private League of Nations”:  
The Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference and  
Japanese Feminists in 1928  
— 『私設国際連盟』：—1928年汎太平洋婦人会議  
と日本人フェミニストについての考察— Taeko Shibahara 3
- Home Education in Rural Japan: Continuity and Change  
from Late Edo to the Early Postwar  
— 農村の女性の家族教育：江戸後期から  
戦後初期にわたる変化と連続性 Christina Ghanbarpour 25
- From Compensating Comfort Women to Compensated Dating  
— 従軍慰安婦の支援から援助交際へ Sharon Kinsella 52
- A Room of Their Own: Time, Space, and the Self-Perceptions  
of Married Couples in Japan  
— 日本の30代の夫婦の共有する時間、空間、  
そしてカップルとしての意識 Dalit Bloch 72
- Young Women / “Bad Girls” in Kirino Natsuo’s *Real World*  
— 桐野夏生の「リアルワールド」における  
若い女性／“不良少女” Barbara E. Thornbury 102
- 

発行所：城西大学国際学術文化振興センター © December 2011  
JŌSAI INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROMOTION OF  
ART AND SCIENCE, JŌSAI UNIVERSITY  
1-1 Keyakidai, Sakado-shi, Saitama-ken, JAPAN 350-0295  
Tel 049-271-7731 Fax 049-271-7981  
Printed in Japan